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WITZIESHOEK: WOMEN, CATTLE AND REBELLION 
ABSTRACT 
This study focusses on the 1950 Witzieshoek rebellion 
from a gender perspective. It examines the context within 
which the rebellion occurred, spanning a period from 1930 
to 1950 and looks at the impact of the rebellion on the 
state. 
The years leading up to the Wi tzieshoek rebellion were 
characterized by crisis as the government struggled to 
maintain authority over the African masses in general and 
African women in particular. Witzieshoek residents had to 
contend with growing deterioration of resources, 
migration and the implementation of a betterment 
programme. These had a differential impact on men and 
women in the reserve, leading to a loss of power in male 
authority structures and increasing autonomy for women. 
This fed into and moulded the development of a culture of 
resistance in the community which exploded in 1950 when 
the majority of the inhabitants revolted against the 
Native Affairs Department and the Trust. 
The Witzieshoek rebellion was a desperate bid to return 
to older and more familiar ways of organization which had 
been based on the productive and reproductive capacity of 
women. The men and women who rebelled were denouncing the 
organization of the community on Trust and Departmental 
terms. The response of the state to the rebellion was to 
appoint a Commission of Enquiry. The Commission, 
operating at a time when 'native' policy was being 
fiercely debated, was unable to offer the kind of 
solutions that Nationalist Party policy would eventually 
demand. Both the rebellion and the Commission ot Enquiry 
failed to bring about any meaningful change to the 
conditions in Witzieshoek. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements 
Abbreviations 
i 
ii 
iii 
Maps and illustrations 
Figure l 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
Figure -4 
Figure 5 
Chapter l 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
Bibliography 
Geographical location of iv 
Witzieshoek, South Africa, 1954 
Map indicating the geographical v 
breakdown of Witzieshoek into 
villagers and their respective 
headmen, 1950 
Location of grazing camps at vi 
Witzieshoek, 1950 
Notice delivered by Witzieshoek vii 
rebels to the Trust, 1950 
The march of the 1 Lingangele 1 , viii 
1950 
Witzieshoek: women, cattle and l 
rebellion 
Gender and the state in South 17 
Africa, 1930-1950 
Organized public life in 60 
Witzieshoek: decline in male 
authority relations, 1939-1950 
Opposition to betterment: 94 
Witzieshoek, 1936-1950 
The Witzieshoek rebellion 137 
The Witzieshoek Commission of 173 
Enquiry: conflicting reflections 
of a •native' policy that ignored 
the women who 'caused all the 
trouble' 
Postscript 216 
233 
i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the following institutions for 
their financial support: 
Centre for Science Development 
University of Cape Town Research Scholarships 
I would also like to express my appreciation to the 
following people for their patience, assistance and time: 
Anne Mager, whose supervision saved my life. 
Bill Nasson, whose valuable assistance came at just the 
right moment. 
Sheila Neumann, without whose Computer expertise I would 
have gone mad. 
Pat van der Spuy, who gave me so much of her time. 
Sha~n Lockyer, who helped me with the layout. 
I would like to dedicate this thesis 
to my father, Roger van Rossem 
Beerstecher, whose courage and 
strength was an inspiration to me. 
ii 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AG 
ANC 
AssNC 
AO 
cc 
CNC 
DNA 
DRC 
HAD 
Mag 
MNA 
NC 
NRB 
NTS 
POA 
SAB 
SEA 
SNA 
us 
VAB 
WVA 
Attorney General 
Additional Native Commissioner 
Ass Commissioner 
Agricultural Off 
Chief Charles Mopeli 
ief Native Commissioner 
Department of Native Affairs 
Dutch 
House of Assembly 
Magistrate 
Minister of Native Affairs 
Native Commissioner 
Native Reserve Board 
Affa 
Pr l Agr 
(Naturelle Sake) 
ltural Officer 
South African Arch 
Secretary of External 
Secretary of Native Affairs 
Under Secretary 
Free Arch 
Witzieshoek Vigi 
Association 
Depot 
iii 
Si::TSJOEA NA LAND 
...... 
KAAP PRCVINSIE 
fig. 1 
-· 
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IN SOUTH AFRICA ,1954 
-•:--" 
•· 
,._ 
•• 
•• 
•• 
••• ••• 
• 
•• 
• 
• 
/ 
•• 
• 
•• 
•• 
• 
•• 
•• ••• 
•• 
• 
• 
•• 
·• .. 
·• • 
• l 
•" ,,• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
• 
••• 
•• 
. •
,• 
fig· 2 MAP INDICATING THE GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN OF WITZ!E~HOEK 
INTO VILLAGES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE HEADMEN. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WITZIESHOEK: WOMEN, CATTLE AND REBELLION 
INTRODUCTION 
The Witzieshoek conununity1 was illuminated for a brief 
period in 1950. Newspapers reported and Parliament 
debated a fierce clash that occurred between some members 
of the community and the police in November of that year. 
The community of Witzieshoek, however, had been engaged 
in a struggle with the Department of Native Affairs and 
the South African Native Trust for over a decade before 
this clash took place. 
In 1936 parliament had passed the Natives Trust and Land 
Act which created a Native Trust body responsible for 
acquiring additional land for the reserves and 
supervising their development. The programme of 
development devised by the state and implemented by the 
Trust was labelled 'betterment' and was introduced to the 
reserves in 1939. Hence 1939 heralded a turning point in 
the organization and functioning of Witzieshoek as the 
Trust and its officials began to administer their 
programme of betterment. 
The Trust imposed its own system of organization onto the 
Witzieshoek community, which severely disrupted the way 
in which the latter had operated prior to 1939. The 
relationship between the officials of the Trust and the 
1 In order to avoid referring to a particular 'tribe' or 'group', I 
have chosen to use the concept 'community'. I have 
differentiated between the variety of people that make up the 
Witzieshoek community on pp. 11-14. In referring to Witzieshoek 
as a community, I am therefore not referring to a homogenous 
group of persons, but to a differentiated group of people that 
inhabit a particular geographical area. 
1 
Witzieshoek inhabitants was thus characterized by 
tension, which manifested itself in the form of 
resistance on the part of the members of Witzieshoek. 
Resistance to the Trust over this period was not marked 
by a clear distinction between 'us and them•. Internal 
dynamics within the community and the national political 
economy had complicated the nature of resistance. The 
chief, Charles Mopeli, for example, occupied an ambiguous 
position in the community. On the one hand, he served as 
an organ of the Trust and the Native Affairs Department 
whilst on the other, he continued to represent the 
community I s grievances against the Trust. The egui voca 1 
nature of his position was further destabilized by the 
interference of the Witzieshoek Vigilance Association2 in 
the affairs of Witz ieshoek. As the conf 1 ict between the 
Trust and the Mopeli community of Witzieshoek deepened, 
Chief Charles' ability to sustain his position as 
representative of both the Trust and the people was 
hampered. By the time resistance had developed over the 
decade into a full blown rebellion, the chief no longer 
represented the rebels. 
The Witzieshoek rebellion which took place between 1949 
and 1950 was distinguished by mass action, intimidation 
and sabotage. Male and female rebels took part in 
demonstrations, operated in a spirit of non-cooperation, 
destroyed fences and other symbols of betterment and 
intimidated officials of the Trust. Although the rebels' 
main aim was to eliminate the Trust, their major demand 
was that a Commission of Enquiry be set up to investigate 
the community's grievances against the Trust. This echoed 
a demand first made by the community in 1946. The state 
acceded to this order and set up a Commission of Enquiry 
which began its proceedings on 1 November. The Commission 
2 Witzieshoek inhabitants working in the towns as migrant workers. 
2 
was not acceptable to the rebels, however, and their 
insurgency continued. 
The climax of the rebellion was the clash between the 
rebels and the police late in November 1950 which 
resulted in sixteen African and two police fatalities and 
over one hundred African casualties. The state responded 
by bringing to trial those who had taken part in the 
clash and who could be identified. The majority of those 
accused were convicted and sentenced to a variety of jail 
terms varying from two months to five years. The state 
had managed to crush the rebellion. 
This study focuses on the Witzieshoek rebellion. In an 
attempt to interpret the actions of the men and women who 
rebelled, it charts the social history of the community 
from the imposition of betterment to the rebellion 
itself. The community of Witzieshoek is examined through 
a gender prism from the 1930s through to the 1950s. The 
differential impact of change on the men and women in the 
community is examined with a focus which shifts from a 
global view of the South African political economy to a 
detailed local analysis of the Witzieshoek community 
itself. 
Chapter outline 
This interpretation will begin with a chapter on the 
state and its interaction with the African community from 
1930 to 1950, placing emphasis on gender. This chapter 
identifies the framework within which the Witzieshoek 
community organized itself and interacted with the 
outside world. 
The period was marked by fiery debates within the state 
over the question of controlling the African populace as 
a whole. Debates were sparked by the unprecedented 
3 
movement of Africans, particularly women, from the rural 
areas to the urban areas, the escalating deterioration of 
the reserves, the bold political initiatives of 
organizations fighting for the rights of Africans, the 
heightened level of unrest within the rural and urban 
African populations and the increasing autonomy of 
African women. The 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s saw south 
Africa in a state of constant flux and the Wi tzieshoek 
rebellion was a reaction to that. 
The next chapter looks specifically at the changes within 
the political organization of the community. It places 
Witzieshoek within a national political and economic 
context and examines its transformation. 
The cornmuni ty was governed by a patriarchal system of 
organization. Over the period from the implementation of 
betterment up to 1950, the nature of that organization 
mutated. Male authority structures and relations 
inherited from the past were superseded by new systems of 
male authority introduced by the Trust. Both the old and 
the new were challenged by the conditions created by the 
national political economy. The result was that the 
nature of male authority in 1950 was very different from 
that of 1939. 
The implementation of betterment and the Witzieshoek 
community's responses to it constitute the focus of the 
ensuing chapter. Betterment represented a technical 
solution to the underdevelopment of the reserves for the 
Native Affairs Department, Trust and state. To the 
Witzieshoek community it represented an invasion, one 
which severely dislocated their social, economic and 
political relations. All contact between the cornmuni ty 
and the Department, Trust and state became determined by 
the conflict between imposed technical solutions and 
resistant domestic relations. 
4 
The Witzieshoek rebellion itself can be defined as a 
process 
actively 
spanning 
resisted 
1949 and 1950, when the community 
the implementation of betterment and 
Departmental rule. The fourth chapter plots the events of 
this rebellious period and attempts to explain it. 
The show-down between the Witzieshoek. community and the 
Trust was inevitable, given the conflict generated by 
changes in male authority relations, the implementation 
of betterment and the cornmuni ty I s interaction with the 
broader South African political economy. The rebellion 
was essentially an outcry against these changes and a 
demand to return to systems of political, social and 
economic organization of the past, a form of organization 
which had been based on male authority and the control of 
women's reproductive and productive capacities. 
The Department appointed a Commission of Enquiry into the 
Witz ieshoek rebel 1 ion in 19 SO. Assessment of the 
Commission's report will form the core of the discussion 
in tne penultimate chapter. 
The Witzieshoek Commission rs report, as a public 
document, was an important part of the debate over the 
control of Africans in the 1950s. It was characterized by 
a masculine bias which affected the representation of 
women and their place in Witzieshoek society. In its 
composition it reflected, ironically, a spectrum of views 
on •native' policy. The contradictions and 
inconsistencies within its own recommendations and 
assertions highlight the incongruities in the broader 
party political debate. Its ability to influence policy 
decisions was curtailed by some of its more contentious 
recommendations. 
The final chapter brings the story of the Witzieshoek 
cornmuni ty to an end. It emphasizes that the Wi tzieshoek 
rebellion was a blend of atavism and nationalism, and 
5 
shows how a disruption of the organization and control of 
women was a threat that the community as a whole could 
not ignore. Women, cattle and rebellion were inextricably 
linked in Witzieshoek in this period. 
A Brief History of Witzieshoek 
Witz ieshoek was located in the north east corner of the 
orange Free State. It bordered Lesotho in the south and 
Natal in the east. 3 The reserve was surrounded by high 
mountain ranges and foothills and comprised hill areas 
and plateaus interspersed with ravines. 
The Witzieshoek community had been established in 1866. 
The Bakwena had settled at Witzieshoek after their defeat 
by the Boers at Mabolela. The Bakwena were a part of the 
Basotho nation and had regularly assisted the Basotho 
under Moshoeshoe at Thaba Bosiu in their on-going war 
against the Boers. once defeated, chief Mopeli had 
requested President Brand for a piece of land on which to 
settle his coT11JT1unity. Witzieshoek was granted to him and 
he established his first village at Qua Qua. 4 
The Batlokwa community (a much smaller group of Basothos} 
joined the Bakwena in Witzieshoek in 1873. In the period 
under inspection, the Witzieshoek reserve was still 
shared by the Bakwena and the Batlokwa communities. 
Although the introduction of Tr~st rule in 1939 affected 
both communities, it was the Bakwena who rebelled in 1949 
and 1950. The Batlokwa had raised their objections to the 
Trust alongside the Bakwena in meetings between the 
Additional Native Commissioner, the chiefs and the 
3 Refer to figure 1. 
4 A. S Mopeli-Paulus and H Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle. The 
story of a Man and a Small South African Tribe', unpublished, 
pp. 3-4. 
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people. Their regent had also refused to submit her 
cattle for culling in the first cull organized by the 
Trust in 1942. However, 
of complaint to the 
these actions, plus a few letters 
Department of Native Affairs, 
constituted their only demonstration of resistance to the 
Trust between 1939 and 1949. The Bakwena, on the other 
hand I had a far more tempestuous relationship with the 
Trust in this period which was marked by constant 
correspondence, petitions, non-cooperation and the 
employment of legal advisers. The rebellion in 1949 and 
1950 was evidently a Bakwena effort as all correspondence 
was signed on behalf of the Mopeli Tribe; moreover all 
those convicted in the trial were Bakwena. The report of 
the Cammi ss ion of Enquiry appointed by the government 
states that I no open demonstration was launched by 
members of this tribe [Batlokwa]', apart from one 
incident where some members of the Batlokwa community 
were present at a demonstration. This led the Commission 
to conclude that 
[t]here is no further evidence that they took 
any further active part ... in the disturbances 
and Chief Wessels Mota stated in evidence that 
members of his tribe did not take an active 
part in the organization of the agitators. 5 
The inactivity of the Batlokwa could be attributed to the 
fact that they viewed themselves and were viewed by the 
Trust and the Native Affairs Department as a I tribe 1 
distinct from the Bakwena. They occupied their own region 
and in fact often conflicted with the Bakwena over a 
variety of issues. Interestingly, a particular bone of 
contention was the border between the two communities. 
This examination of Witzieshoek therefore concerns the 
Bakwena under Chief Charles Mopeli and thus the terms 
5 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the 
Witzieshaek Native Reserve, UG 26/51, p. 15. 
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1 Witzieshoek community' or 'Witzieshoek rebellion 1 are 
not strictly accurate. In the discourse of the statei the 
press and the trial in the 1950s, the Bakwena or Mopeli 
coTIIJllunity became associated with Witzieshoek and hence 
the term Witzieshoek· SYIDbolized that community. For the 
purposes of this analysis, references to the 'Witzieshoek 
community• apply to the members of the Bakwena under the 
chieftainship of Charles Mopeli. 
Peasants and Witzieshoek 
In order to understand the inhabitants of the Witzieshoek 
reserve more fully, it is necessary to discuss their 
identity as a group. This is a problematic task from the 
start because the Witzieshoek community, like other South 
African reserve communities in the middle of the 
twentieth century, was made up of a heterogeneous mixture 
of people. Their relationships with each other, the land 
and the broader economic and political society were 
diverse. Sean Maroney, who analyzed the Witzieshoek 
rebellion in 1976, labelled this disparate group of 
peopl~ as peasants and it is here that this examination 
will begin. 
The notion of a definitive peasantry is one of the most 
contested areas of history. Teodor Shanin was one of the 
first historians to define and discuss peasants as a 
group. He maintained, in l966, that the root of the 
111 maddening 11 peasant quality' 6 lay in its inability to 
neatly slot into the concepts created in modern society. 
He attempted to harness the maddening peasant quality by 
identifying five characteristics peculiar to peasants and 
peasant societies. In his opinion, peasants became 
identifiable if their relationship to land was 
6 T Shani n, 'Peasantry as a Political Factor' , in T Shan in ( ed}, 
Peasants and Peasant Societies, (England and Australia, 1971}, 
p. 239. 
8 
'traditionally defined I and not necessarily constituted 
through 'legal ownership', if the 'family farm' formed 
the basic unit of peasant production and reproduction, if 
functions were performed at a relatively 'unspecialized 
level' and if a 'highly traditionalist and conformist 
culture' existed. Finally, he also pointed out that 'the 
peasantry is a pre-industrial social entity which carries 
over into contemporary society specific elements of a 
different, 
culture'. 7 
older, social structure, economy and 
Eric Wolf, a contemporary of Shanin, emphasized peasants• 
relationships with forces outside the boundaries of their 
localities. He felt that a critical feature of the 
peasantry was the fact that it was in some way dependent 
on and exploited by such forces. In essence, a peasant 
was at the mercy of 'asymmetrical power relations which 
made a permanent charge on his production'. 8 In 197 3, 
Sydney Mintz challenged this assertion, arguing that the 
'internal differentiation 19 within peasant societies was 
as definitive as their exploitative relationship with an 
outside force. In his opinion, studies of peasant 
districts should stress their lack of homogeneity and 
should examine internal relations between the more and 
less powerful peasants as well as external relations with 
other rural groupings. 10 
Colin Bundy produced the first major radical study on 
south African peasants in 1979. Drawing on Wolf, Shanin 
and others he described an African archetype. The African 
peasant was a cultivator, who with the help of his 
7 Ibid, pp. 240-244. 
8 Quoted in C Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry 
(second edition), (Cape Town, 1988), p. s. 
9 SW Mintz, 'A Note on the Definition of Peasantries', Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 1/1, (1973), p. 93. 
lO Ibid.; p. 94. 
9 
family, fulfilled both their subsistence needs and 
outside demands, such as taxes. Although this peasant had 
'recourse to a specific traditional culture', colonialism 
had introduced a new culture which was imposed on the 
old. The African peasant was also I dominated 
economically, politically and culturally by outsiders in 
a wider society', yet the extent and nature of that 
dominance varied over time and space. 11 Like Shanin, 
Bundy viewed the development of a peasantry as a process 
which he referred to as peasantization. 12 He asserted 
that in the South African case, the formation of the 
peasantry was coupled with 'social differentiation' 
within the peasant class as a section of that class 
became proletarianized. 13 
Bundy was criticized by Frederick Cooper in 1981 and Jack 
Lewis in 1984. Cooper's article was the most 
constructive, making an important contribution to peasant 
studies in South Africa. He was mainly concerned with 
Bundy's argument about the re-organization of class 
structure within the peasantry. He criticized Bundy for 
failing to delve deeper into the point that 
peasantization and proletarianization led to class 
differentiation amongst the peasants. Cooper asserted 
that Bundy needed to ask questions about the class 
interests in these societies, for example, 'how they 
(farmers) maintained and reproduced their privileged 
access to resources•. 14 
Cooper 
filling 
11 Bundy, 
12 Ibid., 
13 Ibid., 
recognized Willairn Beinart 1 s achievement in 
the gap left by Bundy's research. In Cooper I s 
The Rise and Fall, p. 9. .. 
p. 10. 
p. 13. 
14 F Cooper, 'Peasants, Capitalists, and Historians: A Review 
Article', Journal of Southern African Studies, 7/2, (1981), p. 
290. 
10 
view, Beinart' s analysis of labour migrancy and rural 
production in Pondoland managed to 'analyse the changing 
nature of agricultural production and the two-way 
relationship of the organization of production inside a 
local area with the wider structures of South Africa 1 • 15 
Although Beinart shied away from talking about a peasant 
or peasantry in his thesis and rather spoke about rural 
producers, Cooper points out 1 Beinart 1 s study would make 
much less sense without Bundy 1 s overview• . 16 
Rather than focusing on the variety of definitions and 
interpretations that the south African historiography has 
produced, the arguments raised by Bundy and Beinart will 
be assessed in the light of the historical experience of 
the inhabitants of Witzieshoek. 17 
By 1930, the kind of peasant that Bundy had defined was a 
rarity in the Witzieshoek reserve. Only a few members of 
the community had the resources to produce a surplus to 
fulfil, in Wolf's term, their rent obligations. According 
to the Principal Agricultural Officer of the Western 
areas in his evidence to the Tomlinson Commission, only 
twenty families out of a population of 13,000 people 
obtained their whole income from farming. 18 
The majority of the community were engaged in a variety 
of other relationships with the land, with each other and 
with the outside world. This is not surprising, 
15 
16 
17 
Ibid., p. 296. 
Ibid., p. 297. 
South Africa has produced other studies dealing with peasants or 
rural producers. Fred Hendricks, Helen Bradford and more 
recently Sean Redding are among the historians who have 
contributed to this field. 
18 Evidence presented to the Commission on the Socio-Economic 
Development of the Native Areas within the Union of South 
Africa, (Tomlinson Commission), vol: 23, Questionnaire: 
Agricultural Officers, District: Witzieshoek, p. 1. 
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considering that both Bundy and Beinart concede that by 
the middle of the twentieth century the notion of a 
peasant in the rural coIDJilunities was not as applicable as 
it had been earlier in the century. The political, 
economic and social relations within Witzieshoek and 
other reserves and their intercourse with the broader 
south Africa had effectively curtailed the ability of so-
called peasant farmers to produce a surplus. In 
Witzieshoek; this led to a number of relations which 
could no longer be defined as strictly peasant-like. 
Firstly, there were those in the community who were 
forced into wage labour to supplement production on the 
land. 19 The Agricultural Officer of the Western Areas 
estimated that approximately 2,700 families obtained part 
of their income 'from farming. 20 This group of people 
could be defined as having ties to the land, but at the 
same time having to engage in some form of wage labour 
outside the district. An important dynamic of this group 
was that in the 1930s the vast majority of those engaging 
in wage labour were men while women continued to 
cultivate the land. 21 An anomaly in the work of Shanin 
through to Bundy and Beinart is the fact that scholars 
did not explore the implications of gender and gender 
relations on the peasantry or proletarianization. In 
Witzieshoek between 1930 and 1950, women continued to be 
the majority of the cultivators while their dependence on 
outside wages increased. 
Another group inhabiting the Witzieshoek landscape were 
landless squatters. This group could be further divie.ed 
into cattle owners who grazed their cattle on communal 
19 SAB: NTS, 2210, 372/280, AssNC (Assistant Native Co!M\issioner) t.o 
DNA (Department of Native Affairs), 27/7/1938. 
20 The Tomlinson Commission, vol: 23, Questionnaire: Agricultural 
Officers, District: Witzieshoek, p. 1. 
21 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to Chief Native 
Commissioner (CNC), 28/9/1950. 
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land and those with 
within the reserve. 
Western Areas put 
no access at all 
The Agricultural 
this group at a 
to any 
Officer 
figure 
resource 
for the 
of 200 
families. 22 The Native commissioner in Witzieshoek 
reported in 1948 that 'there are 600 or 700 families with 
no land 1 • 23 Each of these groups were further dependent 
on wages generated from an outside source. As with those 
persons who had access to land, the landless squatters 
were predominantly women. The persons engaging in outside 
labour constituted a further category which could be 
divided into those who laboured in the towns in 
manufacturing and mining and those who laboured in the 
farming sector. Work in the towns was the most commonly 
used source of labour for men and women in Witz ieshoek 
because it provided higher wages. 
Despite having a variety of relations with the land and 
outsiders, members of the Wi tzieshoek reserve exhibited 
traits common to both the peasants described by Bundy and 
the rural producers described by Beinart. They too drew 
on a traditional culture, but at the same time had to 
deal with the infiltration of new cultures. Ironically, 
an argument forwarded by Redfield in 1955 and 1956 
(criticized by Shanin as being 'too narrow• 24 ) provides 
insight into the tension between traditional and new 
cultures in the Witzieshoek case. 
Redfield claimed that the peasantry emerged as a result 
of the encroachment of the town or city on 1 tribal 1 
culture. Consequently, the local authority was 
subordinated to the city, leading to the breakdown of 
familial cohesion and traditional customs. Redfield 
22 The Tomlinson commission, vol: 23, Questionnaire: Agricultural 
Officers, District: Witzieshoek, p. 1. 
23 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Minutes of the Meeting of Chiefs 
and People, 8/7/1948. 
24 Shan in, 'Peasantry as a Political Factor', p. 255. 
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viewed the peasantry as I people in transition. Inwardly 
they were orientated towards the loca 1 community, but 
outwardly they related to the town' . 25 Redfield' s points 
about local orientation towards the town and 
subordination to the town, apply to Witz ieshoek between 
1930 and 1950. The increasing dependence of the 
Witzieshoek members on towns, particularly Johannesburg, 
and the interaction between town and countryside 
infringed on the political, economic and social 
organization of the community and hence on cultural 
interaction. Beinart, in his examination of migration and 
its impact on local production in Pondoland, contended 
that 'migrancy, along with other changes in the economy, 
created tens ions over the control of resources in the 
family.' This in turn had an impact on traditional 
practices, such as bridewealth, as migrancy provided 
younger men with access to resources to fulfil their own 
marriage obligations. 26 This was also true of 
Witzieshoek. 
Like the peasants found in the pages of Bundy's book, the 
Witzieshoek inhabitants shared a common experience of 
political, economic and cultural domination, which 
intensified with the implementation of betterment in 
1939. They too exhibited social differentiation in their 
development over the 1930s and 1940s. However, Maroney's 
classification of the Witzieshoek inhabitants as pure 
peasants is inaccurate. 
The Witzieshoek rebellion has received limited 
historiographical attention. Sean Maroney's analysis was 
a 'preliminary investigation' which appeared in Africa 
25 S Chodack, 'The Birth of an African Peasantry' Canadian Journal of 
African Studies, V/iii, (1971), p. 340. 
26 W Beinart, 'Labour Migrancy and Rural Production; Pondoland 
c.1900-1950' in P Mayer (edJ, Black Villagers in an Industrial 
Society. Anthropological Perspectives on Labour Migration in 
South Africa, (Cape Town, 1980), p. 86. 
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Perspective in 1976. His examination was followed in 1978 
by Baruch Hirson's study of rural revolt in South Africa 
where the Witzieshoek rebellion was included as an 
example. In 1982, DA Kotze wrote a more detailed account 
of the rebel 1 ion and its causes for the African Studies 
Journal. Tom Lodge incorporated a brief analysis of the 
rebellion in his book, Black Poli tics in South Africa. 
The validity of these perspectives will be tested in the 
discussion that follows. 
conclusion 
This thesis cannot claim to speak on behalf of the 
African women of Witzieshoek. It does however, attempt 
to weave a gender analysis into the story of the 
rebellion. The aim of this examination is not only to add 
to the history of the Witzieshoek community and South 
African history at large, but to demonstrate the 
necessity of gender as a tool of analysis when 
approaching the history of the South African rural 
landscape. 
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CH.APTER TWO 
GENDER AND THE STATE IN SOUTH AFRICA 1930-1950 
Introduction 
Witzieshoek has been a scandal which has 
shattered the equanimity of this country. 
These occurrences are proof .•. that the whole 
of the so-called native administration with its 
reserves, its synthetic tribalism, its puppet 
chiefs, has suffered a complete collapse. 1 
In the period between 1930 and 1950, the 'native 
question' dominated the white political agenda. The 
problem of how to control and administer Africans was the 
most contested issue within the state as well as in the 
party political arena. At the heart of this matter was a 
debate between restricting the movement of African women 
to the towns, and enabling women and their children to 
settle permanently in the urban areas. The increased 
migration of women out of the reserves during the Second 
World War had created a predicament in the control and 
administration of the African populace as a whole. 2 
Linzi Manicom has argued that the state should not be 
viewed as a 'unitary and monolithic structure', but 
rather as a 1 cornplex set of institutions•. 3 Between 1930 
and 19'50, a variety of .state institutions attempted to 
1 HAD (House of Assembly Debates), (1951), vol. 76, col. 8421. 
2 c walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa ( second 
edition), (Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1991), p. 70. 
3 L Manicom, "Ruling Relatiuns: Rethinking State and Gender in South 
Africa·, (paper presente.d to the conference on 'Women and 
Gender in Southern Africa·, Durban, 1991i p. 19. 
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administer and control Africans. The most important was 
the Native Affairs Department which presided over a 
bureaucratic mass of institutions and persons from a 
national to a local level. 4 
The Department was headed by the Minister of Native 
Affairs who was assisted by the Native Affairs 
Commission. The Secretary of Native Affairs was under the 
authority of the Minister and was expected to ensure that 
government policies and legislation was carried out and 
that the Department functioned efficiently. The 
Department was represented on a regional level by Chief 
Native Commissioners, who in turn presided over Native 
Commissioners who administered Departmental policies on a 
local level. 5 
1930-1945 
Crisis in reserve production 
Behind the ever-increasing movement of Africans from the 
reserves to the urban areas, lay a er isis in reserve 
production which was characterized by the degeneration of 
reserve resources. 6 The first half of the twentieth 
century saw the stagnation of production in the African 
reserves. The reserves, functioning as both dumping 
grounds for Africans and labour reservoirs, faced two 
4 Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-
economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the 
Union of South Africa, UG 61/1955, p. 65. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Bundy, The Rise and the Fall, p. 224. 
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contradictory problems: lack of labour power and over-
population. 7 
Over-population had occurred due to the fact that the 
reserves housed an expanding African population within 
restricted borders. Whereas population increase often 
resulted in landlessness and over-use of resources, the 
loss of labour power to the urban areas provided no 
relief. This was because African methods of exploiting 
resources effectively had been severely undermined by the 
migrant labour system which had operated from the 
previous century. 8 
The years between 1930 and 1945 saw the deterioration of 
the reserves and increased competition for resources. 
Already in 1930 the reserves were described as rapidly 
turning into 'rural ghettos 1 • 9 For the rest of that 
decade and up to 1945, those living in the reserves, 
including Witzieshoek, were forced to contend with gross 
over-population, erosion, disease, malnutrition, a 
decrease in soil fertility and lack of labour power. In 
addition, the permanent residents, consisting 
predominantly of women, had to contend with a series of 
droughts which plagued the reserves throughout the 1930s. 
In Witzieshoek itself, pauper and famine relief were 
constant necessities from 1930 to 1945. In 1936 the 
community appealed to the Assistant Native Commissioner 
for an increase in the mealie supplies to the 'infirm and 
indigent people', arguing that the quantity supplied was 
'inadequate'. According to Chief Charles, famine in the 
area was on the 'increase' and 'starvation' was a 
7 F Molteno, 'The Historical Significance of the Bantustan Strategy', 
Social Dynamics 3/2, (1977), p. 18. 
8 Bundy, The Rise and Fall, p. 224. 
9 Ibid., p. 1. 
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threat. 10 This situation was largely due to a protracted 
drought that had occurred during the early 1930s. In 
194 O, the Native Commissioner appealed to the community 
to meet their local nutritional needs themselves as 
'most' relied on 'imported mealies' . 11 In 1944 Chief 
Charles Mopeli reported that 'most' of the community 
bordered on starvation as a result of 'continuous rains 
and frost' which led to 'not as much as a dish full of 
grain' being reaped. 12 This crisis in reserve production 
in Witzieshoek as well as in other reserves had an impact 
on migration. 
Migration 
Migrant labour had become the 'dominant force in the 
social and economic life of the rural periphery of 
southern Africa' by 1930 . 13 Migration before the late 
1930s had predominantly been a male endeavor. For 
example, in 1936 fifty four percent of the adult male 
population was residing outside of the reserves. 14 
10 SAB: NTS, 7849, 46/336, Chief Charles (CC) to Assistant Native 
Corrunissioner (AssNC), 10/8/1936. 
11 SAE: NTS, 6814, 29/318, Minutes, Chiefs and People, 24/6/1940. 
12 SAB: NTS, 7849, 46/336, cc to Additional Native Corrunissioner 
(ANC), 30/5/1944. 
13 C Walker, 'Gender and the development of the migrant labour system 
c.1850-1930: An overview', in c Walker (ed), Women and 
Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, (Cape Town, 1990), p. 
176. 
14 Bundy, The rise and fall, p. 225. 
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As most of those leaving the reserves had been men, the 
modus operandi of reserve life had been disrupted. 15 Male 
migrancy had not only disrupted women I s productive and 
reproductive capacities and broken down the family unit, 
but women had to bear the burden of producing, without 
their male counterparts and with shrinking resources. 
Although women had also begun migrating out of the rural 
areas as early as had men, their rate of migration 
reached significant proportions only in the 1930s. In 
1936, 142.3 per cent more African women resided in the 
towns than in the beginning of the previous decade . 16 
(This was a small percentage relative to the men in 
towns.) 
Walker identified the 
life' as 
period . 17 
the chief 
'deteriorating 
reason behind 
Towns represented an 
quality of 
migration in 
escape from 
rural 
this 
the 
deteriorating rural landscape and 
generated by absent husbands and sons. 
the insecurities 
By the late 1930s I a massive haemorrhage of women was 
occurring from the labour reserves to the towns. 118 
Walker points out that the actual rate of migration of 
women varied regionally, dependent on factors such as a 
region's ability to maintain control over its women, the 
extent of male migration, the accessibility of the towns 
to the rural area and European education. 19 
15 Walker, 'Gender and the development', p. 177. 
16 Ibid., p. 188. 
17 Ibid., p. 189. 
18 P Bonner, 'Family, Crime and Political Consciousness on the East 
Rand, 1939-1955 ·, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
14/3, (1988), p. 395. 
19 Walker, 'Gender and the development•, pp. 190/191. 
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In Philip Bonner's case study of Basotho women, those who 
were married and had to deal with abandonment or 
widowhood or insecurity due to neglect or conflict in 
their new marriage homes, dominated the ranks of women 
migrants. 
The women 
pressures. 
elite and 
migrating out of Witzieshoek faced similar 
Atwell Mopeli-Paulus, a member of the African 
chief I s family in Wi tzieshoek, included 
Witzieshoek women migrants in his narration of his 
experiences on the Rand in 1939 which was published in 
Drum in 1954. 'Lack of land has driven the women to 
places like this, for they all once followed husbands to 
the . reef where they went to work on the mines for 
money. 120 Mr Modernwane, another member of the 
Witzieshoek community, recalled women 'running to the 
towns' in this period. 21 
You [ the husband J don I t send money any more, 
the poor woman is struggling with the children. 
Eventually you [the wife) also go there [town]. 
Perhaps you go there with the intention of 
getting money from him. When you get there you 
find that you are not accepted any more and you 
just remain. 22 
Whatever personal factors were pushing African women into 
migration, the root cause was the decline in production 
in the reserves. 
20 Drum, December 1954, p. 66. 
21 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane, Witzieshoek, 
16/4/1993. 
22 Ibid. 
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The state responds: 
betterment 
segregation, influx control and 
Segregation 
The state response to economic decline in the reserves 
and the position of women migrants on a national level 
must be examined in the framework of its policies and 
discourses between 1930 and 1945 which were exemplified 
by segregation. 
The segregation policies of the state spanning 1930-1945 
directly reflected the views expressed by General Jan 
Smuts in his speech on Native Policy in Africa in 1929. 
Smuts subscribed to the beliefs of liberal 
assimilationists 'who believed in the capacity of the 
black man to 11 rise 11 
assimilation with the 
resonated with the fear 
but at the same time condemned 
white populace. 23 His views 
which had emerged in the early 
part of the century, which stemmed from eugenic beliefs 
in the undesirability of miscegenation. Smuts' arguments 
on segregation and the policies it generated presented a 
strategy to prevent 'unhappy social results racial 
miscegenation, moral degeneration of both [races], racial 
antipathy and clashes• . 24 These were not simply 
characteristic of misguided assumptions about the numbers 
of Africans flooding into the towns, but were part of a 
general 'paranoia about civilization's retrogressive 
tendencies. ' 25 
23 S Dubow, 'Race, Civilization and Culture: the Elaboration of 
Segregationist Discourse in the Inter-War Years'in S Marks and 
s Trapido (eds), The Politics of Race, Class and 
Nationalism, (London and New York, 1987), p. 83. 
24 J c smuts, Greater South Africa. Plans for a better 
world. The Speeches of General the Right Honourable 
J C Smuts, (Johannesburg, 1940), p. 49. 
25 Dubow, 'Race, Civilization and Culture', p. 76. 
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Smuts insisted that the 'native 1 policies of the past had 
redirected interest away from 'native' life and in order 
to give the 'natives' 'bones to chew at', a 'new policy' 
was required. 26 This was one that would 'foster an 
indigenous native culture or system of cultures, and 
cease to force the African into European rnoulds 1 • 27 
According to Saul Dubow, smut's ideology was bound up 
with the notion that the cities represented an 'alien 
environment' for 'the African• who was 'naturally' part 
of the land 1 • 28 In this context, the town was cast as a 
'site of vice and immorality' where 1 the African' was in 
grave danger of degenerating. 29 Smuts argued that the 
movement to and from the reserve of 1 the African male', 
however, would not be problematic as long as the 'family 
life in the native home will continue along traditional 
lines.' In his opinion, this would prevent ideas absorbed 
in the urban areas from emerging in the reserves. 30 
Native policy imbibed this ideology between 1930 and 1945 
in a system of what Saul Dubow termed 'differential 
development or segregation•. 31 The 1937 Native Laws 
Amendment Act which set up apparatus to rid the towns of 
1 surplus' Africans was a direct application of liberal 
policies of assimilation. 
26 smuts, Greater South Africa, p. 43. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Dubow, 'Race, Civilization and Culture', p. 75, 
29 Ibid., p. 76, 
30 smuts, Greater South Africa, p. 55. 
31 Dubow, 'Race, Civilization and Culture·, p. 84. 
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lt was introduced to parliament by Minister Grobler who 
asserted that 'the effect of the influx of young natives 
into surroundings foreign to their mental outlook and 
culture is one of the most serious problems we have to 
face. 132 
State policies and legislation within the reserves 
intersected with gender issues. Segregation sought to 
establish a •tribal home' and hence affected female 
migration directly. 
The women and children will continue to carry 
on their native life at home, will continue to 
work in the homes and in the fields as they 
have done from the immemorial past. The men, 
instead of lying in the sun, or brawling over 
their beer or indulging in ... tribal warfare, 
will go out to work and supplement the f arnily 
income. 33 
The movement of women outside of the 'tr iba 1 home' was 
not consistent with segregation. Furthermore, behind male 
migration, a necessary part of industrial development in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s, lay the desire to change 
the sexual division of labour within the reserves. 'Among 
the men the thin edge of the industrial wedge is 
introduced, and they rightly become the breadwinners 
which they have seldom or never been. • 34 Segregation 
policies between 1930 and 1945 thus sought to control 
women and interfere with the sexual di vision of labour 
within the reserves. 
32 Minister Grobler, quoted in Dubow, 'Race, Civilization and 
Clllture·, p. 86. 
33 Smuts, Greater South Africa, p. 55. 
34 Ibid. 
24 
Influx control 
Rural to urban migration of women not only 
directly challenged the authority of state and 
capital ... , it presaged the creation of a fully 
urbanized, proletarianized generation of 
families, with attendant problems of social 
control and the demand for social services. 35 
The fact that African women were on the move between 1930 
and 1945 pointed to a weakness in the structures set up 
by the state to control such movement. The state, under 
the auspices of the central government and the Native 
Affairs Department, enforced restrictions on the movement 
of African women directly and indirectly in the period 
under examination. 
The amendment to the Urban Areas Act in 1930 sought to 
control the movement of women directly. It demanded that 
only women who were joining their husbands or fathers who 
had been employed in the towns for two years 
continuously, 
there. 36 The 
could acquire special permits to reside 
failure of this form of direct control, 
however, prompted a further amendment to the Urban Areas 
Act, in 1937. This made a certificate of permission from 
local home authorities a prerequisite for entering the 
towns. Again, this legislation was thwarted as women 
could quite easily obtain passes to visit or to find 
husbands or to enter the towns bordering their reserves 
from whence they could move onto the reef. 37 In addition, 
direct control implied direct policing. Taking into 
35 M Lovett, 'Gender Relations, Class Formation, and the Colonial 
State in Africa', in J L Parpart and KA Staudt (eds), Women 
and the State in Africa, (Boulder and London, 1989), p. 
24. 
36 PL Bonner, · "Desirable or Undesirable aaaotho Women?" Liquor, 
Prostitution and the Migration of Basotho Women to the Rand, 
1920-1945 1 in Walker (ed},Women and Gender, p. 243. 
37 Ibid., pp. 245-246. 
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account the sheer numbers of women flocking into the 
urban areas, and the staff shortages as a result of the 
second world war, such a system was difficult to operate. 
Before 1948, the state relied more heavily on indirect 
forms of control, a phenomenon that Cheryl Walker 
describes as 'a reinforced patriarchal tradition 1 •38 This 
involved an intimate alliance between central government 
and the African male elite in the reserve societies, an 
alliance which sought to restrict women I s movement at 
source. 39 An important part of this process was the 
enforcement of customary law in a new form which 
reinforced and highlighted control over women. 
Walker applies Martin Chanock I s assessment of Rhodesia, 
where the male African elite stressed their control over 
women when presenting customary law to the white 
government because they encountered the government at a 
point of insecurity, to the South African case. 40 
According to Walker, women continued to be disadvantaged 
in this way after the colonial period ended as such forms 
of control I were extended by the South African state 
after Union. ' 41 
However, the notion that 'African women belonged in the 
and 
the 
hold 
rural areas under the control of male guardians 
chiefs', which underlay the endeavors of both 
government and the African male elite, did not 
true. 42 In practice, African women were using their 
adroitness to dodge direct and indirect controls, and to 
migrate to the towns. 
38 Walker, 'Gender and the Development', p. 186. 
39 Bonner, 'Desirable or Undesirable', p. 245. 
40 Sited in Manicom, 'Ruling Relations•, p. 15. 
41 Walker, 'Gender and the Development•, p. 185. 
42 Ibid., p. 186. 
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As Walker correctly points out, unlike male migration 
which was characterized by conventionality (in other 
words was a •societal response to new pressures and 
opportunities' offered by colonialism), female migration 
represented 1 a challenge to existing norms and relations 
of power 143 which were based on a patriarchal tradition. 
Because women were still responsible for production in 
the reserves and were theoretically under the control of 
male homestead heads, their choice to migrate was a form 
of 'desertion' or 'escape' rather than a sanctioned 
decision. 
Influx control and the female urban subject 
Having reached the towns, African women posed additional 
problems for white male dominance. This was because they 
were outside the realm of chiefly manipulation and had 
the ability to set themselves up as independent 
produce:rs. Yet again, state-imposed laws failed to curb 
women's productive activities from. 1930 to 1945. Beer-
brewing and prostitution were targeted by the state which 
made both illegal and deportation the punishment. Women 
responded by concealing their trade and evading police 
raids: they even resorted to rioting. 44 
Bonner points out that during this era women became adept 
at manipulating the law. They would engage solicitors who 
would circumvent the due process of law by creating all 
sorts of difficulties. If convicted, the women would 
refuse to divulge from whence they came or just disappear 
into the streets of some other location. 45 Mopeli-Paulus 
43 Ibid., p. 189. 
44 Bonner, 'Desireable or Undesireable', pp. 241-244. 
45 Ibid., p. 244. 
27 
described the evasive tactics adopted by women in his 
article in Drum. He illustrated how women would bury 
barrels full of liquor which would then be guarded day 
and night. In the event that a pol iceman happened to 
patrol nearby, the women would signal each other by 
crying out; 'A .. ah It is unbearable! 1 and run away to 
avoid arrest. 46 
Margot Lovett argues that the colonial state regulated 
women 'indirectly through the language and the authority 
of kinship. 147 This was also true of the South African 
state between 1930 and 1945. The use of language as a 
mechanism to entrench male power went beyond the confines 
of kinship, however. The state carefully constructed a 
negative stereotype of women in the towns which permeated 
official and unofficial discourses. According to Manicom, 
the 'proper• urban subject was 'being constructed as 
mas cu 1 ine' . 48 
State-enforced laws presented women in the towns as 
subjects existing outside of state and patriarchal 
control and therefore as criminal and anarchic. As 
opposed to women in the rural areas who were referred to 
as wives, daughters and tribal members and thus as 
subjects under the control of men, laws to monitor women 
in the urban areas cast them as prostitutes, beer brewers 
and the unruly. 49 Consequently, the same African woman 
was transformed in state discourse from a wife into a 
prostitute if she moved from countryside to town. In 
other words, from the end of the 1930s to 1945, the state 
constructed the I true I African woman as a subject under 
46 Drum, December 1954, p. 65. 
47 Lovett, 'Gender Relations', p. 28. 
48 Manicom, 'Ruling Relations', p. 21. 
49 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the authority and the responsibility of men domiciled in 
rural areas. 
African men also struggled to maintain some sort of 
autonomy in the towns. This directly affected the ability 
of the state to control women as so much of their control 
was dependent on African male authority. Lovett 
identified the 'social control' of the African elite as a 
crucial element in the colonial state's power. According 
to Bonner, because African women were a tiny minority in 
the urban areas of the East Rand, they could take 
advantage of the opportunity provided by 'unlimited 
womanless men 1 • 50 Instead of having to deal with a 
partner who might, for example, commit assault or 
infidelity, a woman could simply 'up and leave', moving 
on to the next willing man. Moreover, women's capacity to 
secure an independent income reduced their dependence on 
men's incomes and hence on men. The result was that in 
the towns women thwarted the authority of men whilst at 
the same time being beyond the social control of male 
elders in the reserves. 
African men, therefore, also had a stake in constructing 
women in the towns in a negative way. For example, 
Mopeli-Paulus' description of people from Witzieshoek 
revealed the same stereotypes of women as the state I s 
discourse displaying the friction between the town and 
Witzieshoek. As these women were no longer subject to the 
forms of control and power operating in the reserve, 
Mopeli-Paulus deliberately condemned their behaviour. His 
aim was to contrast their disagreeable behaviour with the 
behaviour of those in the reserves who purportedly 
enjoyed such control. 
Mopeli-Paulus took a strong stance right from the start 
of his story. 1 The location at Benoni where I stayed, 
SO Bonner, 'Family, crime and Political Consciousness', p. 397. 
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seemed an important centre for Africans from all over the 
Reef, and I soon learned to hate it.' Mopeli's distaste 
for town life began with the 'drunken people' who 
'drowned' the streets of Benoni on weekends. 51 He traced 
this kind of behaviour to the brewing of liquor, which 
women were responsible for in the townships. Women were 
placed centrally in this hateful world. The irony was 
that women from Witzieshoek became eligible for 
condemnation only once they had entered the towns. 
Women's role as brewers of liquor was not inconsistent 
with their role in the reserves where they also embarked 
on such production, but Mopeli successfully recast that 
role in town in a negative light through his use of 
language. 
He wrote that he was 'curious to know how the business 
was carried on' and immediately set it apart by wondering 
whether it was 'anything like our home brew which we make 
1n the reserve. 1 52 By using the words I we I and I our' 
Mopeli-Paulus created an inclusive atmosphere. He 
skillfuly placed the brewing 1n the towns outside the 
comforting terms 1 we 1 and 'our' by explaining how it 
differed. 'I was told that it was, first, beer like any 
other beer, but made into a quick brew by mixing it with 
yeast and even methylated spirits, to make a quick 
drink. 1 Finally he wrote 'I have found a dead hole of my 
people, where some came with hungry eyes to steal at 
prostitutes, and others to become drowned in drink. 1 53 
Not only did he make use of emotive language like 1 dead 1 , 
•steal' and 'drowned', but he linked prostitution to the 
whole notion of drink and hence devalued women further. 
Christine Obbo's findings in terms of African women 1 s 
struggle for economic independence in East Africa can be 
51 Drum, December 1954, p. 65. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
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applied here. She maintains that men, confused over what 
the role of women should be, used them as 'scapegoats', 
lashing out at them in order to re-assert some sort of 
control. 54 She goes on to argue that women were viewed by 
African men as the 'bearers of African culture' and hence 
had to be prevented from assimilating Western culture. 55 
Towns provided the meeting point for such contact; hence 
the desire to restrict women's presence in them. 'Urban 
migration is bad for women because it corrupts their 
virtue, leads to marital instability and erodes 
traditional norms. 156 
Bonner postulates that Basotho women (and therefore 
Witzieshoek women) in particular bore the brunt of such 
negative stereotypes. He maintains that they were blamed 
for a number of social problems ranging from crime to 
violence to immorality, all associated with liquor and 
prostitution. 57 The reason behind the singling out of 
this particular group of women was that they constituted 
the majority in the sphere of liquor production. 58 The 
unprecedented influx into the towns of the Basotho women 
as well as women from all over the reserves in the 1930s 
and 1940s, on a scale much larger than before, had 
created a panic in the corridors of power. 
Betterment 
The government also reacted to the growing deterioration 
of the reserves. Beinart examined the nature of state 
54 
obbo, African Women. Their Struggle f'or Economic 
Independence, (London, 1980), p. 11. 
55 Ibid., p. 15. 
56 Ibid., P• 27. 
57 Bonner, • Desirable or Undesirable', pp. 230-231. 
58 Ibid., p. 222. 
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intervention in the reserves between 1900 and 1960. He 
argued that between 1930 and 1950, 'the welfare of the 
soil often emerges as the cutting edge of justification 
for intervention in peasant agriculture. 159 In 1936 
General Smuts stated that 'erosion is the biggest problem 
confronting the country, bigger than any politics 1 • 60 
Betterment was devised within a conservationist discourse 
which took root in the 1920s in South Africa and was 
formulated in the 1930s into a strategy to combat 
declining productivity in the reserves. The South African 
Native Trust was formed in 1936 as a part of the Native 
Trust and Land Act and was set up with the purpose of 
rehabilitating the scheduled areas set aside for 
exclusive African inhabitance. Proclamation 31 of 1939 
provided for the declaration of betterment areas in the 
reserves after consultation with the local population had 
taken place. 61 
Betterment, devised as it was as a grand strategy for 
development within the reserves, was problematic not only 
as a broad concept but in its application at the reserve 
level. This essentially meant that even before betterment 
was implemented in the Witzieshoek reserve, for example, 
its ability to succeed was severely curtailed. This was 
because its execution was incongruous with the conditions 
existing in the reserves. 
According to Beinart, the government viewed the 
betterment process in purely technical terms, but once 
applied betterment tended to interfere in the social 
59 w Beinart, 'Soll Erosion, Conservation and ideaa about 
Development: a Southern African Explorat~on, 1900-1960', 
Journal of Southern African Studies, 11/1, (1984J, p. 
53. 
60 smuts quoted in Ibid., p. 68. 
61 J Yawitch, Betterment the Myth of Homeland Agriculture 
(Johannesburg, 1982), p. 11. 
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structures and relations in the reserves. 62 On the most 
fundamental level, betterment was intended to create a 
productive African subsistence peasant who employed the 
methodology advocated by betterment officials. It was 
presumed that the conditions existing in the reserves 
enabled the creation of such a peasant. Yet this 
assumption was inherently problematic. In the first 
instance, the male African had been targeted as the 
potentially productive peasant. In a context where the 
majority of men were absent from the reserves for 
extended periods during the year, targeting men bordered 
on the ridiculous. 
This was borne out by two reports, one on betterment in 
general by Edward Roux and one on Witzieshoek in 
particular by Melle. In his analysis of reconstruction in 
the reserves in 1944, Roux argued that 1 the chief 
difficulty' was that the farmer was •away at work on the 
mines for most of the year. I 63 Melle, the under-
agricultural officer for Witzieshoek, illustrated the 
contradiction between betterment and migration. In a 
report on the reserve, he stated that the 'highly 
unsatisfactory agricultural and pastoral methods so 
common in the Native areas I were enforced by the fact 
that 'most' Africans earned their living in industry 
outside the reserve to which they returned periodically 
which made I agricultural education virtually impossible 
since the men were seldom available to teach 1 • 64 Hence, 
the system of 'part time farming and part time labouring' 
was 'fundamentally unsound' due to the fact that it meant 
62 Beinart, 'Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development', 
p. 83. 
63 ER Roux, 'The Native Reserves and Post-War Reconstruction', (Cape 
Town, 1944), p. 4. 
64 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part: 2, Melle to Chief Native 
ColMlissioner (CNC), 28/9/1950. 
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that 'the Native ... neither becomes a skilled farmer nor 
a consistently efficient workman. 165 
The targeting of men alone was also inconsistent with the 
conditions of organization already in existence in 
Witzieshoek 
agricultural 
and in other 
production had 
reserves. In 
customarily 
Witzieshoek, 
been divided 
along sexual lines. Women were primarily responsible for 
production at home and in the fields, whereas men were 
exclusively in charge of pastoralism. However, male 
assistance at ploughing and harvesting time was 
essential. 66 By the time that betterment was implemented, 
this sexual division of labour existed only in theory as 
in the absence of men, women were taking on all the 
responsibilities of agricultural production. 67 
This was exacerbated in Witzieshoek by the fact that the 
Trust had no specific policy geared towards educating 
women, in terms of agricultural production. General 
education was in the hands of the Dutch Reformed mission 
which had very specific aims for women. In 1944, for 
instance, the mission introduced housecraft as a subject 
for the girls in their school. 68 The church mapped out a 
definitive role for women which had very little to do 
with agriculture. It proposed a course for women which 
included mother care, health care, weaving, spinning, 
knitting, washing, cooking, gardening and rudimentary 
• l 69 agr1cu ture ... 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Molaba, Witzieshoek, 
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The Dutch Reformed Church perceived African women through 
its own religious prism and hence sought to wean them 
from their usual responsibilities and to restrict their 
activities to the domestic sphere. such a perception was 
carried through to the state and the Trust, the latter 
being unable to encompass women in its own betterment 
strategies. The non-existence of agricultural education 
for women, bar a few elementary pointers, coupled with 
the creation on the part of the Dutch Reformed Church of 
a new mould within which women should act (sanctioned by 
the Trust) meant that the concept of 'the productive 
agricultural subsistence peasant' was a non-starter. 
The state I s response was defined 1n the passage of the 
Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. The irony in this 
piece of legislation was that both central government and 
the Department of Native Affairs were affected by the 
needs of the expanding industrial economy. Hence 
betterment was implemented in a context where migration 
would continue to dislocate rural production. Moreover, 
it would continue to disrupt family structures to the 
disadvantage of African women. 
The inability on the part of betterment to impose the 
lofty principle of a productive African male farmer in 
practice was further exacerbated by another reality: 
insufficient funding. In Roux's analysis of 
reconstruction, he argued that 'lack of funds' was a 
crucial hindrance to the betterment process. 70 The 
various departments in the Native Administration dealing 
with betterment had to rely on the Trust for financial 
support, as parliament did not vote directly for funds 
for use in agriculture. The Trust in turn was restricted 
to receiving income from African taxes which was 
inadequate. Roux stated that these funds amounted to I a 
70 Roux, 'The Native Reserves', p. 3. 
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little over a million pounds annually. 171 This was 
further compounded by the different needs of the 
departments involved in African Administration which had 
to make use of these funds. This left a 'hopelessly 
inadequate' amount for agriculture. 72 
The financial insecurity of the Trust meant that its 
implementation of betterment went hand in hand with a 
number of strict conditions. For instance, because the 
Trust I s work was mainly predicated on African taxation, 
taxation became the prerequisite for two important 
functions. One was the ability to vote for local Reserve 
Boards and the other was the capacity to acquire a plot 
of land. Hence the ability to acquire cash for tax 
purposes became an essential part of life in the reserves 
after 1939. 
The Review of the Activities of the Department of Native 
Affairs for the year 1944-1945 touched on two other 
fundamental issues affecting the abilities of the Trust 
departments in the various betterment areas in the early 
forties. 73 The first was the 'shortage of staff' owing to 
the absence of many members of the department on military 
duty. 74 The loss of technical staff due to the war effort 
especially hampered development. 75 The second was 
shortages in materials and the replacement of materials, 
such as mechanical transport, tools and equiprnent. 76 
Witzieshoek, like many other reserves, experienced the 
71 Ibid., p. 2. 
72 Ibid., p. 3. 
73 Union of South Africa. Review of the Activities of the 
Department of Native Affairs for the year 1944-'45. 
74 Ibid., p. 30. 
75 Ibid., p. 1 l. 
76 Ibid. 
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impact of these handicaps in the early 1940s. 77 And 
these, too, served to exacerbate already difficult 
conditions for women. In 1942, for example, it was 
reported that a delay in equipment and fertilizer needed 
to improve crops had plunged the community into dire 
straits, as the former had arrived after the best 
planting season. 78 
In its report on 1944 and 1945, the Native Affairs 
Department admitted that such problems meant that the 
advantages offered by the co-operation of people could 
not materialize. 79 In Witzieshoek itself, Melle touched 
on this precise concern. He reported that I the people 
were co-operative' for the first four years but that 
'their acquiescence lessened when the expected over-
optimistic benefits did not materialize.' He went en to 
say that they began to 'lose faith in the Department and 
its schemes' as a result of 'agitators' drawing on this 
point. 80 Members of the community, not necessarily 
agitators, had made their grievances with the Trust clear 
in a variety of ways right from its inception in 1939. 
This leads to the consideration of resistance in the 
years between 1930 and 1945. 
77 SAB: NTS, 7508, 655/327/19, Supply of seed, fertilizer and 
Equipment to natives: increased crop production scheme, 1942. 
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37 
Resistance 
Shula Marks 
resistance 
However, an 
and Stanley Trapido argued 
in general was dampened 
of rural 
in 
that 
the 
African 
1930s. 81 
'undercurrent resistance' 82 did 
continue throughout the decade. There were instances of 
opposition in Natal in the form of food riots, in the 
Northern Transvaal where men and women resisted 
government legislation and in the Eastern Cape where 
people protested against cattle culling. 83 
The early 1940s, conversely, 
resistance. 84 Resistance up to 
saw the blooming of 
1945 was predominantly 
urban. Trade unions formed and expanded, demonstrating an 
increased awareness of class and worker consciousness. A 
record number of strikes were recorded between 1939 and 
1945, 85 despite the fact that they were declared illegal 
in 1943. 86 The Council for Non-European Trade Union 
boasted 158 1 000 members in 1945, a threat the government 
could not ignore lightly. 87 According to Walker, 'women 
formed a significant part of the groundswell of 
discontent and resistance that rumbled through the 
townships 1 • 88 In contrast to the 1930s a 'wider range' of 
women were involved in resistance. Although they joined 
81 s Marks and s Trapido, The Poli tics of Race, Class and 
Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa, (London 
and New York, 1987), p. 44. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 D Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961 Conflict and 
Compromise, (Oxford, 1991), p. 37. 
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86 T Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, 
(Johannesburg; 1983), p. 18. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Walker, Women and Resistance, p. 75. 
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in the boycotts and squatter movements in the early 
1940s, they were most active over the food crisis. 89 
The African National Congress's Women's League was formed 
in 1943 90 and although it articulated middle class 
beliefs, its formation indicated a tacit, if unconscious, 
acceptance on the part of African men, that women's roles 
had expanded into the public sphere. This acceptance was 
juxtaposed against efforts by the male African elite to 
control 'their' women. The role and identity of African 
women in this period were evidently in a state of flux. 
Both African men and women had to grapple with the 
challenges presented by women. 
1945-1948 
Rural Decline 
The pattern of rural decline continued into the mid-1940s 
despite the implementation of betterment. Between 1946 
and 1952 Africans were producing 'less than half their 
normal grain requirements•. 91 In Witzieshoek in March 
1947, the Additional Native commissioner, in a report to 
the Chief Native Commissioner of the Western Areas, noted 
that the reserve could not support its population. He 
pointed out that at that stage 'many families' were 
1 landless 1 and that the 'maximum carrying capacity of the 
area' could not maintain 'sufficient animals to meet the 
minimum requirements of the people. 192 
89 Ibid., p. 77. 
90 Ibid., p. 89. 
91 M Herrel, The African Reserves of South Africa, 
(Johannesburg, 1969), p. 35. 
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The evident impotence of betterment strategies was 
exacerbated by women I s actions and reactions within the 
framework of the reserves. Women left behind in the 
reserves had responded with initiative and ingenuity, 
devising coping strategies. In Witzieshoek, women in the 
absence of men began to attend pi tsos ( 1 traditionally 1 , 
an all-male meeting to discuss the organization of the 
community) and ,khotlas ('traditionally', all-male court 
sessions). This meant that women no longer remained 
within the constructed customs and social definitions 
which had operated before the disruption in reserve life. 
In other words, in the context of economic deterioration 
and decay, African women were being forced into positions 
that were formerly exclusively male. Thus, not only were 
they directly challenging state farms of control, but 
they were also disrupting the white male notion of the 
position of African women in the reserves. 
Migration continues 
The second world war had a profound impact on 
industrialization and migration. It stimulated the growth 
of secondary industries and hence increased the job 
opportunities for those Africans flooding to the towns. 93 
At the same time, the concentration of resources and 
effort on the war meant that restrictions on the movement 
to and from the towns of African men and women were 
difficult to enforce. In these circumstances, the towns 
became escape routes from the increasing hardship of 
reserve life. 
The population census of 1946 claimed that in the urban 
areas, the African majority had increased by 57.2 per 
93 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 24. 
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cent between 1936 and 1946. 94 Within this general trend, 
women were migrating at a greater rate than men. 
According to Posel, the numbers of women in the urban 
areas increased at the rate of 79.95 per cent in contrast 
to men whose numbers only increased by 4 6. 8 O per cent 
between 1936 and 1946. 95 The vast increase in the numbers 
of urbanized women ironically stemmed from the Native 
Affairs Department's attitude. Posel contends that the 
influx control of women was ineffectual because of the 
'ambiguous' attitude of the Department which combined a 
strategy of control at source with a determination not to 
'impose undue restrictions on the movement of women. 196 
Resistance flourishes 
Resistance in both the towns and countryside continued to 
flourish after 1945. The late 1940s saw the synthesis of 
a 'coherent nationalist struggle' , 97 Such resistance was 
born out of the crisis in the reserves and the expanding 
urban labour force which fed into African political 
organization and led to the emergence of more radical 
ideologies. African resistance itself cast a shadow over 
'native' administration and control. Any overt 
manifestation of such resistance was a visual reminder of 
the state's and more particularly the central 
government's and Native Affairs Department's 
ineffectiveness. 
Rural protest intensified in the post-war period. The 
government had decided to instigate a •sweeping scheme of 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., p. 46. 
97 A Ash forth, The Poli tics of Official Discourse in 
Twentieth Century South Africa, (New York, 1990), p. 119. 
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large scale rehabilitation' in the reserves in 1945. 98 In 
the Transkei, stock-culling which was crucial to this new 
improved rehabilitation met with 
hostility•. 99 In 1947, the implementation 
scheme in the district of Butterworth 
'deep-rooted 
of a betterment 
in the Transkei 
provoked 'spirited opposition' and in 1948, another 
Transkeian district, Mount Ayliff, mounted an attack on 
rehabilitation. 100 Although resistance in Witzieshoek had 
yet to become a full scale rebellion, the community's 
opposition to betterment was unmistakable in this period. 
Beinart asserted that rural opposition had the most 
decisive long term effect on rehabilitation. 101 
The establishment of the Youth League revived the African 
National Congress after the war. The Youth League infused 
Africanist ideologies into the A.N.C. According to Gail 
Gerhart, 
positive 
such ideologies projected 'a new and aggressive 
self image compounded of pride in the past, 
confident expectations for the future, and an emotional, 
burning love for the African's God-given blackness. ' 102 
The Congress began articulating a more radical 
nationalism as the voices of the Youth League became 
stronger. 
The A. N. C. found an audience in the towns of the late 
1940s which had been transformed into urban ghettos 
characterized by immense poverty and desolation and 
98 C Bundy, 'Land and Liberation: Popular Rural Protest and the 
National Liberation Movements in South Africa, 1920-1960'in 
Marks and Trapido, The Poli tics of Race. Class and 
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100 Ibid., p. 274. 
lOl Beinart, 'Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about 
Development', p. 80. 
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exacerbated by inadequate facilities. 103 The general 
strike in 1946 was the first major conflict between the 
state and Africans in the second half of the decade. The 
state responded in a brutal fashion, striking a harsh 
blow to Trade Unionism. Despite this, African resistance 
continued to burgeon, bolstered by the Atlantic Charter 
calling for self determination.104 
Women played an important role in these struggles between 
1945 and 194S. In the urban areas, faced by poor 
facilities and poverty, women came together and resisted, 
organizing marches. 105 Women also fought to keep their 
new-found sense of economic autonomy, organizing boycotts 
of beer halls which threatened their influence in the 
sphere of 
prohibiting 
brewing, and 
their right 
demonstrating against 
to brew liquor. 106 In 
laws 
the 
squatter areas it was women who often took the lead, not 
only in administering the squatter areas, but also in the 
squatter movements of the decade. 107 Women's increased 
independence gave them the tools as well as the courage 
to tackle the problems facing them. 
Segregation revisited 
Influx of Africans and its control dominated the 
political agenda between 1945 and 1948. The influx of 
women in particular, and the threat this posed to the 
state, was one of the catalysts which catapulted the 
Nationalist Party into power and saw the implementation 
103 !bid., p. 47. 
104 A Ashforth, The Poli tics of Official Discourse, 
p. 117. 
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of stringent restrictions on black people in general, but 
women in particular. The separate development theory of 
the Nationalist Party had 'crystallized' in the mid 
1940s. 108 Its main aim was to contain the influx of 
African men and women into the towns as well as to 
restrict their political voice in the reserves. The state 
sought to control Africans through the mechanism of 
'divide and rule' and the co-option of traditional 
authorities and members of the petite bourgeoisie. 109 
Behind this 
control over 
thus far. 
ideology of separation was a desire to regain 
the African female, who had •yuded control 
Between 1945 and 1948, debates in the House of Assembly 
revolved around I native' policy and administration and 
their effectiveness. The importance in these debates 
lies in what they reveal about the mood of the 1940s. 
Those debating in the House argued with a sense of 
urgency, evoking strong images of the crisis in both the 
urban and rural areas in order to substantiate views for 
and against total segregation. 
Prior to 1948, 
condemned the 
the opposition in the House relentlessly 
'native' policy of the United Party. The 
Nationalist Party chastised the Native Affairs Department 
for a policy which was 'lacking in council, lacking in 
force and lacking in determination. ' 11° Central to the 
Nationalist Party's condemnation was the influx of 
Africans to the towns. 'If we look back on the history of 
the government we find that its impotence has prevented 
it from solving our greatest problems. 1111 It argued that 
108 p Maylam, A History of the African People of South 
Africa: From the Early Iron Age to the 1970s, (Cape 
Town and Johannesburg, 1986), p. 170. 
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the government had been 'powerless• to stem the flow of 
Africans to the towns. 112 In its opinion the only answer 
was segregation, but segregation on Nationalist Party 
terms. Already in 1945 it had accused the United Party of 
tarnishing segregation. 1 This is not a policy of 
segregation, it is a policy of absolute equality•. 113 The 
Nationalist Party essentially argued that the 
government's inability to properly control resistance and 
migration had led to the African becoming an 'an 
imitation Westerner•, 114 one who sought equality on 
Western terms rather than in his own •tribal' 
environment. 
Nationalists instead argued for 'the grand principles of 
segregation' believing that the solution to African 
influx and resistance in the 1940s lay in their policy of 
national self determination. 115 Segregationist die-hards 
argued that I they [the Africans] must develop their own 
national structure. They must have their own fatherland: 
there they must have their own schools ... churches ... 
(and] the seat of their government•. 116 The premise behind 
this argument was that if the Africans had their own 
fatherland they would have 'no right to expect its 
people, who form part of the population of another 
country to be given a say in the legislative bodies of 
that country. ' 117 Clearly this policy was designed like 
the concept of migrant labour, so that Africans living in 
the towns would have no political rights and therefore 
pose no political threat. In other words those present in 
112 Ibid. 
113 HAD, (1945), vol. 54, col. 8246 
114 Ibid., col. 8240 
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the towns would be 'dependent on and limited by the needs 
of the white population. •118 
In this context, Nationalists argued that the urban areas 
were 'centres of white civilization 1119 which had to be 
exempted from 'the great influx of semi-barbarians'. 120 
Thus, in order to preserve these centres of 'white 
civilization' they maintained that 'the natives' cultural 
and intellectual centre of gravity• 1 21 had to be as far 
away from the towns as possible. 
The United Party also came under fire from the three 
Native Representatives in parliament. In 194 5, Mr 
Hemming, the representative for the Transkei, argued that 
the reclamation scheme in the reserves was 'wrong because 
it refuses to take into account the important factor that 
the country itself is overpopulated trodden out by 
human feet as much as cattle. 1122 In 1948, Mrs Ballinger, 
the Native representative for the Eastern Cape, argued 
that 'the system of native policy which has been in 
operation since 1936 has come to a point where it can no 
longer work. 1123 They argued that the government had 
failed to take into account the conditions in the 
reserves and in the towns. In terms of the government's 
policy towards the towns, the housing policy of the 
United Party had evidently achieved little as it gave 
priority to the middle class Africans rather than poorer 
Africans. 'It is a condition which has led to a mounting 
118 Ibid. , col. 128. 
119 Ibid., col. 1356. 
120 Ibid. 
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tide of disease, 
wretchedness. 1124 
of crime, of poverty, of 
In the United Party's defence, the Minister for Native 
Affairs argued that 'no Native policy can be static, just 
as little as evolution can be static. •125 He defended his 
policies, arguing that rehabilitation had failed thus far 
due to the 'shortage of men and material' rather than as 
a result of inadequate control or incongruent policies. 126 
He accepted the influx of Africans into the towns, 
instead concentrating on the problem of housing; here he 
argued that in order to forge a 'greater south Africa 1 , 
it would be necessary to eliminate the situation where 
'the native, who is one of our greatest assets' had to 
•work in the factories by day and live under a bush or in 
shacks miles from his work at night. •127 
Between 194 5 and 194 8, the various interests within the 
government were on a coll is ion course that hit home in 
1948 when the Nationalist Party usurped the majority in 
parliament. The United Party realized that its brand of 
segregation had not worked. The Prime Minister argued 
before the election in 1948 that the Nationalist policy 
of segregation was a 'bogey• 128 and the Minister of Native 
Affairs contended that it was humiliating the black 
community and that 'sooner or later these people will 
show their resentment and show it unmistakably 1 • 129 
Clearly, the revitalization of African organisation on a 
national scale was adding to the panic evident in the 
124 Ibid, , vol. 62, col. 1341. 
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House of Assembly debates over the control of Africans. 
The spread of communism was a primary concern of all 
political parties, as the African menace was identified 
as the communist threat. By 1948, the danger of the 'red 
terror' had amplified and was used as a political 
football in the elections. Nationalist campaigners argued 
that the policies and principles proposed by the United 
Party would 'infinitely aggravate the danger of communism 
in South Africa' , 130 whilst those crusading for the United 
Party declared that Nationalist policy would lead South 
Africa into the hands of the communists. 131 
The state and the African family 
A further feature of parliamentary debate in this period 
was a general concern over the plight of the African 
family and women. This was symbolic of the dilemma that 
the influx of women and the decline in reserve production 
had produced for the state. 
By 1945 a dissenting liberal voice in the House of 
Assembly was coming to grips with the realities of 
deterioration and decay in both the rural and urban areas 
and was opposed to complete segregation. Mrs Ballinger 
argued that South Africa had reached a crossroads and it 
needed to address its problems with change rather than 
'old and outworn ideas.• 132 Instead of wanting to oust the 
Africans from the towns, the Minister of Native Affairs 
argued that 'one must realize that there are large 
sections of natives who for generations have been urban 
130 Ibid., col. 62. 
131 Ibid., col. 89. 
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dwellers• 133 and who had 'in fact lost all tribal 
connections and sanctions. •134 
The United Party, along with the Native Representatives, 
therefore sought to deal with the reality of the African 
as a permanent urban resident. 'It is no exaggeration 
that the question of 
greatest problems that 
native housing is one of the 
we have to cope with today.• 13 5 
These arguments focused on homelessness, viewing it and 
not women as the cause of social decay. 
Just as those pro-segregation made use of the family and 
African women as the basis of their argument, those 
against it conjured up concern over the family in their 
defence. 
The hostels have been built in the past on the 
assumption that the African lives in the 
reserves and only comes for a short time to 
live in the towns a policy ... we opposed. 
We oppose it as being immoral, we oppose it as 
it brings down family life and because it leads 
to inefficiency and waste. 136 
Male migrancy became the target in these arguments. 'The 
operation of laws which absolutely refuse to allow 
married men and women to live together lead to moral 
deterioration'. 137 
The whole substance of rural life is being 
undermined by interference with family life. 
133 Ibid., col. 2863. 
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This absence of family discipline with all 
its consequences is an evil that presents one 
of the most serious problems 
government has to face. 138 
that the 
The segregationists also evoked a concern for African 
families and women. The construction of the African urban 
subject as masculine is evident in such discourse. 
According to this view, the preservation of the African 
family lay in the strengthening of I native kinmanship 1 
and the patriarchal baggage that went with it. 139 
Ironically, segregationists made use of Smuts's 1929 
speech to justify their points. They argued that in order 
for Africans to achieve national self-determination it 
was necessary that 'family life in the native home 
continue along traditional lines. ' 140 This was a direct 
quote from Smuts. By the use of the word 'traditional' it 
is clear that what was being advocated was male dominated 
forms of organization and control. This is corroborated 
in the same argument where they continued to quote Smuts. 
'The routine of the family and the tribe will not be 
altered in any material way. The male adults, fathers and 
sons will no doubt imbibe new ideas in their white 
employment, but their social system will not suffer on 
that account.' They believed that the influx of women 
should be prevented. 'It is the movement of the native 
family, of the women and children, which must be 
prevented•. 141 The 'desertion of the Native tribal home by 
the women and children' was perceived as the root of the 
problem of control. 14 2 
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The use of smuts in segregationists' arguments is 
significant as it illustrates the degree to which the 
United Party had digressed from the policies it had 
advocated and implemented from 193 6 onwards. such 
policies were perceived to have failed dismally by the 
time of the election of 1948. 
The Nationalist Party was able to take advantage of the 
chaos of the 1940s in its bid to win the election. 
Drawing on a strong sense of Afrikaner 
convinced the majority of voters that 
nationalism, 
its policy 
it 
of 
segregation would end the crisis in the control of the 
Africans. A major part of its election campaign was the 
construction of emotive icons which presented African men 
as potential rapists, murderers and violent er iminals. 
The Nationalists argued that the policies of the United 
Party government had led to the unprecedented influx of 
Africans into the towns, which had led to criminal 
attacks. Their election promise was to limit the influx 
of Africans and therefore put a stop to the 'swart 
gevaar'. 
This revealed the inconsistencies within the Nationalist 
policies towards the control and administration of 
Africans even before they came to power. Despite wanting 
the segregate black and white, the Nationalists could not 
expel all Africans from the towns or the farms. The pre-
requisite for development in the 'white man•s• 143 country 
was the use of African labour power in white-owned 
industries and farms. 
143 A N Pelzer, Verwoerd Speaks, (Johannesburg, 1966), p. 16. 
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1948-1951 
Rural deterioration persists 
Reserve production continued to dwindle during the first 
Nationalist Party administration. In January 1949, the 
Senior Field Research Officer at Witzieshoek bemoaned the 
extent of erosion and stressed the urgency of the need to 
reverse the damage. 144 The Agricultural Officer in a 
report in September 1949 mentioned the acute land 
problem. 
The reserve is overcrowded to a degree when the 
absolute maximum allotment of land and 
livestock per family permissible is well below 
the absolute minimum requirements of the family 
for the requirements of bare existence. 145 
In a detailed report on the reserve in 1950, Melle 
discussed in detail the underdeveloped state of the 
reserve. He argued that it was 'so over-populated, 
overstocked and denuded' that •most of the adult males' 
were forced to 'seek a livelihood outside of the 
reserve. •146 He reinforced the sense of urgency expressed 
in the two reports written in 1949 by pointing out that 
even in the event that the reserve were increased to 
double its size in 1950, 
there would not be 
a stage would be reached where 
•sufficient land for the 
inhabitants. •147 W G Ballinger, in his report on the 
reserve in 1951, summed up the situation. 'My impression 
144 SAB: NTS, 7459, 50i/327~ part 1, report to CNC from the Senior 
Field Research Officer, 31/1/1949. 
145 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Agricultural Officer (AO) to 
ANC, 27/9/1949. 
146 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to CNC, 28/9/1950. 
147 Ibid. 
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is that the reserve is, at present, over-populated and 
underdeveloped. ' 148 
Melle touched on one of the hindrances to development in 
the case of Witzieshoek. 'The women and children do 
practically all the agricultural work and under the 
Department's present organization there is no adequate 
means of teaching children and women modern methods of 
agriculture. ' 149 Instead, the increasingly desperate 
conditions in the reserves led to the escalation of 
migration. Betterment therefore continued to fail to 
bring about effective development. 
The state had continued to enforce betterment within the 
reserves, but in a new context. The demands of the 
industrial urban centres had been superseded by those of 
white farmers. Reserves continued to function as labour 
pools, but their labour was re-directed to the farms in 
the area. 
Influx magnifies 
In 1948 Mr Derbyshire, a member of the Dominion Party, 
stated in the House of Assembly that 'the greatest 
problem in South Africa ... is the influx of Natives to 
~he towns• 150 • Women in the period between 1948 and 1950 
continued to migrate at a greater rate then men. The 
rapid increase in the number of women migrating into the 
towns was illustrated in the masculinity ratios. In 
Johannesburg, for example, the ratio decreased from 2 7 6 
148 VAB: HG 4/l/2/1/487/488, court case, Rex vs Malau and 74 
others, copy of a report by Senator Ballinger, September 
1950. 
149 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to CNC, 28/9/1950. 
150 HAD, (1948), vol. 62, col. 138. 
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in 1936, to 148 in 1951, and in the East Rand from 662 to 
294,151 
One of the results was that the transition from United 
Party rule to Nationalist Party rule saw the construction 
of the male urban subject further entrenched. Nationalist 
Party discourse thus continued to castigate women in the 
towns. 
The influx of the Native women into the urban 
areas is one of the most important factors 
breaking up the family. It is constantly 
being said that the Natives in the cities 
deteriorate. The undesirable conditions are 
largely caused by the presence of women, who in 
many cases leave their homes contrary to the 
wishes of their fathers or guardians and 
contrary to tribal custom. 152 
Resistance peaks 
African Protest peaked in the early 1950s with the 
Defiance Campaign. In 1949 the A.N.C. had set down a 
Programme of Action which challenged segregation and 
called for militant and defiant resistance. The A.N.C. 
also developed and consolidated ties with the South 
African Communist Party. These movements advocated 
strategies of mass action such as boycotts, strikes and 
passive resistance such as civil disobedience and non-co-
operation, and began implementing them in 1950. 153 
151 c Simkins, 'African Urbanization at the Time of the Last Smuts 
Government·, Perspectives in Economic History, 2, 
(1983), p. 29. 
152 HAD, (1950), vol. 71, col. 3766. 
153 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 22. 
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Bonner argues that the 'most striking development of the 
1940s and 1950s was 'the partial emancipation of 
women. 1 154 According to Fatima Meer, the 'anger of women 
burst bounds' in this period. 155 In the urban areas 
between 1948 and 1951, faced by bad facilities and 
poverty, African women came together and resisted, 
organizing marches which often resulted in 'clashes with 
the pol ice' . 156 The A. N. C. Women's League emerged as a 
'real force' in 1949. Madie-Hall Xuma was replaced by Ida 
Mtwana, a member of the Youth League, as the president of 
the Women's League. The latter infused a 'more activist 
spirit' into the organization. 157 
Again, resistance was not confined to the urban areas. In 
his examination of rural resistance in The Politics of 
Race, Class and Nationalism, Bundy cited the Native 
Affairs Department reports for the years 1948 to 1952. 
All spoke of 'considerable organised opposition', 'semi-
secret organisation', alarming reverses serious 
retardation' of policy due to 'malicious agitators•. 158 
The Witzieshoek rebellion was one example of such 
resistance. What began as a 'voluntary 1 159 acceptance of 
the Trust and its officials, in Melle's opinion, 
developed over the period from 1936 to 1950 into 'solid 
opposition to the Department, its officials and any 
Government scheme. 1160 A violent clash which occurred 
154 Ibid. 
155 ' d F Meer, 'Organizing under Apartheid', in M Davies (ed), Th1r 
World - Second Sex, vol. 2, (London and New Jersey, 1987), 
p. 25. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., p. 92. 
158 Bundy, 'Land and Liberation', p. 274. 
159 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2 1 Melle to CNC, 28/9/1950. 
160 Ibid. 
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between the rebels and the police during the rebellion 
pushed it into the national limelight. On the face of it, 
Witzieshoek was just another indication of the paralysis 
of Native Affairs administration. Yet beneath the 
surface, the explosion was caused by the interference of 
the state in gender organization within the community. It 
remains a brilliant expression of the intimate 
relationship between state and gender. 
Conclusion 
Between 1939 and 1950, the policies adopted by the state 
in general, the strategies adopted by the central 
government to enforce influx control, and the scheme 
adopted by the Native Affairs Department in the reserves, 
had a particular and profound effect on gender relations 
in Witzieshoek. 
The Witzieshoek rebellion emerged out of a context 
characterized by state-enforced control over migration 
and reserves. The acknowledgement, on the part of the 
United Party by 1948, that segregation in this sense had 
failed was significant. The Witzieshoek rebellion was a 
product of a state-enforced Native Affairs policy and 
administration which had failed dismally 'on the ground' 
and which had instituted drastic changes in the lives of 
African men and women. 
Hence the Witzieshoek rebellion occurred in a context of 
rapid change which in turn created a crisis in the 
reserves and in the control of African women. Both fed 
into and moulded the trends of increased migration, 
African militancy and white conservatism. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ORGANIZED PUBLIC LIFE IN WITZIESHOEK: A DECLINE IN MALE 
AUTHORITY RELATIONS, 1939-1950 
Introduction 
In the period 1939 to 1950, two main forces shaped the 
Wi tzieshoek community: the Department of Native Affairs 
in conjunction with the Native Trust, and the migration 
of men and women. The organization of the community 
underwent a metamot"phosis which ultimately resulted in 
the erosion of male authority relations. Old patterns of 
patriarchal authority and control were severely 
undermined both by the Department and by migration, 
whilst new structures, introduced by the Department, 
hinging on male authority and control had lost legitimacy 
by 1950. In the Wi tzieshoek community a metaphor arose 
after 1939. It was expressed as a taunt by women: 'They 
tell the coward men, bring me a pair of trousers that I 
may put it on. You get the women's dress. 11 It was used 
to symbolize a man's lack of I courage• and was thus a 
direct threat to his masculinity. 2 The significance of 
this metaphor lies in its ability to encapsulate the 
transmutation of gender relations in Witzieshoek between 
1939 and 1950. 
Male authority relations: Witzieshoek, 1939 
1939 heralded a t~rning point in the organization of the 
Wi tzieshoek comrnuni ty. The implementation of betterment 
in the community not only affected the •traditional' male 
1 UNISA: AAS219, Interview, Prof Kotze with GM Mohale. 
2 Ibid. 
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authority relations, but also modified Departmental 
structures of authority. 
Prior to the direct interference in Witzieshoek systems 
of organization by the Department and Trust in 1939, the 
community had revolved around the authority of a male 
chief. His power had been checked up to 1939 by the 
presence of an Additional Native Commissioner. Yet the 
chief had, to a large extent, been allowed free reign and 
had retained much of his command over the community. 3 His 
ascendancy was backed up by male authority on a number of 
levels. Below the chief were headmen who, like the chief, 
had acquired this position through inheritance. Finally, 
each family unit was headed by a male who was in turn 
accountable to his headman and the chief. 
By 1939, with the advent of the Trust, Chief Charles' 
role as collaborator with the Department of Native 
Affairs and Trust officials at Witzieshoek had become 
entrenched. The salient difference, however, was that the 
chief was more accountable to the Native Affairs 
Department and the Trust than he was to his own people. 
1939 thus heralded a new dispensation for chiefly 
authority. 
The relationship between the Department, the Trust and 
the Witzieshoek residents was complex. The Trust had been 
charged with ensuring the 'settlement, support, benefit 
and material and moral welfare of the natives of the 
Union'. 4 This translated into the need to supervise the 
acquisition and development of land in the reserves and 
to this end its primary focus was agriculture and 
3 Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the 
Disturbances in the Witzieshoek Native Reserve, UG 
26/1951, p. 3. 
4 Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of 
Basotholand, Bechuanaland Protectorate and 
Swaziland, 24, 1948, p. 476. 
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engineering. The Trust was administered by the Minister 
of Native Affairs who had been delegated this function by 
the Governor General. 5 He in turn presided over the 
various departments of the Trust which were headed by 
directors. Each department was further divided on a 
regional and local level. The Agricultural Department, 
for example, was run by the Chief Agricultural Officers 
on a regional level and by agricultural officers assisted 
by overseers and demonstrators on a local level. 6 
Although the Trust was a 
Department of Native Affairs, 
on close collaboration 
separate body from the 
its administration depended 
with the Chief Native 
Commissioners and t~e Native Commissioners in the various 
regions. In Witzieshoek, the general administration of 
the reserve was controlled by the Department of Native 
Affairs through the Native Commissioner. The introduction 
of betterment meant that the latter's responsibility for 
the 'administration of regulations for the control of the 
location' encompassed the regulations introduced by the 
Trust. 7 Therefore the functions of the Trust fell under 
the jurisdiction of the Native Commissioner as well as 
that of the local agricultural officers. 
The Department of Native Affairs had introduced two new 
bodies charged with administering the community into the 
reserve in the beginning of the century. These bodies 
transformed the nature of patriarchy within Wi tzieshoek 
by instituting another level of authority and power held 
exclusively by men. The Native Reserve Board consisted of 
six male Africans, three elected locally and three 
appointed by the government, a representative of the 
5 Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 1939-1940, UG 
42/1941, p. 3. 
6 Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa, 24, 
1948, p. 461. 
7 Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1950-1951, 
UG 30/1953, p. 10. 
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Dutch Reformed Church, and the 
Commissioner. The magistrates court 
preside over criminal and serious 
Assistant Native 
was established to 
civil disputes. The 
establishment of betterment in the community in 1939 
changed the nature of these bodies. The Native Reserve 
Board's powers 
court was used 
laws. 
were curtailed while the magistrate's 
to prosecute those who violated Trust 
Prior to 1939, the community had also been governed by 
two 'traditional' bodies: the pitso and the khotla. 
Al though these had been effectively superseded by the 
Native Reserve Board and the magistrate's court, they had 
continued to function. The pitso was the meeting of all 
male members of the community over twenty one years of 
age (although younger boys did attend but had no speaking 
rights), which decided on all important issues, such as 
ploughing and harvesting of the chief's fields. The 
khotla, on the other hand, was a dispute-solving 
mechanism. Here, 
prohibited. 8 
again, women's participation was 
Despite women's exclusion from the pitso and khotla, a 
number of problem-solving mechanisms existed for them in 
1939. On the most basic level, women could resolve 
grievances within the family or through discussion with 
other women. 'Women did not have a meeting place; they 
could meet anywhere when they had problems but they 
usually met at their home. You would just invite the 
others to sit down and discuss these problems. ' 9 
Otherwise, a woman would either tell her husband who in 
turn would tell the headman, who would then take it to 
the chief or pitso if he was unable to resolve it, or she 
8 Interviews, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane, Shan Beerstecher 
with Mrs and Mr Moleka, Witzieshoek 14/4/1993, Shan Beerstecher 
with Mrs and Mr Mothibi, Witzieshoek, 15/4/1993. 
9 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mrs and Hr Holeka. 
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could go to the chief's wife who would either try to sort 
it out or refer it to the chief and pitso. 10 
The Wi tzieshoek Vigilance Association was set up in May 
1939 with the formal adoption of a constitution. It 
represented an alternative form of male authority to the 
one instigated by the Department. It based itself in 
Johannesburg where a large group of Witzieshoek 
inhabitants resided and had a branch in Witzieshoek 
(Leihlo La Sechaba) and Harr ismi th. It opened its 
membership to both 'men and women over seventeen years of 
age. ' 11 Though in theory its form represented a radical 
departure from the all-male pitso and khotla, its 
inclusion of women seems to have been largely 
superficial, as its discourse excluded women from the 
political realm. 
The Department and the Trust, the Chief and the 
Witzieshoek Vigilance Association: 1939-1951 
The Trust had a contradictory impact on chiefly authority 
and hence on male hegemony. By choosing to continue to 
collaborate with the government and especially the Trust 
and its officials from 1939, Chief Charles could no 
longer claim autonomy over the affairs of Wi tzieshoek. 
The government in the person of the Assistant Native 
Commissioner and the local magistrate stripped the 
chieftainship of its former authority because ultimate 
authority lay in their hands. 
This became evident right from the implementation of 
Proclamation 39 in 1939. Chief Charles no longer had the 
authority to distribute land amongst his people, a vital 
10 Ibid. 
11 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Witzieshoek Vigilance Association 
(WVA) , Constitution and Rules, 30/5/1939. 
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element of his chiefly function in the eyes of the 
community. Furthermore, he did not have the power to 
enforce any decisions regarding production in the 
community. For example, he could not sanction the 
bringing of cattle into the community without the backing 
of the Trust and its officials. 12 
The erosion of chiefly authority therefore became a real 
concern which was shared by members of the community. As 
early as 1940, the chief had to point out specifically in 
a meeting of the Chiefs and people13 that he did have the 
authority to decide cases connected with damage caused to 
arable allotments. 
I would like to point out that since the arable 
allotments have been taken over by the Board my 
people seem to be under the impression that I 
have no more authority to decide cases 
connected with any damage caused to an arable 
plot. 14 
What fuelled such a perception was the fact that the 
chief did not have authority over more important cases, 
such as cattle theft or breaking of Trust laws. 
The introduction of the Trust provided the Witz ieshoek 
Vigilance Association with a burst of energy. The 
Association concerned itself directly with Witzieshoek 
affairs right from its inception and its prime targets 
were the Department and Trust precisely because they had 
12 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, SNA TO CNC, 23/3/1948. 
13 Meetings with the Chiefs and people were organized on behalf 
of the Department and were forums where the local Native 
Commissioner and police sergeant addressed the community and 
'listened' to their grievances. They could be classified as 
Department and Trust pi tsos. 
14 SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, part 2, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
24/6/1940. 
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drained the chieftainship of its former power and 
authority. 
Its stand against both bodies made the Association 
unpopular amongst those members of the community who were 
adherents of the Department and its betterment programme. 
In 1941, the Reserve Board ignored a letter sent by AN 
Mopeli, the secretary of the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
Association, because the members of the community on the 
Board claimed that it 'did not represent the tribe 115 and 
the Association was 'always up in arms against the Chief, 
Board and Administration in the Reserve. •16 
Despite its prime targets being the Department and Trust, 
the Witzieshoek Vigilance Association unwittingly 
challenged the chief's tenuous hold over the community. 
This was because it represented an alternative form of 
male authority to the one sanctioned by the Department. 
This made it a formidable opponent of the Department and 
the chief from the outset. 
The extent to which the Association presented an 
alternative form of male authority can be gauged from its 
discourse. In an article written by the Association for 
the African newspaper Bantu World in 1942, it appealed 
directly to a sense of masculine identity. 
I hereby announce for general information that 
as the affairs of the persecution of the people 
of Witzieshoek have reached a stage 
they can no longer be taken lightly, 
each and every man's duty to do his 
bit ... you are created as men as you 
lS SAB: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 2, Minutes NRB, 23/10/1941. 
16 Ibid. 
at which 
it is now 
rightful 
all know 
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what the duty of a man is when things are like 
this. 17 
This article was calling on men, attempting to unite them 
through a common masculine identity. The inference that 
men had a specific duty in this context implied that 
women had one too, but one that was in the background. It 
was men whom the Association expected to take up the 
reins and lead the way. 
An important feature of the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
Association was that it indicated the extent of 
interaction and communication between people in the towns 
and at home. Apart from temporary sojourns back to 
Witzieshoek, members of the Association would have gained 
information on the reserve from friends and relatives, 
such as wives or grandparents. Thus, neither area existed 
in a vacuum. The fact that the Association stressed male 
authority underlined the extent to which the latter was 
being openly thwarted in the towns and at home. The 
Association was trying to bolster patriarchy in this 
context. 
The Association confirmed its allegiance to patriarchal 
authority in its desire to elevate Chief Charles to his 
'rightful' position within the community. It argued in a 
memorandum to the Native Affairs Department in 1943 that 
'the Chiefs have no power. The real Ruler is the 
Assistant Native Commissioner. The Chiefs are mere 
figureheads that must "dance to his fiddle" 1 18 The 
Association claimed to speak out on behalf of the 
community and later in the same document reiterated its 
dissatisfaction with the chiefs' lack of real power. 
17 SAB: NTS, 10313, 1/426, Copy in letter, ANC to Magistrate (Mag), 
23/4/1942. 
18 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to DNA, 26/8/1943. 
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The people feel that until Chiefs are given 
their respectful status and not the position of 
a servant of the Assistant Native Commissioner; 
and until people are given the freedom to 
direct their grievances to the proper quarters 
as soon as they felt there was an attempt at 
their oppression; so long will the African in 
this Reserve remain 'eating the bread of 
tears' . 19 
The conflict between the Association on the one hand, and 
the Department, Trust and chief on the other went beyond 
the problem of chiefly authority. The Association also 
condemned various other features of Department rule. In 
its 1943 memorandum to the Department, it denounced the 
education system of the Dutch Reformed Church which the 
Department had co-opted. It felt that educationally, the 
reserve was 'the most backward of the Sister reserves in 
the province. 1 20 It placed the blame squarely in the 
hands of the Dutch Reformed Church for this anomaly, 
which according to the Association 'gave little heed to 
the mental side of the people', due to its policy which 
was to I educate the native not to be like the white 
man'. 21 
The Association displayed a strong Africanist ideology in 
its discourse, which was encapsulated in its desire for 
'African liberty', its outcry against 'white supremacy• 
and the installation of whites rather than African 
employees of the Department and Trust. Its obvious 
distaste for the Church's education system stemmed from 
the latter's failure to place education of Africans on an 
equal footing with that of whites. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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The Association subscribed to a form of 'enlightened' or 
progressive chieftainship. By emphasizing the importance 
of the authority of the chief, while at the same time 
arguing that lack of education led to backwardness and 
ignorance, the Association was transformimg the 
chieftainship into one that sanctioned 'development'. The 
irony in this notion was that Chief Charles in his 
collaboration with the Trust and the Native Affairs 
Department perceived himself to be enlightened. According 
to an interview conducted by Prof Kotze with GM Mchale 
(the then Prime Minister of Qua Qua) in the 1970s, Chief 
Charles was an 'enlightened' chief determined to educate 
his people and ensure their economic development. 22 By 
proclaiming Chief Charles to be enlightened, Mchale was 
imposing his own values on the chief. In other words, as 
an educated member of the African elite in the seventies, 
Mchale would have perceived Chief Charles' collaboration 
with the Department as essential to the development of 
the reserve. 
Despite the Association's efforts on his behalf, the 
chief disapproved of it. This was apparent in his letter 
to the Assistant Native Commissioner in 1944. 
I am totally in disagreement with the attitude 
adopted by the Leihlo le Sechaba and the 
Witzieshoek Vigilance Association These 
bodies are unauthorised and unrecognised by me 
as far as I'm aware these bodies have a 
tendency of taking things on their own and more 
often than not have trespassed into my sphere 
of activities and jurisdiction. 23 
The chief's response was predictable as he not only 
relied on the Department for his status, but was 
22 UNISA: AAS219, Interview, Prof Kotze with GM Mohale. 
23 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, quoted by ANC to Mag, 27/3/1947. 
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essentially an organ of its authority. The Assistant 
Native Commissioner's response to the Association was 
even more vitriolic than that of the chief. The former 
demanded that it be banned to prevent it spreading its 
'poisonous propaganda in exaggerated form' and 
undermining the authority and loyalty of the chief. 24 
The irony in the chief's and other African members of the 
Board's response to the Vigilance Association was that 
despite their loyalty to the Department and Trust, their 
support of it was not unequivocal. In 1943, the chief had 
petitioned the Department of Native Affairs, deploring 
certain features of betterment. In 194 7, in a letter to 
the Chief Native Commissioner, the chief and members of 
the community listed grievances which mirrored some of 
the Association's complaints in the 1943 memorandum. They 
questioned the 'imposition of taxes without the 
consultation or advice through our chief, the virtual 
abolition of authority of chiefs and sub-chiefs whose 
existence is a tradition with us' (both emphasized by the 
Association) and the 'functioning of the Assistant Native 
Commissioner as both administrative and judicial 
officer' . 25 This directly echoed of the Association's 
disapproval of the Commissioner in 194 3. 'He is not only 
a Magistrate of his own Court but also the Master of his 
own Police and the Chairman of his own Board. 126 
Interestingly, despite a deepening of resistance towards 
the Department and Trust over the period 1939 to 1951, 
the Witzieshoek Vigilance Association did not continue to 
bloom. In 1944, The Chief Native Commissioner pointed out 
in a letter to the Additional Native Commissioner that 
'the Department is of the opinion that not too much 
notice should be taken of the Vigilance Association which 
24 Ibid. 
25 SAS: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, CC et al to CNC, 6/11/1947. 
26 SAS: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to DNA, 26/08/1943. 
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is now dying a natural death 1 • 27 This opinion was not the 
result of wishful thinking, for the Association had lost 
the energy it had displayed from 1939 to 1943. It 
reappeared briefly in 1948, when the Association sent a 
letter to the Department reacting against the 'recent 
rapid changes 
distribution of 
enforcement of 
in the Reserve', such as the unequal 
land, unfair control over trees and the 
stock limitation. 28 The Witzieshoek 
Commission of Enquiry made much of the Association's 
involvement in the rebellion in 1950. 29 The Commission's 
assessment is debatable and will be discussed in the 
appropriate chapter. 30 
The demands of the Association fell on deaf ears, while 
the chief's power continued to weaken and concern over 
his position intensified by the late 1940s. In 1947, the 
Additional Native Commissioner himself stated that, 
Chief Charles Mopeli 's position has been for 
some time not as secure as outward appearance 
would lead one to believe. There is a feeling 
amongst the tribe that the government has 
reduced the Chief to a mere figurehead and 
usurped or delegated inherited authority to 
others, thereby giving them [the people] no 
voice in the government. 31 
This impression of the chief's power was substantiated by 
perception of his character and attitude. In the same 
report, the Commissioner argued that the Chief was 'not 
27 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Secretary of Native Affairs (SNA) 
to Mag (Harrismith), 6/10/1944. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, pp. 12-13. 
30 Refer to chapter 6. 
31 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, ANC to CNC, 29/3/1947. 
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pugnacious by nature' and that this was interpreted by 
many as a 'weakness'· 32 In 1948, the Commissioner 
reiterated his argument of the previous year. 'The Chief 
is deprived of administrative duties and because of this 
his prestige and position are undermined. 133 
In 1951, in a meeting with the chief and the Witzieshoek 
people, Isak Tomale, a member of the Mopeli community, 
encapsulated the fundamental problem which the 
introduction of the Trust had created for Chief Charles. 
We are crying for the customs and respect of 
our Chief and Sub-chiefs. It is originally the 
white man that caused trouble amongst us. While 
we respected our Chief the white men pulled us 
away from him. Personally it is difficult for 
the Chief because he is not bigger than the 
Native Commissioner. It would be well if you 
could direct us, govern us, and hear us through 
our Chief. We always wanted to remain under the 
wings of our Chief. We would not like to be 
snatched from under his wings. 34 
The Native Reserve Board and chiefly authority: 1939-1949 
Part of the perception that the chief was stripped of his 
powers, in addition to his actual loss of autonomy, was 
reflected in the functioning of the Native Reserve Board 
and magistrates court after 1939. This was because these 
institutions effectively usurped the role formerly played 
by the pitso and the khotla. The pitso, though still in 
existence, could no longer enforce its decisions onto the 
32 Ibid. 
33 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, SNA to CNC, 23/3/1948. 
34 SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, part 2, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
5/9/1951. 
69 
community, while the khotla could only deal with civil 
disputes. 
The Native Reserve Board was a controversial element of 
Wi tzieshoek government in a number of other ways, and 
this affected not only its popularity but its ability to 
entrench male authority. Firstly, it was a body whose 
majority of members were not elected either by the 
community or by the chief. It took direction not from the 
chief, but from the Assistant Native Commissioner, its 
chairperson. And it relied on the African members to 
properly represent the views of the Witzieshoek 
community. Notwithstanding the use of consul tat ion, the 
forum was dominated by the Native Commissioner who in 
effect held the reins of power. 35 
In its 1943 memorandum, the Wi tzieshoek Vigilance 
Association bemoaned the fact that the Board was 'not for 
the convenience of the people but for the convenience of 
the Assistant Native Commissioner. People are never 
consulted. They are always dictated to and they 
thereafter do not question. 1 36 In a meeting with the 
Chiefs and people in 194 7, resistance to the Board was 
expressed unequivocally by one Michael Skosana: 'The 
Wi tzieshoek Native Reserve Board does not represent the 
people of Witzieshoek. It is an independent body and we 
cannot abide by what it decided in the past. 1 37 
Secondly, the Board was problematic because the pre-
requisite for election to it and voter status, was that 
one had to be a male tax paying member of the community. 
It is apparent that tax was a consistent difficulty for 
35 This is clear from the minutes of the Reserve Board meetings, SAB: 
NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 1 and 2. 
36 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to DNA, 26/8/1943. 
37 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/ 327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
12/6/1947. 
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the inhabitants of the reserve. In a meeting with the 
Chiefs and people in 1940, the Assistant Native 
Commissioner implored people to pay their taxes and 
warned them that they would be prosecuted if they failed 
to do so. 38 In 1946, he again referred to the 
'unsatisfactory tax position.' 39 Those who paid taxes 
did so erratically. For example, in April 1948, 101 
pounds were collected in taxes, in June only twenty 
pounds, ten shillings and in August as little as eleven 
pounds. Yet in November 1949, as much as 241 pounds was 
collected when four months previously only five pounds 
had been recorded. 40 
Apart from the problem that only male tax-paying members 
of the community could vote for elected representatives, 
which meant only those that could keep up with their 
taxes could vote, there was the logistical dilemma that a 
large part of the community resided outside the reserve 
and therefore was not able to be present in order to 
vote. In 1940, this was pointed out by the Witzieshoek 
Vigilance Association in relation to the election 
procedure. 'This procedure gave no opportunity to take 
part in either the nomination or the election to those 
residents ... who are temporarily absent in Johannesburg 
earning money to subsidize the inefficiency of the tribal 
lands.' 41 The fact that more than half of the 
community's taxes were paid outside of the reserve 
between 1945 and 1950 makes the elective process of the 
Reserve Board derisory. 
38 SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 24/6/1940. 
39 SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
31/12/1946. 
40 SAB: KOG, 659, AOD969C/993C, NRB, Schedule of Revenue Collections 
April 1948 to August 1950. 
41 SAB: NTS, 8150, 13/341, part 2, WVA to ANC, 21/10/1940. 
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Ergo, the legitimacy of the Board rested on the 
eligibility of the male members of the Witzieshoek 
community to vote. In the face of widespread tax evasion, 
in addition to the physical absence of those qualified to 
vote, the Board elections became farcical. The extent to 
which the Board and its actions represented a farce to 
the community can be gauged by the number of people 
attending the meetings with the Chiefs and people, a 
forum the Board relied on to advertise decisions and for 
consultation. In a community numbering approximately 
eight thousand at any one time, the numbers of one 
hundred and one hundred and fifty recorded at these 
meetings constituted a tiny percentage of the 
population. 42 Through its non-attendance of these 
meetings, the community of Witzieshoek, was signaling 
its disapproval both of such a forum of consultation, and 
of the Native Reserve Board. 
The extent to which the Reserve Board was a tool in the 
hands of the Native Commissioner, reiterating and 
enforcing Trust regulations and opinion, was underlined 
by the attitude of the Commissioner and the tone of the 
meetings. For example, in a meeting of the Board in 
January 1947, most of the Witzieshoek representatives 
voiced their disagreement with stock reduction. However, 
the Commissioner still concluded that he was pleased that 
1 the Board has entrenched that Livestock Limitation is 
necessary. 143 This was a blatant discounting of what had 
emerged at the meeting. The rejection of this form of 
public organization by men in part symbolized the decline 
in male authority relations. 
42 SAB: NTS, 6418, 29/318, Minutes, Chiefs and people, The 
minutes are also recorded in SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1 
and 2. 
43 SAB: NTS, 8144, 4/341, Minutes, NRB, 9/1/1947. 
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Migration to the towns: a threat to male authority 
relations, 1939-1950 
Witzieshoek vs the Towns 
Witzieshoek was a community which depended on an intimate 
relationship with the towns Harrismith, Johannesburg and 
Durban, in order to survive. 44 Migration largely defined 
the relationship between Witzieshoek and these towns and 
was a major source of tension, one which highlighted the 
erosion of male authority relations. This was due to a 
number of factors. 
Although the movement of men to and from the towns 
enjoyed the tacit support of both the members of the 
community and its chief, female migration was condemned. 
In order to supplement the rapidly diminishing resources 
in Witzieshoek, which had an impact on the economic well-
being of the community as well as on the community's 
ability to sustain social relations, outside employment 
for men had become a necessity early in the century. In 
his account of the Rand in 1939, Mopeli-Paulus revealed 
how the inability to acquire cattle, which were essential 
in regulating marriage transactions, without outside 
funding forced men to migrate. He described how recruits 
would board the buses and cry out, 'I' 11 marry when I 
come back! I'm working for cattle for the wedding' . 45 
Migration of men had been formalized in 1938 with the 
appointment of an attesting officer for recruitment in 
Witzieshoek. 46 In 1938, 1 90% of able bodied Natives' were 
migrating to the towns. 47 
44 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle.', pp. 
48 and 101. 
45 Drum, December 1954, p. 68. 
46 SAB: NTS, 2325, 939/280, Recruiting in Witzieshoek. 
47 SAB: NTS, 2210, 372/280, AssNC to DNA, 27/7/1938. 
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In contrast, women migrants could not 
towns in order to build up an insurance 
soJourn to the 
policy for the 
future. Women migrants could not rely on returning to the 
rural areas, as their access to land was dependent on a 
husband or on his dependents. Furthermore, unlike men who 
could leave their stock and land in the hands of their 
wives, women could not. Their only hope of returning to 
the Hoek once they had migrated would be on the arm of 
their husbands. As Walker contends, for women, migration 
was 'far more likely to be permanent•. 48 
Migration was also problematic because it symbolized the 
movement of both women and men beyond the realm of 
chiefly control. In his article on life on the reef, 
Mopeli-Paulus made this clear: 'The chiefs at home have 
no power or influence over these people, or the lives 
they come to. ,49 This was exacerbated by the social 
relations which operated in the towns, which were 
distinguished by independent women. 
Mopeli-Paulus managed to capture the spirit of the social 
relations operating in the towns in his story on the 
Rand. He described how 'his' Basotho women had shouted 
'If you are a man, come let me tell you - keep 
away, my boy! Go to the Christians! Here is 
Benoni Twatwa. We rule ourselves. ' Then 
throwing their skirts above their knees and 
crying. 'Take and eat. ' 50 
48 Walker, 'Gender and the Development of Migrant Labour System•, p. 
188. 
49 Drum, December 1954, p. 66. 
50 Ibid., p. 68. 
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By shouting out, 'We rule ourselves', these women were 
taunting men with their power to do as they pleased. This 
was a power which seemed to stern from their sexuality: 
'Take and eat' . The Basotho women were making use of 
their bodies on two levels. The first level was similar 
to that described by Caroline Ifeka-Moller in her study 
of the Women's War in Nigeria. Ifeka-Moller's study is 
particularly useful as it provides an insight into the 
use of the sexual insult. She argues that what men of the 
day viewed as 'obscene gestures' of 'nearly naked' women 
were in fact a mechanism of self identity and pride to 
the Igbo women. 51 They were intentionally exposing their 
genitalia to stress not to men but to themselves the 
important function they controlled: reproduction. Ifeka-
Moller argued that women in that society had a 'cultural 
identity ('feminine') which placed more emphasis on 
women's biological functions than did men's identity 
('masculine') on their biology.' 52 This was true of 
Witzieshoek society which revered motherhood above all 
and hence women's biological ability to reproduce. 53 By 
using their bodies, and therefore, a sexually explicit 
action, Igbo women were re-asserting their identity as 
reproducers. 'Hidden from sight behind the genitalia is 
the womb, which I suggest as the operator of female 
reproduction, was the source of the Igbo woman's pride in 
herself as a woman. 154 Like the Igbo women, Witzieshoek 
women were stating their pride in their womanhood and 
through this re-asserting their self-identity as women. 
The second level was as a means to taunt men. It is after 
all in the realm of sexuality that men can lose their 
51 C Ifeka-Moller, 'Female Militancy and Colonial Revolt: The Women's 
War of 1929, Eastern Nigeria' ins Ardener (ed), Perceiving 
Women, (New York, 1975), p. 129. 
52 Ibid., p. 144. 
53 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The world and the Cattle', p. 8. 
54 Ifeka-Holler, 'Female Militancy', p. 127. 
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self control and hence their ability to exert power. By 
exposing the source of that lack of control and further 
by shouting 'take and eat! ' women were exhibiting the 
fact that within the domain of sexuality they had a 
potential source of power. That source of power was 
accentuated by the ability to reproduce. 
In Witzieshoek, reproduction was central to women's 
identity and a potential source of power, but it was 
regulated by bridewealth transactions. In the context of 
the towns, reproduction was something that women 
controlled. They did not have to involve themselves in 
the institutions governing marriage or to rely on the men 
who regulated these institutions. Thus, by exposing their 
independence, of these ins ti tut ions and of men, women 
were flaunting the threat they presented to male control. 
The towns enabled them to import an important part of 
their self-identity from Witzieshoek, but at the same 
time enabled them to thwart men in the process. 
The significance of Mopeli-Paulus' extract lies not only 
in the actions of the women, but in his response. In an 
attempt to condemn these women, Mopeli-Paulus constructed 
them through symbols and terms asserting their sexuality 
and 'immorality'. He did so by linking women to liquor 
and prostitution, both of which he condemned. An example 
of this can be found in the second chapter. 55 He 
reiterated his antipathy towards these women by decribing 
an incident where a friend visited prostitutes. 'Young 
women appeared and started hanging oround their necks 
encouraging them to buy more brandy'. once Mopeli's 
friend was so drunk that he was 'scarcely conscious', he 
was taken to another room and the women •told him to take 
his trousers off, took them, and walked out of the room 
with them.' It was only the next day that he realized 
that he had lost all the money that he had been carrying 
55 Refer to chapter 2. 
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on his person. 56 Theft was thus added to these women's 
repertoire. The restlessness between town and countryside 
is marked by Mopeli-Paulus I association of town women 
with negative icons and an implicit assumption that rural 
women were free from such vices. 
The increasing autonomy of women in the urban areas also 
affected the behaviour of men in these districts which in 
turn fed into the conflict between Wi tzieshoek and the 
towns. Men reaffirmed their masculinity through the 
taking of male wives. '"Father I am a contented man. For 
now I am married to a girl - a girl found for me in the 
compound" and the girl they sing of is no girl but a 
boy. ,57 
Patrick Harries argues that the taking of male 'wives' in 
the compounds of the early Witwatersrand gold mines was 
an attempt by men to reconstruct the gender differences 
they were familiar with in the rural areas and through 
this to perpetuate their masculine identity and 
domination over women in a context where the latter were 
not present. 58 The fact that the taking of male wives was 
still taking place in 1939 suggests that men continued to 
reinforce their masculine identity and domination over 
- :-,;,;.,er 
women, despite the increasing presence of wemen. In 
Mopeli-Paulus' story, he maintains that the 'immoral' 
actions of town women, their prostitution, brewing of 
liquor and theft, led men to conclude that 'it's safer to 
stick to boys 1 • 59 
56 Drum, December 1954, p. 67. 
57 Ibid., p. 68. 
58 P Harries, 'Symbols and Sexuality: Culture and Identity on the 
Early Witwatersrand Gold Hines', Gender and History, 2/3, 
(1990), p. 324. 
59 Drum, December 1954, p. 67. 
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According to Harries, the process which started off with 
the new young arrivals becoming 'wives' and ended when 
the same men took their own 'wives' was a type of rite of 
passage marking the transition from boyhood to manhood. 60 
This reflected the ideologies in the rural areas where 
marriage and the accompanying full sexual relations 
between girls and boys 'marked the passage from childhood 
to adulthood' as well as locking them into their 
distinctive masculine and feminine gender roles. 61 
In the context of migrant labour, young boys in the rural 
areas were inclined to identify with their mothers who 
were left in charge of the homesteads. 62 Therefore, on 
reaching the urban areas, boys were weaned of these ties 
through their liaisons with men. These relationships 
incorporated them into the male world, teaching them 
through re-enactions of gender roles how to behave as men 
and how to interact with women. 63 Harries points out 
that these liaisons acted as a means to 'strengthen male 
identity at a time when men's extended absence from the 
rural areas was making women increasingly powerful at 
home. ' 64 
The importance of this practice to Witzieshoek lies in 
the fact that men were establishing and defining new 
relations to entrench male authority because the latter 
was rapidly eroding on the home front and within the 
towns. Such actions on the part of men in the towns went 
beyond accepted custom, contributing to the stress 
between town and countryside. The parameters enforced by 
town life meant that femininity and masculinity were cast 
60 Harries, 'Symbols and Sexuality', p. 327. 
61 Ibid., p. 326. 
62 Ibid., p. 327. 
63 Ibid., p. 328. 
64 Ibid. 
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in a new mould. This created a conflict between the 
ideologies governing self-identity in Witz ieshoek which 
were based on patriarchy and a particular sexual division 
of labour, and the ideologies directing self-identity 
within the towns. 
Chief Charles' response to the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
Association must also be analyzed in this mould. His 
conclusions were dictated by his perceptions of the towns 
and their influence on his people and hence indicated the 
restlessness between the two. He stated that the 
Witzieshoek Vigilance Association consisted of 
'Witzieshoek inhabitants who spend most of their lives in 
Johannesburg and who are filled with the spirit of 
Johannesburg life. 165 One can see how Chief Charles' 
attitude reflected that of Mopeli-Paulus. In order to 
condemn the Association and its membership, it was enough 
for them to be linked to the towns. 
Finally, the strain between the towns and the reserve was 
affected by the return of inhabitants with newly-formed 
ideas. According to Mr Modernwane, attitudes of the 
people migrating into the towns had altered on their 
return. 'The change was towards not listening, not 
conforming to the standards, and in some of the 
traditions and customs if one were to apply logic, they 
sounded illogical and there would be evolution like that 
(sic]. 166 Note the emphasis on the word •not', for 
returning migrants were clearly no longer subscribing to 
the social relations and customs governing life in 
Witzieshoek. 
65 SAB: 7459, 506/327, part 2, CC quoted in letter from SNA to MNA, 
21/3/1950. 
66 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
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A case 1n point was an 
that those returning 
molesting young girls. 
appeal made by the local sergeant 
to Witzieshoek refrain from 
He drew attention to young boys returning from 
Johannesburg swanking in public places in their 
Oxford bags. They had no respect for 
Europeans and did not support their parents. 
That they go about molesting young girls. That 
this sort of thing must be stopped. 67 
The perpetration of violent behaviour on the part of men, 
whether confined to migrants or not, was a further 
indication 
structures. 
of the disruption 
such incidences of 
in male 
violence 
authority 
represent 
attempts by men to assert their domination over women. 
The employment of actions such as rape or assault against 
women have been shown to be a form of male control in 
black South African societies in this period by Janssen 
Jurriet. 68 Moreover, Lloyd Vogelman reveals a useful 
contemporary explanation of such behaviour which can be 
applied to Witzieshoek. 'Sometimes men rape women who 
appear to defy control of their own 1 i ves - women who 
seem to break the rules. Rape, or other forms of 
violence, is then inflicted so as to ensure the woman's 
respect for the man's authority and her renewed or 
continuing adherence to prevailing notions of f erninine 
behaviour 1 • 69 
67 SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
22/9/1936. Please note that such presentations of returning 
migrants were bound up in the state discourse of the period 
seeking to caste the towns as places of evil. This particular 
statement, though illuminating, must be viewed within such a 
context. Those young boys who had not gone to the towns as yet 
were certainly not necessarily exempt from such behaviour. 
68 J Jurriet, Sexism, the Male Monopoly on History and 
Thought, (New York, 1982), pp. 224-226. 
69 L Vogelman, The Sexual face of Violence I Rapists on Rape, 
(Johannesburg, 1990), p. 29. 
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In Witzieshoek, in 1947 for instance, the majority of 
cases heard in the regional court were those of assault, 
perpetrated by men against women. Interestingly, in all 
such cases, the victim was the attacker's wife or a 
relative such as a mother, aunt or grandmother. One man 
claimed that he had burnt down a woman's hut because she 
had ended their affair. There were also three reported 
cases of rape. In the one incident the brother-in-law 
raped his sister-in-law, whose husband was in Johanesburg 
at the time. 70 
The notion that Smuts had alluded to in his speech in 
1929, that male migrants would not imbibe new ideas in 
the town, proved to be unrealistic. This created a 
tension in the fabric of the community which was 
aggravated by the migration of women specifically, and by 
the movement of both men and women outside of the chief's 
control. 
Migration: the pitso and the khotla, 1939-1950 
The widespread migration 
(Witz ieshoek) had a profound 
of men 
impact on 
from the 
the pitsos 
Hoek 
and 
therefore on political organization and male control. The 
absence of men disrupted a number of political processes 
which by 1950 had become radically transformed. 
By 1950, according to GM Mohale, women still constituted 
the majority in Witzieshoek. 71 In the context of a 
minority of men, women chose the most direct route to 
air their views. They started attending pitsos and 
70 VAB: LWI, 1/1/1/1, part 1, court :Records, Harrismith. The other 
two rapists were not related to their victims in any 
way. 
71 UNISA: AAS219, Interview, Prof Kotze with GM Mohale. 
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speaking out about their grievances. 72 In his life story, 
Mopeli-Paulus explained exactly which women attended 
pi tsos in 1950. 'Some of these women were widows or the 
wives of men who were out working on the mines or the 
farms or the towns, who felt that they had responsibility 
for the lands and cattle. •73 
Secondly, without a male family head to represent them, 
women were also attending khotlas and being given the 
opportunity to speak out about disputes. 74 Thus, the 
absence of men disrupted the flow of communication from 
the male family head to the chief. By 1950, pi tsos and 
khotlas were no longer defined by their male membership 
but rather as broader, more inclusive community 
institutions. This, of course had a devastating effect on 
the pi tso and khotla as mechanisms for male control. In 
the absence of any other all-male forum which was 
legitimate in the eyes of the community, the changed 
gender composition of the pitso and the khotla 
represented the erosion of male control. 
The decay of masculine authority should be viewed within 
the framework of the social relations which governed 
Witzieshoek. The sexual division of labour was an 
important organizing construct in the community. In order 
to sustain production and reproduction, tasks were 
customarily divided into men's and women's 
responsibilities. Underlying this division was a 
complementary separation between masculine and feminine 
identities. Although both the sexual division of labour 
and gender identification were not static, they were 
72 Interviews, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane, Shan Beerstecher 
with Mrs and Mr Moleka, Shan Beerstecher with Mrs and Mr 
Mothibi. 
73 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 119. 
74 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
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reinforced from generation to generation through the 
socialization of children. 
In his autobiography, Mopeli-Paulus illustrates the 
entrenchment of masculine and feminine identities and 
categories within Witzieshoek. He describes how as a boy 
he had been expected to herd cattle and sleep alongside 
the other boys in the community. The strict separation 
between the tasks expected of boys and girls was 
reinforced by an overt entrenchment of gender 
differences. Mopeli explained that the strongest of the 
herd boys would be given the title 'mampoli', once he had 
'shown his strength by beating all the others in stick 
fights. ' This young boy would then command respect and 
have the power to 'order any boy to bring food for 
him. 175 The 'mampoli' was only revered once he had 
displayed the strength and aggression associated with 
masculinity. This was sharply contrasted with girls' and 
women's behaviour. 
We were afraid of being called 'women' and 
longed to be men. Our ways toughened us, and we 
also knew that the girls were forever asking, 
'Who amongst the herd boys is the biggest and 
strongest fighter? A Basotho boy feels 
important when he goes wounded among the 
girls! 76 
This strong sense of masculine identity was reinforced 
beyond the discourse of the herd boys. 
When the herd boys are herding in the fields, 
any man passing by on the road had the right to 
call them up and flog them. If, after a 
75 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 8. 
76 Ibid. 
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flogging, a boy should cry because of pain, the 
others will turn on him, and mock him thus: 
Are you a woman, to cry? 
Man is a Ram and does not cry. 77 
This absorption of gender identity was reinforced by 
custom. For example when Mopeli-Paulus was young, he was 
confused about the strict laws regulating food 
consumption. He described how he asked an old man at the 
khotla, 'Why girls should not be allowed to eat eggs? 178 
By the time that women were attending pitsos and khotlas, 
which Mopeli-Paulus described as 'the place of the men•, 
the generation of children that Mopeli-Paulus represented 
were in their early forties. 79 Their sense of masculinity 
or femininity that had been defined through their 
socialization from an early age would have been severely 
challenged by I the place of men I becoming the place of 
women and men. 
When asked about pitsos and khotlas, Mr Mothibi, of the 
same generation as Mopeli-Paulus, replied that at first 
women did not attend, but later they had been allowed to 
do so and that pi tsos had I lost their meaning I as a 
result. 80 Mr Modernwane addressed the issue in more 
detail and related it back to dissatisfaction with the 
Trust. He pointed out that there was •resistance• on the 
part of men towards women's involvement in pi tsos and 
khotlas. 81 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., p. 15. 
79 Ibid. 
SO Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mrs and Mr Mothibi. 
81 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
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In fact there was a great dislike of the Trust 
because there was some recognition attached to 
women whose husbands had died. If the 
cattle of the women did something wrong she 
would be the person to be charged. 
there were cases where they were 
You know, 
all by 
themselves and that didn't quite sit with the 
people around here. Because as far as they were 
concerned, if a woman had a case she would have 
to be accompanied by a male member of the 
family. 82 
Although the subject of women attending pitsos and 
khotlas was not recorded at the meetings of the Chiefs 
end peoole, the consistent calls by men for a return to 
chiefly control screamed out a desire to return to 
systems of organization based on male control. 'As you 
can see we have a chief under whom we live in this 
Reserve. Without him we as a tribe can do nothing. •83 
Mopeli-Paulus addressed the issue in a more roundabout 
way. 
I thought of the days of my grandfather, when 
the Chiefs had power over the land. The 
Basothos are loyal people because their Chiefs 
know that they must see to the needs and 
interests of their followers. Otherwise why 
should they follow them? In the old days no 
common man went hungry in a good year: men 
gathered round their chief at khotla and food 
was brought there and everyone ate and drank 
and then sat to discuss a case, or played 
maraba-maraba that betrays the herd boys, for 
82 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
83 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/ 327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
8/7/1948. 
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gatherings held by other male members of the community 
from which the chief was excluded. 89 
Conclusion 
The implementation of the Trust and its betterment 
programme in 1939 had a profound impact on male authority 
in Witzieshoek. The power and authority of the chief was 
severely eroded and this created frustration within the 
community, which was manifested in ambivalent attitudes 
towards the chief. Demands for the ful 1 restoration of 
chiefly authority were contradicted by alternative 
authority structures such as the Vigilance Association 
and by meetings which excluded the chief. Antipathy 
towards the Trust was exacerbated by the Native Reserve 
Board and the magistrate's court, both of which 
undermined the pitso and khotla. 
Male authority was assaulted from another front, the 
towns. Migration to the towns by both men and women 
adversely affected the authority structures in the 
reserve between 1939 and 1950. Migrants were not only 
beyond the grasp of the chief and the Trust, but were 
also actively challenging accepted norms in the towns as 
well as on their return to Wi tzieshoek. Women migrants 
created specific problems due to their relative 
independence. The threat presented to the community and 
to male 
increasing 
1950, the 
control by migration to 
independence for women 
structures that were in 
the towns led to 
in Witzieshoek. By 
place in Witz ieshoek 
resembled those in place in 1939 in name only. Male 
authority relations had been severely undermined. 
89 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Court case, Rex vs Malau and Mopeli-
Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 119. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OPPOSITION TO BETTERMENT: WITZIESHOEK, 1936-1950 
'Witzieshoek is the tombstone of the betterment scheme in 
south Africa• 1 
In order to obtain a rounded view of the context 
informing and moulding the minds of Witzieshoek 
inhabitants, it is necessary to look at the 
underdevelopment of Witzieshoek in this period and the 
parallel implementation of a betterment strategy in the 
area. Betterment threatened the organization of the 
Witzieshoek community which was based on both the 
productive and reproductive capabilities of its women, as 
well as the authority of men over women. Furthermore, the 
effects of both decay and betterment were felt more 
keenly by women than by men between 1936 and 1950. Male 
migrant workers, though ultimately affected by the 
situation in Witzieshoek, did not have to deal with it on 
a daily basis. 
In 1936, the Agricultural Department of the Department of 
Native Affairs appointed a technical committee 'to 
investigate and recommend measures for improving 
conditions in the reserve. •2 The recommendations included 
measures to erect fences, control grazing, oversee the 
division and demarcation of lands and to reduce 
livestock. 3 In 1939, Proclamation 31 was implemented, and 
the reserve was officially declared a betterment area. 
1936 thus marked the beginning of a period of so-called 
development in Witzieshoek, characterized by interference 
1 HAD, (1951), vol. 76, col.8421. 
2 SAB: 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to CNC, 28/9/1950. 
2 Ibid. 
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on the part of the Department, and later the Trust, in 
the organization of production. This production was 
located within a community which had been based on the 
sexual division of labour between women and men, but 
which was now predominantly dependent on the labour of 
women. Members of the cornrouni ty began encountering the 
Trust officials on a daily basis. 
Opposition to Betterment: a gender interpretation 
•cattle is our God': the system of bohali pre-1939 
Betterment presented a threat to the custom of bohal i 4 , 
upon which the social organization of the Witzieshoek 
community was predicated. Bohali was a custom that 
essentially harnessed women's productive and reproductive 
functions. 
Following Jeff Guy, the 'essential element' in southern 
African pre-capitalist societies was the 'union between a 
man and a woman that established the homestead' which in 
turn was the 'unit of production' that formed the basis 
of that society. 5 Guy argues that bridewealth was a 
'social transaction which united two great male concerns: 
the control of women and cattle in a dynamic totality. 16 
In this process, men were able to control women's 
productive roles in both the domestic and agricultural 
arenas as well as women's fertility and their 
reproductive role by maintaining control over cattle, the 
essential ingredient in the marriage transaction. 
4 A payment in the form of cattle. 
5 J Guy, 'Gender Oppression', p. 36. 
6 Ibid. 
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Women had been the backbone of Witzieshoek society before 
the intervention of the Trust. Production revolved around 
their role as producers and reproducers. In the first 
instance, the community relied on the food women 
harvested and cooked and in the second instance, its 
continued existence was based upon their fertility. As 
Jeff Guy argues, women's ability to produce offspring and 
hence create labour power enabled them to create a 
surplus, not in material goods but in the form of persons 
and their labour power. 7 Cattle were incorporated into 
Witzieshoek and other societies precisely because they 
could be amassed and surpluses, in the hands of men, 
could be used as bohali in order to gain control over 
productive and reproductive women. 
Thus, Guy concludes that cattle were important to men in 
pre-capitalist societies in two respects: their pure 
value as agricultural products and their role in the 
perpetual reproductive cycle of women. In essence, cattle 
unleashed the labour power of women in the homestead 
which resulted not only in production, but through 
reproduction in increased labour power and hence 
increased production. Cattle directly empowered their 
male owners; the more cattle a man amassed, the greater 
his social, as well as economic and political power. 
Mopeli-Paulus illustrated this phenomenon with regards to 
Witzieshoek. 
I had always admired my uncles, who had married 
many wives~ and had thought how good it was to 
have a large family, with plenty of boys to 
look after the stock. When my cousins came out 
to the mines they formed a good and happy team 
of workers, who sent much money to their 
fathers, who, in turn, could easily afford to 
7 Ibid., p. 40. 
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buy cattle for bohali - the bride price - and 
marry them well. 8 
This process was cyclical. Each member of the community, 
whether male or female, was subject to different rules 
and differential access to social power depending on 
their age. This was because age was thought to determine 
fertility and potency. 9 Mopeli-Paulus explained how he 
was subject to his parents' and the community's authority 
from pre-adolescence. For example, at a young age, he was 
expected to help herd cattle; later he had to obtain his 
father's permission to leave the community to work in the 
city, and finally his father chose his prospective wife 
for him. 10 He wrote that 'the golden rule of the Basotho 
is that a child owes all he owns to his parents. ' 11 The 
youngest members of the community, both male and female, 
were subject to the greatest control, especially once 
fertile. Once married, the husband could start amassing 
his own cattle and thus acquire the social power that 
older men had obtained. 
Land was not only a crucial resource within the 
community, but it was also bound up with the gendered 
organization of the community. Plot allocation prior to 
Trust infiltration had been in the hands of the chief. 
Women's access to arable land was through a husband or a 
father. Unmarried women would be expected to help work 
their mothers' plots and could only 'own' a plot after 
marriage. Married men would be allocated a plot of land 
for each of their wives. Thus, the key to amassing land 
was amassing wives. Therefore, in order to gain land, 
both men and women depended on successful marriage 
8 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 39. 
9 Guy, 'Gender Oppression', p. 42. 
lO Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 59. 
11 Ibid., p. 58. 
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transactions. Hence the issues of cattle and women's 
productive and reproductive capacity were inextricably 
linked to the land. 
Stock limitation: a threat to 'our God' 
Men react, 1939-1950 
On 14 June 193 9, at a meeting of the Reserve Board and 
the Headmen in Witzieshoek, the provisions of a draft 
proclamation limiting stock were accepted and its 
application agreed upon. 12 This was the most 
controversial element of the Trust regulations. The issue 
of consultation was part of the battle against this 
proclamation, but the root of the resistance was a 
desperate bid to recreate systems of organization based 
on earlier gender relations. 
In Witzieshoek between 1936 and 1950, the homestead still 
constituted the basic productive unit, despite the fact 
that its form had radically altered. Hence bohali 
continued to operate as a mechanism to establish 
homesteads and cement ties between homesteads. 
Perhaps the single most controversial aspect of African 
culture, according to white conservationists in the 
period under examination, 
to 'hoard' cattle. 13 The 
was the tendency for Africans 
inability of conservationists 
and Trust officials in Witzieshoek and elsewhere to 
accept the centrality of cattle to the functioning of 
African society, economically, politically and socially, 
was to lay the foundations for conflict. 
12 SAB:7335, 127/327, Meeting, NRB, Chiefs and headmen, 14/6/1938. 
13 Beinart, 'Soil Erosion, Conservation and Ideas about Development', 
p. 59. 
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Chief Charles Mopeli articulated this conflict in a 
letter to the Chief Native Commissioner: 
It is the declared policy of the Government 
that the African people must develop on their 
own lines. For such development, it will be 
conceded, the recognition and observance of 
traditions, as distinct from anything that can 
fairly be regarded as primitive or uncivilized 
practices, are first essentials. Directly or 
indirectly to force the abandonment of a 
tradition would amount to the very negation of 
the African developing along his own lines and 
can only create a feeling of frustration in the 
African mind. This is precisely what the 
application of Proclamation 31 of 1939 does for 
it runs counter to one of our most cherished 
traditions. We refer to our marriage system, 
one of the foundations of which is the payment 
of dowry in the form of stock. 14 
The statement by Chief Charles indicated that bohali 
still featured prominently in the community despite the 
fact that it had been disrupted by migration of men and 
women, severe shortages of land and sharp divisions 
between those who owned large herds and those who owned 
only a few cattle. Ironically enough, instead of 
weakening the practice of bohal i, these conditions had 
more firmly embedded it in the community. 
This is illustrated in Mopeli-Paulus• autobiography. 
14 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, CC et al to CNC, 6/11/1947, and in 
SAE, NTS, 6814, 29/318. 
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What among all things come first? The Masotho 
would say, 'cattle'. He will calculate on his 
fingers, and work out how many cows will calve 
next year, and then be able to say how many of 
his sons will marry. cattle are his bank, and 
he says money is useless to him, for it does 
not give birth, as cows do every year, it 
cannot confirm a marriage; it cannot serve at 
any ceremonies. From cattle he gets meat, and 
hides to make blankets, but he would rather the 
beast died on its own than slaughter it .... It 
is true he thinks of them as father, mother and 
God to him, calling it 'Molimo o nko e 
metsi'-his 'God with the watering nose•. 15 
In his evidence to the Tomlinson Commission, the Native 
Commissioner claimed that eighty per cent of marital 
unions in Witzieshoek were customary, in other words 
1 lobolo marriages'. 16 The importance of cattle was 
expressed by other male members of the community in 
petitions, in letters and in meetings between 1939 and 
1950. For instance, in 1947 during a meeting of the 
Reserve Board, a male member elected to the board, E 
Mopeli, stated, •cattle is our God just the same as money 
is the whiteman's God. 117 David Mopeli, another 
Wi tzieshoek resident, wrote to the Secretary of Native 
Affairs: 'stock is our bank'· 1 8 In 1948, at a meeting of 
the Chiefs and people, a certain Micheal Sekhosana 
directly linked the importance of cattle to community 
resistance to the Trust: 'This stock lirni tat ion kills 
15 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 107. 
16 Tomlinson Commission, Vol. 23, Questionaire, Native 
Co[lUTlissioner, District: Witzieshoek, p. 9. 
17 SAB: 8144, 4/341, part 3, Minutes of the meeting of the Native 
Reserve Board, 9/11/1947. 
18 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, letter from David Letsie Mopeli 
to the SNA, 17/8/1945. 
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us. 119 
served 
These 
to 
expressions 
legitimize 
of the 
bohali 
centrality of cattle 
and its function in 
controlling women and entrenching senior male authority. 
Male migrants from Witzieshoek also endorsed the custom 
of bohali. The Principal Agricultural Officer stated that 
•much money obtained from the sale of labour outside of 
the district• was invested in cattle within it. 20 
Migrants were investing in cattle in order to secure 
social status. Once married, cattle guaranteed them 
legitimacy, a place in society and ultimately the social 
status they coveted, as well as the means to further 
control women's productive and reproductive capacities. 
The paradox was that as the 1930s and 1940s unfolded, the 
likelihood that male migrants and permanent residents 
could obtain such social power was diminishing. It is 
therefore necessary to explain why these men continued to 
defend and advocate bohali. 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that male authority 
in Witzieshoek between 1939 and 1950 was continually 
challenged by the implementation of the Trust, the 
migration of men and women, and the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
Association. The concern over chiefly authority and the 
khotla and pi tso were also bound up with the issue of 
cattle. This was because these institutions were closely 
linked to cattle in the discourse of the community. In 
the khotla or pitso, each man who spoke first greeted the 
chief in terms of cattle. •cattle, the son of Thesele 1 or 
1 We thank the cattle, son of Moshoeshoe 1 • 21 Therefore, 
respect towards the chief and his authority was 
19 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
8/7/1948. 
20 Tomlin son Commission, vol: 23, Questionaire; Agricultural 
Officers, District: Witzieshoek, p. 3. 
21 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 14. 
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intimately linked to cattle and their position in the 
community. Mopeli-Paulus made this link more explicit: 
He had great respect for his cattle, and great 
love. He knows each beast by name, and the 
words to describe them are always on his lips. 
He greets his chief thus: 'Cattle, son of 
Thesele!' or 'Cattle, Morena!' and after food 
has been given him by his chief, he will speak 
thus: 'Likhomo ha li ate, Morena! ' , 'Let the 
cattle increase, Chief!' meaning, 'Let there be 
food again tomorrow. I shall not be hungry as 
long as I have my chief. 22 
The link between cattle and the chief fuelled the 
resistance on the part of men against stock 1 imitation. 
In essence, stock limitation represented the single most 
important threat to male authority and control. James 
Ferguson investigated the centrality of cattle to Lesotho 
society after capitalist infiltration. His study relates 
directly to Witzieshoek, not only because of the close 
geographical association between Witzieshoek and Lesotho, 
but because Witzieshoek residents were Basothos and thus 
had similar beliefs and practices to the Basothos 
Ferguson 
offer an 
studied. Furthermore, 
insightful framework 
Witzieshoek residents. 
Ferguson's conclusions 
within which to study 
According to Ferguson, in Basotho society in Lesotho, a 
man's social power was dependent on the number of his 
livestock. A man who was weal thy in this sense was one 
who had a large herd. 23 such a man was called a 'rnorui' 
in Basotho society and was respected not only because of 
his wealth in cattle but because these cattle effectively 
22 Ibid., p. 107. 
23 J Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, {Lesotho, 1992), p. 
152. 
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belonged to the whole community. An informant explained 
this concept: 'Because with the cattle, he will hire me 
with them, so that he ploughs for me or does various 
things for me with these animals. Now I, too, am able to 
live. 124 
This was equally true of Witzieshoek between 1939 and 
1950. In interviews, men and women recalled this kind of 
social wealth. Cattle in the community would be shared 
out in order to assist with ploughing, or to provide 
milk. Mr Modernwane provided an example which indicated 
another form of this I shared' weal th. 'And there was a 
system where if you didn't have a herd boy in your 
family, you would give somebody your cattle to look after 
and he would enjoy the use of the milk and also you would 
have to give him something' . 25 He then went on to say, 
'Now those who didn't have the means that is how they 
worked out. ' 26 Here we see the practical application of 
the statement, 'Now I, too am able to live.' 
Of course, in this context, chiefs were the most 
respected 'morui'. Guy points out that chiefs should be 
seen as 'the richest and most powerful' males. 2 7 Their 
power ultimately rested on the ability to harness women's 
productive and reproductive potentials. Hence poli tica 1 
power rested on the social and economic power afforded 
men by the flow of cattle and women. The chiefs' wealth 
represented the ultimate form of 'shared' weal th, that 
went beyond just cattle. This demonstrates that the 
reactions of men in Witzieshoek to stock limitation 
between 1930 and 1950 were not irrational. To them the 
only way to rehabilitate Witzieshoek was to continue to 
24 Ibid., p. 153. 
25 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Guy, 'Gender Oppression', p. 42. 
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advocate bohali so that it could continue to represent 
productive and reproductive power of women as well as 
shared wealth. 
Ferguson scrutinized 
the Lesotho economy 
'traditional' uses of cattle within 
after capitalist infiltration and 
within the migrant labour system, providing a valuable 
explanation of men's continued reverence for cattle. He 
concluded that in the Lesotho context, characterized by 
largely absent men, livestock as a male possession 
assumed a new importance. It legitimized the husband as 
head of the household by providing tangible and visible 
support of dependents, even in his absence. It also 
functioned as a symbolic re-assertion of the husband's 
'structural presence even in the face of his physical 
absence'. 28 Finally, despite men's absence, cattle 
enabled them to become involved in the community through 
'relations of patronage and reciprocity•. 29 Such an 
analysis is easily applicable to Witzieshoek, a community 
similarly characterized by male migrancy, where bohali 
continued to dominate the agenda of men both inside and 
outside of reserve. 
Women's perspective, 1939-1950 
Resistance against stock limitation was not exclusively 
male. Women did have limited access to cattle and hence a 
form of power. Bohali also provided Witzieshoek women 
with access to marriage, children and the status 
associated with motherhood. Moreover, in the absence of 
men, as more and more women were becoming surrogate 
household heads, cattle became part of their domain, 
albeit temporarily. 
28 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 156. 
29 Ibid. 
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In order to evaluate women's reactions to stock 
lirni tat ion, it is necessary to examine in more detail 
what bohali meant to them. Prior to capitalist 
penetration, women had enjoyed increased privileges and 
rights with age. In her study of southern African women, 
Harriet Ngubane uses the example of the pre-capitalist 
marriage system to elucidate this point. She argues that 
throughout southern African societies, the newly married 
woman was the most vulnerable, needing to adapt to strict 
rules governing her code of conduct in the new envirornent 
of her in-laws. 30 The fact that this practice continued 
in Witzieshoek after contact with European capital was 
attested to by Mopeli-Paulus. He described the 
incorporation of his own mother 
household. 
into his father's 
When the wife of a chief is still a bride, she 
has to work like any other married women until 
she is accustomed to her new home, so my mother 
would get up early to cook the porridge for the 
herdboys to take with them; she went onto the 
lands to do the weeding; she brewed beer, and 
attended to all the requirements of the house, 
as does any ngoetsi of the village. The 
basotho saying goes: 'Horne is where a man had 
enough to eat'. 31 
Once the 'ngoetsi' had given birth to her first child, 
her status improved as motherhood was revered above all 
else in women. 
According to our custom, a mother of a newly-
born child stays inside her house for a period 
of about three months. She is spoon-fed, and 
not expected to do any work, and her people 
30 H Ngubane, 'Southern Africa and the Women's Decade', (copy of 
draft chapter, 1991), p. 23. 
31 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Catt le', p. 18. 
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take great pride in hearing others speak of her 
as fat and nice-looking. 32 
As a newcomer, the wife would initially fall under the 
jurisdiction of the mother in law, but in time would set 
up her own kitchen and gain access to a field. 33 Once her 
children had grown up and in turn married, she would then 
earn the status of mother-in-law herself. This was a 
position which enjoyed respect within the society. 
Mopeli-Paulus recounted an incident where his 
grandmother, whom he described as •a woman of strong 
character', summoned the father of a boy who had hit him 
and run away to avoid retribution 'to answer to her for 
his son. 134 The father clearly had no choice but to 
respect the wishes of the old woman. In this position, a 
woman had the power to make decisions about the household 
and became an important part of the religious practices 
within it. 35 Ngubane asserts that at this stage women 
'played a crucial part, not only in terms of procreation 
and socialization of children but in emphasizing and 
perpetuating social norms• 36 
Furthermore, Ngubane argues that women could own cattle. 
These acquisitions, though, were restricted there were 
only two avenues by which they could obtain cattle. On 
marriage, a woman was given a milch cow with its heifer 
by her father. This was to supply the new wife with 
access to milk, something she was denied in her husband's 
home. 37 Secondly, when her own daughters married, she was 
given a 'special mother's beast' which was usually a 
32 Ibid., p. 8. 
33 Ngubane, 'Southern Africa', p. 23. 
34 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 13. 
35 Ngubane, 'Southern African•, p. 25. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., p. 32. 
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young cow. 38 Finally, by virtue of her position within 
the homestead, a wife had access to the power and 
prestige associated with the cattle owned by her husband. 
Ngubane argues that wives had a form of •economic power' 
as a result. 39 Such power was based, however, on forming 
a liaison with a man. 
In Witzieshoek, between 1939 and 1950, motherhood and 
cattle continued to be a vi ta 1 element contributing to 
women's social and economic security. The dilemma that 
land deterioration and male migration had created in 
their lives made such security a major priority. In order 
to establish some sort of collateral for the future, 
women had the option of subscribing to bohali or 
prioritizing cash as a resource. 
Women's access to cash was determined by the extent of 
their dependence on wage-earning husbands and sons, or 
their direct involvement in the informal economy (beer 
brewing or making clay pots). Moreover, remittances from 
husbands and sons were not always regularly provided and 
cash earned through the informal economy could not always 
ensure economic security, especially with the increasing 
deterioration of the reserve. For women, the only 
realistic escape from the reciprocal and restrictive 
relations imposed by bridewealth, therefore, was 
migration to the towns beyond the limits of chiefly and 
familial control. Women in the towns could largely ignore 
bohali because a different system of organization 
operated there which was regulated by cash rather than by 
cattle. 
In Witzieshoek right up to 1950, cattle still superseded 
cash. Not only did they dominate bohali transactions, but 
they were also used in rituals such as those celebrating 
38 Ibid. p. 33. 
39 Ibid. 
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birth .. 4° Chief Charles and a number of other people made 
the former apparent in a letter to the Chief Native 
Commissioner. 'Our people think in terms of stock and not 
in terms of cash unless circumstances force us to do 
so. ,41 The fact that eighty per cent of marriages in 
Witzieshoek were customary suggests that women in 
Witzieshoek continued to subscribe to bohali and 
therefore had a stake in resisting stock limitation. 42 
Generation vs generation? 
By 1939, the institution of bohali was handicapped by 
migration from the Hoek and by challenges from within. 
Although the practice continued, problems associated with 
degeneration, such as lack of cattle and desertion by 
male inhabitants, combined with new ideas and beliefs 
absorbed from the towns, chipped away at its core. This 
was reflected in conflicting attitudes between the young 
and the old. 
In Ferguson's analysis of Lesotho, not everyone 
subscribed to bohali. He argued that the interests of the 
younger generation di verged from those of the older. In 
order to retain power and prestige, older people had a 
stake in maintaining and upholding bridewealth as the 
means to harness the wealth of younger men and to control 
women. Young men, on the other hand, were torn between 
building up an investment for their old age and having to 
contend with external claims to their wealth in the form 
of bohali payments. In contrast, young women had no such 
conflicting feelings. According to Ferguson, they were 
40 Interview, Shan Eeerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
41 SAE: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, CC et al to CNC, 6/11/1947, and in 
SAE, NTS, 6814, 29/318. 
42 Tomlin son Commission, vol. 23, Questionnaire, Native 
commissioner, District: Witzieshoek, p. 9. 
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the system. 43 Older women, 'constant attackers' of 
though, tended to have contradictory views. They were 
staunch supporters of the system where they had access to 
the wealth of younger men, yet if they relied totally on 
cash as a resource, cattle no longer interested them. 44 
Yet, younger men and women would eventually become the 
older generation. Thus the cycle would continue and they 
would eventually have to subscribe to such traditions or 
abandon them and the accompanying power and prestige 
altogether. 
For both men and women in Witzieshoek, stock limitation 
presented an overt threat to already disrupted systems of 
organization. In a meeting of the Chiefs and people, Mona 
Mopeli summed up the problem. 
Some of my people have six married sons. 
According to custom we have to pay dowry up to 
10 head of cattle. If I have to pay 10 head of 
cattle in respect of one son, and I only have 
10 cattle, then I will have to kill the rest of 
my sons. These children which are not married 
according to custom commit adultery and break 
the law. 45 
The issue of consultation 
Both women and men in he community expressed a number of 
grievances against the Trust, which had escalated into 
demands by 1950. The implementation of betterment rested 
on the assumption that adequate consul tat ion with male 
members of the community had taken place. One of the 
43 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 164. 
44 Ibid., p. 164. 
45 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
8/7/1948. 
104 
terms of the draft stated that the application of the 
proclamation could occur 'after consultation with the 
inhabitants thereof and with any District or Local 
Council having jurisdiction. 146 In the case of 
Witzieshoek, a theme which permeates the resistance was a 
perception on the part of a large section of the 
community that insufficient consultation had taken place. 
Consultation in this sense was more than just permission 
to implement betterment. It also included the enforcement 
of Trust rules and regulations. 
On the face of it, consultation was a male issue in 1939. 
This was because 'consultation with the inhabitants' 
actually meant consultation with the male inhabitants. As 
pointed out before, the Trust recognized and entrenched 
male participation in political structures and decision-
making.47 But this posed a serious problem for the men at 
Witz ieshoek, because consul tat ion occurred in a context 
in which the majority of them were away. 
The fact that large numbers of men were absent from 
Witzieshoek 
effectively 
when such 
eliminated 
'consultation' took 
their political 
place, 
voice. 
Furthermore, men who were away or who were forced to 
migrate subsequent to consultation were forced to rely on 
their wives or mothers. This immediately created a 
dilemma for the men. On the one hand, the only persons 
who could protect their interests were women. Yet women 
were politically silent as they were given no official 
opportunity to express their opinion within the existing 
decision making structures. On the other hand, women 
formed the majority of permanent residents and hence 
would have been the individuals implementing betterment. 
In this context, consultation and betterment became a 
46 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Draft Proclamation for Stock 
Limitation, 14/2/1939. 
47 Refer to chapter 3 
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sham because there was a discrepancy between those 
consulted and those who in fact implemented the policy. 
In fact, the whole issue of consultation over betterment 
was absurd. This was because the terms of consul tat ion 
were not negotiable. The Trust and the Department of 
Native Affairs were simply looking for a rubber stamp 
rather than meaningful debate. They were not talking the 
same language as the Witzieshoek inhabitants. To the 
Trust and the Department, betterment was a purely 
technical solution to the crisis in production. Its 
implementation therefore was not contestable in their 
eyes. To the Witzieshoek community, betterment went far 
beyond the technical. As a programme of action, it 
infringed on the social organization of the community 
which regulated men's productive and women's productive 
and reproductive power. 
The perception that insufficient consultation had taken 
and was taking place manifested itself in the community 
only from 1943. The previous year had seen the community 
willingly taking part in a culling operation. According 
to the Native Commissioner, lying behind the change in 
attitude was 'the manner in which it was introduced~~ 
He pointed out that the Witzieshoek inhabitants were 
claiming that they accepted and supported 'livestock 
improvement' and not 'limitation' thereof 'which they 
would never have voted for. •49 Livestock improvement 
represented an entirely different concept to the 
community than it did to the Department and Trust. 
The Trust believed that part of the process of improving 
stock in Witzieshoek was the limitation of numbers. To 
this end, it assessed the carrying capacity in February 
48 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Letter from ANC to CNC, 
29/3/1947. 
44 Ibid. 
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19 4 O and determined that Witz ieshoek should be limited 
to 12, 500 cattle uni ts. so The community, on the other 
hand, viewed livestock improvement as a means to upgrade 
their stock. The resentment generated by 'the manner in 
which it [culling] was introduced' was only a small part 
of the resistance to stock limitation. Opposition was 
rooted in the central importance of amassing cattle to 
the organization of the community. 
Bound up with the initial consent on the part of both men 
and women to cull was the notion that improvement would 
bolster bohali, not eradicate it. 51 Those who argued that 
stock improvement did not mean limitation expressed this 
sentiment. In 1943, the Witzieshoek Vigilance Association 
argued in its memorandum to the Minister of Native 
Affairs, 
When the stock was culled last year, the plea 
was that the government wanted people to own 
better animals ... things do seem that the aim 
of the local authority was the limitation of 
stock rather than improvement. 52 
The Association's distress over the issue of stock 
limitation not only emphasized the significance of cattle 
to male migrants in the towns, but highlighted the link 
between the towns and the reserve. Furthermore, it 
displayed the universality of the opposition to stock 
limitation. 
5o SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Government Notice, 2/2/1940. 
51 In the absence of men, a large number of women had presented 
cattle for counting and culling in 1942. They had made the 
final decision to cull, even if they had consulted their 
husbands. The decision to oppose culling was made for all 
practical purposes, by women as it was up to them whether to 
submit cattle for culling. 
52 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to MNA, 26/8/1943. 
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The Association I s grievance was a direct reflection of 
reserve residents' frustration over the issue. In a 
letter to the Chief Native Commissioner in 1947, the 
Additional Native Commissioner stated that residents of 
Witzieshoek claimed 'that they never agreed to stock 
limitation and that they were "sold" by the Reserve Board 
when it agreed that this area be declared a betterment 
area' . 53 
This view was reiterated in 194 7 at a meeting of the 
Native Reserve Board. According to E Mopeli, a male 
resident of Witz ieshoek and a memt)er of the Board, 'It 
was not explained to us at the time that we had to accept 
livestock limitation .•.. The tribe has been deceived and 
the tribe has never accepted the Proclamation as we now 
understand it. 154 
These ideas were voiced repeatedly in meetings with the 
Chiefs and people, as well as in representations to the 
Native Commissioner. For example, in 
Chief Native 
a meeting between 
Commissioner and the Additional and 
committees representing the Mopeli and Batlokwa 
communities in January 1948, Joseph Kaba intimated that 
he had evidence to prove that no consultation had taken 
place in connection with stock limitation. 55 In the same 
month of that year, in a meeting of the Chiefs and 
people, it was stated that 'the people were not told 
everything about stock limitation. The people were under 
the impression that only inferior stock would be culled. 
This however is not the case as good stock is also culled 
53 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Letter from ANC to CNC, 
23/6/1947. 
54 SAS: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 3, Minutes, NRS, 9/1/1947. 
55 SAS: NTS, 6814, 29/318, part 2, Minutes of a meeting between the 
CNC, ANC and committees representing the Mopeli and Batlokwa 
communities, 22/1/1948. 
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now. 156 By 1949, frustration over the issue of 
consultation regarding stock limitation had reached a 
level that prompted Chief Charles Mopeli to appeal to the 
Minister of Native Affairs to suspend the enforcement of 
Proclamation 31 of 1939. 57 
Consultation was also a contentious issue in terms of 
other rules and regulations instigated by the Trust. Yet 
again the general perception arose that new rules were 
being enforced without any form of discussion or 
deliberation with the community. Tied to the discontent 
concerning insufficient consultation, was dissatisfaction 
with the Native Reserve Board. The Reserve Board was 
accused of misleading the Witzieshoek community with 
regard to stock limitation and other regulations. 
The Witzieshoek Vigilance Association articulated this 
sentiment in its 1943 document. 'People never get to know 
what was discussed and concluded in the Board, until it 
came to them as ''Law from the Native Affairs 
Department. ,'59 The situation was worsened by the system 
of fines which went hand in hand with failure to comply 
with rules and regulations. In the same document, the 
Association complained about heavy fines. In 1944, the 
Native Commissioner reinforced the Association's stand-
point in a letter to the Director of Native Labour. 1 The 
Assistant Native Commissioner 
unsympathetic. He is known to the 
'Ponto Le Leshome' (Ten pounds) 
fine of less than ten pounds.• 59 
1S said to be 
natives by the name of 
as he seldom imposes a 
In 1946, the members of 
the community included this grievance in a petition (not 
56 Ibid. 
57 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Telegram from Frank Smuts to MNA, 
1949. 
58 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to MNA, 26/8/1943. 
59 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Letter from NC to Director of 
Native Labour, 5/7/1944. 
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sanctioned by Chief Charles): 'New laws and regulations 
are at present being made for the Reserve about which we 
know nothing and we are prosecuted as soon as we break 
them. 1 60 John Mabaso succinctly put forward the case of 
the Wi tzieshoek community: 'The Trust has in the last 
fourteen years only got fines out of us. 161 A telegram to 
the Minister of ~ative Affairs in 1949 described the mood 
of Witzieshoek inhabitants as 'bordering on unrest' . 62 
This unrest was characterized by both male and female 
participation. 
Opposition to betterment: daily resistance 
Cattle culling 
Men's and women's reactions to stock limitation were 
additionally affected by the culling process itself. The 
purpose of the cull was to brand any animal that was 
considered inferior with a cull mark. These animals would 
then have to be produced for a stock sale. This procedure 
<-: 
inevitably di~dvataged the owner of such an animal. 
'Cattle with a "cull" brand do not get good prices at the 
sales. ' 63 
The culling process was itself dubious. According to an 
interview with a local white trader, culling was done in 
a 'haphazard manner• 64 and in an assessment of the culls 
of 1942 and 1946, the Agricultural officer at Witzieshoek 
60 SAE: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2' Petition, 1946. 
61 SAE: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Minutes, NRE, 1/5/1950. 
62 SAE: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Telegram, Frank Smuts to MNA, 
1949. 
63 SAE: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Minutes, NRE, 1/5/1950. 
64 UNISA: AAS219, Interview Prof Kotze with Mr MA Brandt and wife. 
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admitted that the effects of culling were 'nullified by 
the inability of the local officers to maintain control 
of the 1 i vestock. ' 65 This was due to the tactic on the 
part of many members of the community to 'dodge' the 
culling by evacuating 'large numbers of their animals 
immediately prior to a count or cull and to recall these 
immediately after the cull had been completed'. 66 This 
process made it impossible to prove, in the absence of 
any identifying marks on the cattle, that any 'animal was 
not produced for counting or culling. 167 
The tendency in Witzieshoek to dodge the cull was more 
than just a means of avoiding the ramifications of having 
to sell an animal with a cull brand. Ferguson argues that 
the Basotho in his case study were reluctant to sell 
their cattle because they represented something greater 
than mere cash. Because their function went beyond an 
ordinary agricultural product, people would be willing to 
buy cattle but not to sell. In other words, there was a 
'one way barrier: cash can always be converted to cattle 
through purchase; cattle, however, cannot be converted to 
cash through sale, except under certain conditions' . 68 
Cattle represented more than simply stored weal th, or a 
kind of a bank for both men and women, and thus 
reluctance to accept a cull mark was part of a reluctance 
to sell cattle at all. 
To a large extent, it was women who had to contend with 
haphazard culling. Stock had to be brought to the culling 
by adult members of the community and in the absence of 
sons or fathers, this task was the responsibility of 
65 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Letter from Agricultural Officer 
(AO) to CNC, 27/9/1949. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, p. 147. 
111 
women. It was women who had to deal directly with culling 
officers. 
In addition to the inefficient culling methods of the 
Trust, the 'light-hearted legislation' and the 'haphazard 
fashion' in which Proclamation 31 'had been conceived and 
drafted' meant that the few who were prosecuted for 
failing to produce cattle at culling had good grounds for 
defence. 69 In 194 6, the Trust unsuccesfully prosecuted 
four male members of the community for failure to present 
stock at the cull. In the judgement on appeal at the 
Supreme Court, Mr Justice F P van den Heever pointed out 
that 'the proclamation was silent on how the time and 
place fixed by the Culling Officer were to be brought to 
the notice of those who were subjected to its 
upliftment.' 70 The Justice stated 'we are dealing with a 
Native Reserve. Why not publication in the Paris S0ir? 171 
Similarly, 1n 1949, male members of the community, who had 
been convicted of driving stock into closed camps, 
successfully appealed to the Supreme Court. 72 In a letter 
to the Secretary for Native Affairs in March 1950, the 
Attorney General stated unequivocally that he was 'not 
anxious to direct criminal proceedings for either failing 
to produce stock for culling or obstructing the culling 
officers' precisely because of the difficulties 
associated with successful prosecution. 73 
Successful evasion of culling encouraged defiance on the 
part of the community towards both stock limitation and 
69 SAB: NTS, 506/327, part 1, Farmers Weekly, 19/3/1947. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Telegram to DNA, 16/2/1950. 
73 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Attorney General (AG) to SNA, 
7/3/1950. 
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the Trust. The fact that the members of the community had 
'won so many of the legal proceedings' boosted the 'open 
defiance of the law' according to the Agricultural 
Officer in 1949. 74 
More importantly, it was within this set of circumstances 
that Paulus Howell Mopeli 75 assumed a prominent role in 
the community which was to thrust him into a leadership 
position during the unrest of 1950. Mopelyana (as he was 
more commonly known) had been one of the successful 
applicants in the appeal against conviction in 1947. 
This, coupled with his provocative attitude towards the 
Trust and the Department, earned him 'a full measure of 
awe and admiration•· 76 
Mr and Mrs Mothibi explained this 'awe and admiration': 
The first year [1942] they agreed (to cull 
their stock], but Mopelyana refused and the 
second year [1946] they agreed and Mopelyana 
still refused. So they decided to join him 
because they could see that their cattle were, 
the number, getting smaller while Mopelyana was 
still retaining his. 77 
Mopelyana' s esteem within the community was also due to 
the status and prestige he had achieved as the owner of 
cattle. He was a 'morui' , a man who was due reverence. 
Furthermore as a part of the Chief Charles' family, he 
had status associated with the ruling class and this 
would have also given him a measure of respect. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Paulus Howell Mopeli and Atwell Mopeli-Paulus are two different 
people. 
76 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part l, ANC to CNC, 29/3/1947. 
77 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Mothibi. 
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Grazing camps 
Linked to the limitation of stock was the implementation 
of a comprehensive grazing system in the reserve in 1936. 
This radically affected the day-to-day existence of the 
members of the community. In 1936, the Trust divided part 
of Witzieshoek into five grazing camps, each 
approximately 4,500 morgen in size which were fenced in 
and monitored by rangers employed by the Trust. 78 The 
rangers were expected to maintain the camps and ensure 
that the required permits were acquired by persons 
seeking to move their cattle to and from the enclosures. 
Ironically, it was women who had to contend with the 
daily irritants of the grazing system. As a large 
majority of men were away and boys who usually herded 
cattle were in school or only around on certain days, 
taking care of the stock became yet another priority on a 
long list of women's responsibilities. 
Not only did women have to contend with demands relating 
to stock care, including registering and producing it for 
sale, but they also had to deal with the permit system. 
'The tribe are experiencing great difficulty with the 
permit system, as many men are away from the reserve and 
women and children are put to the trouble of going to the 
Stock Cammi ttee to get a recommendation and then to the 
office for the necessary permit. 179 In September 1946, in 
a letter to the Department, two members of the community 
lamented that women had been arrested whilst driving 
stock in the camps and had been fined. 80 Widows were 
considered to be particularly vulnerable. 'The tribe 
78 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to CNC, 28/9/1950. 
79 Ibid. 
80 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Letter to DNA from E Peete and E 
Mabasa, 2/9/1946. 
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desires that widows be allowed to graze their stock in 
the same grazing camps as their guardians so that they 
can keep an eye on the stock.' 81 Apart from having to 
obtain permits for cattle, women also needed to get 
permits for collecting water, smearing the floors and for 
cutting down trees. 82 
The whole system of grazing control was a pressure point 
between the community and the Trust. Oral evidence 
suggests a strong animosity towards the grazing camps. 
Both men and women were frustrated by official closure of 
grazing camps, ~ther for resting the soil or for culling 
purposes. This further restricted the grazing areas which 
were oversubscribed anyway. In the 1946 petition, this 
difficulty received specific attention. 'The closing of 
the four former grazing camps had caused great 
dissatisfaction among all the people, as there are no 
signs of soi 1 erosion in any of these camps, and the 
other grazing provided this year is very poor, and 
limited. •83 Albert Mopeli, a Witzieshoek resident, 
complained in a letter to the Secretary of Native Affairs 
in 1947 that the closure of certain grazing camps in 
winter would result in inadequate land for grazing. 84 
Rangers were also contentious, as they were Africans from 
outside the reserve who were in effect given control over 
the stock of the Wi tzieshoek residents. Male opposition 
to the rangers stemmed from two sources. Men who were 
living in the reserve resented their interference and 
this was exacerbated by daily contact. Such anger was 
9/1/1947. Note the 81 SAS: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 3, Minutes NRB, 
use of the word 'guardians•. Widows have 
another indication of male authority. 
a childlike status, 
82 SAB: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 3, Minutes NRB, 1942 and Interviews, 
Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane, Mr and Mrs Moleka, Mr 
Molaba and Mr and Mrs Mothibi. 
83 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Petition, 1946. 
84 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Albert Mopeli to SNA, 12/1/1947. 
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made clear when in 1949 a male member of the cornrnuni ty 
pointed out that the driving of cattle by Trust employees 
was 'causing a lot of resentment among the tribe. •85 
h Futhermore, ~ether men lived within or outside the 
reserve they resented restrictions placed on what they 
considered to be their domain. Rangers also angered women 
I 
in the reserve. As the persons primacy responsible for 
stock care on a daily basis, women had to contend 
directly with the rangers and with any problems 
associated with them. 
In 1939, in an article in Bantu World, a Trust 
spokesperson described the rangers as men responsible for 
patrolling and caring for the grazing camps. 86 According 
to members of the community, the rangers were not 
fulfilling this function. In 1945 they were blamed for 
the theft of stock from the camps. 87 The petition of 1946 
pointed out that 'the gate to the grazing camp number 2' 
was in a state of disrepair and that the gate was not 
'properly closed 1 • 88 Also in 1946, Chief Charles 
complained at a general meeting that the people were 
experiencing difficulties getting their stock out of the 
grazing camps because rangers were not always available· 89 
The rangers' role in giving evidence which could lead to 
prosecution further antagonized community members. In a 
letter to the Chief Native Commissioner, the magistrate 
stated that he could not always rely on the evidence of 
the rangers; they 'may be untruthful in giving 
SS SAB: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 3, Minutes, NRB, 17/2/1949. 
86 Bantu World, 20 June 1939. 
87 SAB: NTS, 6814, 318, part 2, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
28/9/1945. 
88 Ibid. 
89 SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, part 2, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
31/12/1946. 
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information to the Additional Native Commissioner' . 90 
Unjustified prosecution angered the members of the 
community further. 
Forced Relocation 
In order to 
members of 
elsewhere. 
Witzieshoek. 
Mopeli and 
accommodate the five 
been 
grazing camps, some 
forcibly relocated the 
This 
community 
affected 
had 
both men and women in 
A case in point was the removal of Howell 
'his small following' in 1941. 91 Howell 
Mopeli, Mopelyana's father, 
number one and, according 
after much unpleasantness 
been compelled to move. 92 
had resided in grazing camp 
to the Commissioner, 'only 
(and) repeated warnings' had 
When he finally did move, 
Mopeli made the following comment: 'We wish to state that 
we do this with the deepest feeling of the wrong done to 
us.• 93 The frustration felt by the community in the face 
of forced removals generated frustration. This was 
expressed by Howell Mopeli: 'my residences have been 
shifted so many times I do not think I'll be safe 
anywhere. ' 94 
Related to this was the forced re-allocation of arable 
allotments which also caused much resentment between the 
community and the Trust. In the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
Association's memorandum, mention was made of this. 'This 
season a number of residents, including helpless widows, 
were made to pay heavy fines ranging from two pounds to 
90 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Letter to CNC from Mag, 
18/8/1950. 
91 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, ANC to CNC, 29/3/1947. 
92 Ibid. 
93 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Howell Mopeli to SNA, 28/11/1943. 
94 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Howell Mopeli to SNA, 2/3/1941. 
117 
three pounds for cultivating under stress of want lands 
they used to cultivate. •95 The Association argued that in 
the light of the scarcity of food, such a response was 
'particularly unfair'. 96 The Board minutes recorded an 
incident in 1944 when a woman was relocated to a new plot 
of land 'but persisted in asking to be allowed to 
cultivate her original land' and was subsequently fined 
five pounds when 'she stubbornly went and ploughed the 
prohibited land. 197 
Women, who had to take on responsibilities formerly 
allocated to men in addition to their own tasks, were 
strongly affected. Not only were women forced to cling to 
institutions such as bohali which offered them some sort 
of security in a context of shrinking resources, but they 
were also having to come to terms with encountering Trust 
and Department officials on a daily basis. 
Land Administration 
Land was a crucial resource and the severe lack of it 
placed betterment 
awkward position. 
I 
as a development 
In the first place, 
programme, in an 
it was unable to 
accommodate the approximately seven hundred landless 
families in the area, who either relied totally on a 
meagre number of 
members working 
stock or were at the mercy of 
outside Witzieshoek. 98 Secondly, 
family 
those 
who occupied land, in 
finding it increasingly 
this case mainly women, were 
difficult to produce enough to 
support their own families, let alone any surplus for the 
market. 
95 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to MNA, 26/8/1943. 
96 Ibid. 
97 SAB: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 2, Minutes NRB, 1944 .. 
98 · SAB: NTS, 8150, 506/327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
8/7/1948. 
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The Trust had to establish a betterment programme of land 
administration within the constraints imposed by the 
dearth of land in Witzieshoek. In an attempt to cater for 
as many inhabitants as possible, the Trust divided the 
arable lands into three-morgen plots in 19 3 9, which it 
allocated to rnen. 99 In the case of widows, however, the 
Trust further divided the plots into units of one and a 
half morgen. This caused resentment amongst the locals. 
In 1943, in a petition to the Native Affairs Department, 
Chief Charles pointed out that it was 'very hard to eke a 
living even on 5 morgen' and that on three morgen it was 
even more difficult. 100 In the same year, the Vigilance 
Association argued that plots allotted were 'far too 
small'· 1°1 In 1945, mention was made in a meeting of the 
Chiefs and people of the 'shortage of land 1 • 102 In 1946, 
another petition to the Department argued that three 
morgen were not enough to I support a family. 1 103 As the 
primary producers, women were the most deeply affected by 
the severe lack of land. Not only did they have to 
contend with dwindling resources, but they did not 
benefit directly from the Trust's agricultural expertise 
because it blindly ignored their role. 
Those widows who had to produce on one and a half morgen 
of land struggled most. This is borne out by the fact 
that they were a constant concern within the community. 
In order to protect widows I interests and create some 
sort of security, the community had set up a system 
99 SAE: URU, 1983, 2726, Proclamation re: Regulations for the 
administration and control of land in Witzieshoek, 23/9/1941. 
lOO SAE: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Petition submitted by CC, 
3/9/1943. 
lOl SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, WVA to HNA, 26/8/1943. 
102 SAE: NTS, 6814, 29 / 318, part 2, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
28/9/1945. 
l0 3 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Petition, 1946. 
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whereby the widows' brothers-in-law would maintain them 
and their children. 104 In the context of underdevelopment 
and increasing competition for resources between 1939 and 
1950, such brothers-in-law found it increasingly 
difficult to fulfil this role. As a result, widows were 
increasingly deprived. In a meeting of the Native Reserve 
Board, Chief Charles pleaded with the government to 
'sympathize with the taxing of widows on account of the 
hard living' they were experiencing. 105 Unattached women 
and widows faced a particular problem: 'These people are 
left with minor children who are unable to work and they 
also cannot obtain employment anywhere. 1106 
Alongside stock limitation, rules and regulations 
relating to land and its agricultural production were 
also contentious in the period following the 
implementation of betterment. As pointed out above, land 
was the other major reason for resistance against the 
Trust. 
The Trust regulations accorded the Native Commissioner 
the role of allocating plots. He could 'allot to any 
local tax-payer or married Native or Kraalhead an arable 
allotment•. 107 Women who were widowed or 'unattached with 
family obligations' were entitled to land as the term 
'kraalhead' 
practife. 108 
included them, though more in theory than in 
Nevertheless the land al located to men was 
generally handed over to the care of women, as had been 
the practice in the past. This was especially so for the 
majority of male migrants who left women in charge of 
104 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Moleka. 
lOS SAB: NTS, 8144, 4/341, part 2, Minutes, NRB, 23/10/1941. 
l0 6 SAB: NTS, 7849, 46/336, part 1, Letter from CC to ANC, 10/8/1936. 
107 SAB: URU, 1983, 2726, Proclamation, Land Administration, 
23/9/1941. 
l0 8 Ibid. 
120 
their plots. 109 As a result, women continued to fulfil 
their 'traditional' role as producers but under 
increasingly adverse circumstances. 
The fact that the Native commissioner could cancel any 
allotment 'if the allotment holder was more than two 
years in arrears with any payment of local tax' only 
served to exacerbate the situation . 110 As women were by 
and large the persons responsible for plots, they relied 
on procuring cash in some form or other. Those who were 
married depended on their wage-earning husbands or sons 
to fulfil the tax obligation. 111 However, such dependence 
made them vulnerable. 
Such vulnerability could deteriorate into a predicament 
if the husband or son decided to cut off all ties with 
the reserve, a not unusual decision. Mopeli-Paulus writes 
of how he asked an old man why he had not returned to the 
reserve. The latter had replied that people were 'eaten 
by the reef', and were content with life there and had 
nothing to return to. 112 
109 
How can you expect us to go home when there is 
not enough land for us there? We must pay our 
poll-tax, we must pay the levy to the chief, we 
must maintain our families. How can we do all 
these things when there is nowhere to plough? 113 
This is confirmed by oral evidence. Interview, Shan Beerstecher 
with Mr Modernwane and Mr Molaba and interview, Prof Kotze with 
Mr Mohali. 
llO SAB: URU, 1983, 2726, Proclamation, Land Administration, 
23/9/1941. 
111 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
112 Drum, December 1954, p. 67. 
ll3 Ibid. 
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The fact 
aware of 
disaster, 
overcome 
that 
their 
is 
cash 
women in the period of examination were 
susceptible state and the potential for 
attested to by the steps they took to 
flow needs. Interviews with Witzieshoek 
residents indicate that women were acquiring cash through 
a type of informal economy in the reserve. They drew on 
skills they already had at their disposal, making clay 
pots, 'kerries'or calabashes, by weaving mats or selling 
homebrew. 114 
Ironically, despite serious money difficulties, the Trust 
did nothing to encourage this informal economy. It even 
went so far as to act against it by instituting another 
condition for the cancellation of an allotment, if the 
allotment holder was 'convicted of any contravention of 
the liquor laws or if any person permitted by the 
allotment holder to be on the allotment [was] guilty of 
an offence 
allotment or 
[was] found 
against 
if any 
at the 
the liquor laws while upon such 
intoxicating or spirituous liquor 
time on the allotment. 1115 By 
restricting the brewing of liquor, 
off a potential resource for 
whether as a result of economic 
the Trust was cutting 
women. Women, though, 
need or a desire to 
maintain their customary status as brewers of beer, 
continued to brew and sell liquor in Wi tzieshoek. This 
was illustrated in 1945 when, at a meeting of the Chiefs 
and people, the Police Sergeant informed the meeting that 
'the trafficking in liquor must stop. • 116 
A further condition that the Trust placed on ret¥aning 
arable allotments was in terms of the cultivation method 
used. An allotment could be cancelled if it was used in a 
114 Interviews, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Moleka, Mr 
Modernwane, Mr Molaba and Mrs and Mr Mothibi. 
115 SAB: URU, 1983, 2726, Proclamation, Land Administration, 
23/9/1941. 
116 . SAB: NTS, 6814, 29/318, part 2, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
31/12/1945. 
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manner which caused or was 'calculated to cause erosion 
of the soil or impairment to that allotment or the 
neighbouring allotment. 1117 This was bound up with the 
perception common to conservationists and the Trust that 
African methods and soil erosion went hand in hand. In an 
official survey of Witzieshoek in the 1950s, the 
deterioration of the land was directly linked to African 
methods of farming: 'overgrazing, overstocking, annual 
veld burning, indiscriminate cultivation of steep slopes, 
primitive agricultural methods [and] uncontrolled 
establishment of residential kraals high up in the 
mountains' were seen to cause 'the virtual total 
disappearance of sponges which formed sources of many 
rivers• and hence soil erosion. 118 
Yet, again, members of the community and women in 
particular were not falling into line. The repeated 
insistence by the Trust that people stop ploughing up and 
down the fields, indicates that some women were using 
this method. The petition of 1946 addressed this problem. 
'At present we feel that the Agricultural Officer is too 
strict in having us prosecuted, and fined if he finds 
that we have ploughed too deep 1119 
In the period after betterment the introduction of 
betterment and the rebellion, women in Witzieshoek had to 
come to terms with the variety of conditions, rules and 
regulations applied to them. Their daily routine was 
disrupted by having to acquire permits, register stock, 
procure cash and take on increasing agricultural and 
political responsibilities. A good case in point is the 
impact on women of the enclosure of fountains in 1940. 
Wommen were expected to climb up and down steps in order 
117 SAB: URU, 1983, 2726, Proclamation, Land Administration, 
23/9/1941. 
118 Ibid. 
119 SAB: NTS, 8150, 15/341, part 2, Petition, 1946. 
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to collect water and this caused concern in the 
community. Chief Charles verbalized this concern. 'It is 
found out that great difficulty is being experienced by 
elderly women' in ascending and descending the steps; 
'furthermore the people regard it as very difficult for 
their womenfolk to always climb up and down steps like 
this as water is life. ,12o 
White versus black: the Farmers and the Traders 
The lack of any real development in the 1930s and 1940s 
in addition to the increased deterioration of the reserve 
certainly did not endear the Trust to the community. The 
resultant emergence of a culture of resistance, which 
gained in intensity as the 1940s came to a close, was 
also affected by the traders and farmers in the area. 
The three white traders in the region ran six stores. 
They supplied the community with all their basic 
necessities and essentially monopolized trade. These 
traders sparked controversy, because 
they were exempted from the rules, 
conditions governing the lives of 
on the one hand, 
regulations and 
the people in 
Witzieshoek, and on the other hand were perceived to be 
taking advantage of the community. Unlike their 
customers, the traders were allowed to keep up to seventy 
large and small animals on their properties which were 
not subject to cul 1 ing; moreover they owned enough land 
to graze these animals. 121 The traders were in fact 
entitled to twenty morgen of land which was then fenced 
in. 122 The sheer impact of the visual difference between 
three and twenty morgen must have antagonized the 
community. Here again was a grievance which became a 
120 SAB: NTS, 8013, 370/337, part 1, CC complaint, 1940. 
121 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Stock owned by traders. 
122 SAB: 8150, 15/341, part 2, ANC to CNC, 9/9/1946. 
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constant source of tension between the community and the 
Trust. 
An important component of the community's response to the 
traders was bound up with racial attitudes. The 
community's lack of faith in the Trust was compounded by 
the perception that the traders were giving them a raw 
deal. Thus, antipathy was moulded into an anti-white 
sentiment, one which was expanded to include white 
farmers in the area. These attitudes were embedded in the 
black nationalism and Africanism which was sweeping the 
country as a whole. 
In 1943, the Witzieshoek Vigilance Association's 
memorandum mentioned the traders, complaining of their 
'large farms' and 'large herds'· 123 Further sources of 
contention were the prices charged by the traders and the 
constant trade between them and the Basotholanders. The 
community's objection to the latter stemmed from a fiery 
relationship over a long period. In the context of 
deterioration, the Witzieshoek community resented the 
competition over resources in the area presented by the 
Basotholanders. This resentment was fuelled by the 
constant threat of thievery. Already mentioned was the 
community's objection of the Trust's rangers' inability 
to protect their stock from thieves; the community's 
animosity towards the Basotholanders who actually stole 
their animals must have been tenfold. 
Women who were trying 
budgets lost out in 
competition In 1944, 
Native Commissioner, 
to 
the 
in 
run households and balance 
face of high prices and 
a letter to the Additional 
Charles criticized the Chief 
storekeepers for selling maize to the Basotholanders and 
for overcharging those inhabitants of the Hoek buying 
123 Ibid. 
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maize 124 The subject was also broached In the 1946 
petition. 
The white farmers did not present a direct problem to the 
residents of Witz ieshoek in this period. Yet the 
community•s perceptions of them was influenced by an 
anti-white sentiment. The farmers indirectly afflicted 
the community in two ways. According to the stock 
limitation report by the Additional Native Commissioner 
in 1947, the severe shortage of land was •accentuated by 
the knowledge that adjoining the reserve [were] huge 
tracts of fertile country, owned by single Europeans and 
which [lay] virtually idle. 1125 The obvious contrast was 
made worse by the fact that some of the farmers who owned 
the land were willing to sell it to the Trust. The Trusts 
hands were tied, though, because it had already bought 
its full quota in the Free State which had been given to 
the Thaba Nchu reserve and because it could not afford 
the inflated prices of the farms. 126 
conclusion 
Throughout the period of Trust administration, the people 
of Witzieshoek voiced their grievances with the system in 
a number of ways. For men, the two most common were their 
vocal reminders in meetings and the various petitions 
drafted. According to Melle, the community had been 
petitioning the Trust for a period of fourteen years. 127 
These petitions indicate the highly organized nature of 
resistance in this period. Women's resistance is more 
difficult to gauge, especially for the period prior to 
the rebellion. In the official record, biased attitudes 
124 SAB: NTS, 7849, 46/336, CC to ANC, 30/5/1944. 
12 5 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, ANC to CNC, 29/3/1947. 
126 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, copy of letter from W G Ballinger, 
7/10/1950. 
127 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to CNC, 28/9/1950. 
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towards men meant that they were predominantly the 
spokesmen of the community, while biased attitudes 
towards women meant the opposite. However, women were 
playing an increased role in the community and there is 
evidence that they defied Trust regulations, as when they 
insisted on ploughing up and down instead of across the 
fields. 
A further gauge of 
community's use of 
their grievances. 
Commissioner noted 
the extent of organization is the 
lawyers through whom they articulated 
In 1947 the Additional Native 
that the chiefs were collecting an 
amount of 2/6 from each male resident in order 'to 
accumulate funds for litigation purposes•· 128 
Organization was also taking place in the urban areas. 
For example, the development of the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
Association represented the broad base within which the 
culture of resistance had rooted itself. 
The community's rejection of the Trust was based on 
practices which formed the core of Witz ieshoek society. 
In a meeting with the Chiefs and people in July 1948, 
Chief Charles stated that the most important matters in 
the community were 'land and stock 1 • 129 He had 
encapsulated in one sentence the root cause of the 
development of a culture of resistance in Witzieshoek. 
Land and stock were the chief issues over which conflict 
arose between those advocating and implementing 
betterment on the one han~ and the community as a whole 
on the other. 
Land and stock were vital elements in the organization of 
the community along patriarchal lines. In a context in 
which such organization was being challenged and male 
128 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, ANC to CNC, 23/6/1947. 
129 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
8/7/1948. 
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authority eroded, these mechanisms of control over women 
- land and stock - became the heart of the men's struggle 
against the Trust. Women also defended this system of 
organization, but in their case, security was a main 
objective. 
From 1939 to 1950, the Witzieshoek community of men and 
women, residing both inside the reserve and in the urban 
areas, resisted the Trust's control, be it on an 
individual level by refusing to relocate or by ploughing 
up and down, or on a communal level by forming an 
association or by getting together and drafting petitions 
and consulting lawyers. Such resistance led to the 
materialization of an anti-Trust sentiment. According to 
Mr Modernwane, by 1950 the Trust was a 'sort of a swear 
word' which was synonymous with oppression in the eyes of 
most of the community. 130 
130 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Hr Hodernwane. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE WITZIESHOEK REBELLION 
Lingangele, come to help us-
The Trust government has taken away the 
chieftainship 
our land has been eaten up; 
They have burned our cattle 
And we and our children starve. 
Lingangele, come to help us-
The Land of Mopeli is gone. 1 
The witzieshoek Rebellion: a short chronology of events 
The inhabitants of Witzieshoek had objected to Trust rule 
since 1939. By 1949, these objections had developed into 
openly, defiant rebellion. The community took to the 
streets of Witzieshoek voicing their grievances in both 
new and old ways, which were characterized by an 
intensity and urgency which had not been seen before. 
September 1949 saw the start of the fierce resistance 
which swept through Witzieshoek. According to the 
judgement in the case Rex vs Paulus Malau and 74 others, 
it was at this point that 'acts of vandalism and 
unauthorized pitsos were held which the chief couldn't 
prevent. 12 According to Mopeli-Paulus, the 'rebellious 
majority section' called itself '"Lingangele" "Those 
who stand firm" ' 3 
It was the Trust's decision to initiate a cull in 1949 
which effectively sparked the rebellion. The government 
1 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 120. 
2 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Court Case: Rex vs Malau. 
3 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 120. 
129 
had slashed the maximum number of cattle from 12,500 to 
10, ooo. 4 On 4 January 1950, a notice was issued to the 
community demanding the presentation of cattle for the 
purposes of a cull to ensure the reduction of stock to 
the newly established limit. Culling was supposed to take 
place at five different centres from 6 to 18 January. 
Each centre was 1 inked to one of the five designated 
grazing camps. 4 
In response to the call for a cull, a number of members 
of the community, both men and women, decided to defy the 
notice by refusing to cull. On 13 January 1950, a group 
of approximately three hundred residents marched to the 
offices of the Trust where they delivered a letter to the 
Commissioner. The letter demanded that the police be kept 
away from the cull. The anger and resentment felt by 
those writing the letter was palpable: 1 there shal 1 be 
bloodshed which shall have been provoked by you. We warn 
you for the last time about our stock. We have respected 
you long enough. 15 Another letter was given to the 
magistrate by a Mr Albert Mopeli, who claimed to be the 
secretary of the 1 tribe 1 and stated that •we are unable to 
accept the notice in connection with the culling of 
stock. 16 Even at this early stage of the year, the 
resisters patently had no intention to continue to accept 
the Trust•s implementation of betterment. 
As a result, culling was a dismal failure. In an 
assessment of the culling between 8 and 11 January, the 
Principal Agricultural Officer pointed out that of the 
967 stock owners with cattle in grazing camps 1 and 2, 
4 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Government Notice, 23/9/1949. 
5 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, JR Motleheng to ANC, 13/2/1950 and SAB, 
NTS: 7459, 506/327, part 1. 
6 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, copy letter Albert Mopeli to ANC, 
13/1/1950. 
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only seventy one had produced their cattle for culling. 
Out of the approximately nine hundred stock owners who 
had failed to bring their stock for culling, only ten 
were prosecuted. 7 
Those who did present their cattle for culling purposes 
on 13 January were forced to halt the process by a 'large 
number of mounted' African men and women who removed the 
stock and drove it away. 8 As a result of these actions, 
the culling operation was stopped. Mopeli-Paulus story 
recalled that at this time 'crowds of women rode about 
the Reserve, showing their defiance of the Trust by 
chasing employees from the work they were doing on the 
plantations and the roads. •9 
Despite this open resistance to the Trust, it continued 
in its efforts to enforce the compulsory reduction of 
stock. On 18 January, the Under Secretary for Native 
Affairs addressed a meeting of the community, stating 
unequivocally that culling would continue and so would 
the removal of huts from the mountain slopes. 10 Yet the 
community continued to defy the Trust. On 16 February as 
many as one thousand Africans seized the chief's cattle 
at the auction sale pens. The next day, four hundred men 
and women protested in front of the Trust office. On the 
18th one thousand members of the community assembled at 
the Show Grounds in defiance of the magistrate who had 
convened a meeting at his office. By the time the 
magistrate reached the meeting at the Show Grounds, the 
people had dispersed, and according to the chiefs he then 
7 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Principal Agricultural Officer 
(PAO) to CNC, 25/2/1950. 
a Ibid. 
9 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 120. 
lO VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau.Part of the relocation 
process had been to force inhabitants living on the mountain 
slopes to move to other areas. 
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consulted, the people had taken the decision to continue 
obstructing the culling. 11 
According to the judgement of the court case12 , from 
February onwards 'unauthorized' pitsos were regularly 
held at Mopelyana' s kraal. 13 Mopeli-Paulus reflected on 
these gatherings. 'All over the reserve, horsemen in 
large numbers could be seen riding towards the 
showgrounds or Namoha These gatherings were even 
attended by women.' 14 On 14 March, all stock cards and 
land allotment certificates were returned to the Trust 
officials by a group of three hundred African men and 
women. A letter accompanied the cards and certificates 
demanding that the Trust evacuate the reserve 
immediately. 'It will be better for us if you take all 
that is yours, then the noise will come to an end. 115 On 
the same day, the Chief Native Commissioner met with the 
chiefs and headmen and in a letter to the Secretary of 
Native Affairs argued that a 'commission consisting of 
agricultural experts, should be appointed to enquire into 
the position at Witzieshoek. 116 
Despite community resistance, both the Trust and the 
Department decided to continue with culling in April 
1950. In August, the Department decided to take overt 
action by bringing in a force of stand-by policemen 
armed with sten guns, tear gas and rifles. Letsie Mopeli 
and Paulus Mpheteng were arrested under the Riotous 
Assemblies Act, inspiring a protest march to the police 
11 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, telegram from mag, 18/2/1950. 
12 VAS: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex VS Malau. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the cattle', p. 119. 
15 VAS: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau, copy letter, Letsie Mopeli 
to ANC, 14/3/1950. 
16 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, CNC to SNA, 5/4/1950. 
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station by 250 community members. Although both were 
later acquitted of the charges brought against them, 
resistance continued. 17 On 26 August 1950, the rebels 
resorted to threatening letters. About f arty were 
delivered to officials of the Trust such as the 
agricultural demonstrators and the rangers. The letters 
read as follows: 
Take notice that as you are a er iminal and a 
trouble maker amongst the peaceful tribe of 
Mopeli, we warn you to leave the Trust work and 
sit down or quit and go and cause confusion and 
trouble where the Trust has bought land for 
you, Witzieshoek is no Trust 
sympathetic warning, Mopeli Tribe. 18 
land. A 
The tactics adopted by the rebels evoked a response from 
the state; at the end of August a Commission of Enquiry 
was appointed. It was ordered to 'enquire into and report 
on the causes of the recent unrest and disturbances in 
the Witzieshoek native reserve'. It was also expected to 
assess what steps should be taken to 'put an end to the 
said unrest and disturbances' as well as whether the 
reserve was 'overpopulated and overstocked I and if so, 
what steps should be undertaken to remedy this. 19 On 12 
October the appointment of the Commission was formally 
announced to the community residents. Having voiced their 
dissatisfaction with the composition of the Commission, 
the rebels declared their intention to provide it with 
separate evidence. 20 
17 Argus, 2/8/1950. 
18 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Mopeli Tribe to rangers and 
demonstrators, 26/8/1950. 
19 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 1. 
20 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, H Mopeli and P Moteka to Commission of 
Enquiry. 
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On 10 November 1950, a group under the leadership of 
Mopelyana was scheduled to give evidence. Before doing 
so, they demanded that the Commission sit in the open to 
enable the cornmuni ty to hear their testimony. When this 
request was denied, the approximately one thousand 
African men and women gathered in front of the court 
demonstrated until evening. Mr w G Ballinger and Mr 
Basner, the rebel1-appointed attorneys, gave evidence on 
their behalf. The four witnesses, Paulus Howell Mopeli 
(Mopelyana) , Scotland Koloi, Paulus Mpheteng and Letsie 
Mopeli, were sworn in at the Commission only at the end 
of the day when they decided to testify despite most of 
the community's exclusion from the proceedings. 
On 23 November, the government issued a notice banning a 
gathering of more than five members of the community for 
any purpose other than those officially sanctioned, as 
well as prohibiting the carrying of all weapons. The 
definition of weapons included sticks and sickles. 21 On 
24 November, another force of policemen arrived in order 
to maintain law and order. Despite all these measures, a 
violent clash occurred on 28 November between the police 
and the community at Namoha, Mopelyana 's kraal. Mopeli-
Paulus recounted a version of that day given by a female 
friend of his, Machake Mabote. He described her as 'an 
ordinary Christian tribeswoman of middle age. 122 
On that day a large gathering of women and men had 
converged at Namoha in order to accompany their 
representatives to the Court house. Mopeli-Paulus claimed 
that they never had the opportunity to do so, as the 
hearing had been postponed. According to Machake Mabote, 
the police arrived at Namoha just as the meeting was 
ending and 'the people were singing and hearing the 
21 SAB: URU, 2817, 3368, 21/11/1950. 
22 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 129. 
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prayer before they went. ' 23 She then described how more 
than thirty armed policemen, all white except one, 
stopped approximately a hundred yards from the crowd who 
continued to sing. 
23 Ibid. 
They did not stop when the police came, and I 
don't know why it was. They just went on 
singing. A woman sitting on the ground next to 
me who had a baby on her lap, put her head 
close to mine, and said softly today our 
lives are finished. . .. The singing was strong 
and beautiful, and I suddenly felt as if my 
hair was raise up [sic]. Though I pretended I 
had not heard her, inside I was afraid of death 
and prayed. . .. 
From the chief's stoep where we sat, I saw two 
men from the gathering walk out towards the 
lined up horsemen, who held their strange guns 
like hoe handles on their arms .... The two men 
reached them, and I could hear shouted 
conversation above the singing of the women, 
who sang now as if to drive their own fears, 
with an excited sound in their voices. An old 
women leaning on a stick, beside me, seemed 
quite overcome and even danced. 
The very air was moving, and we all seemed to 
know that something was going to happen soon, 
yet still everyone sat in his place- the women 
on the stoep, in the front of the chief's huts, 
and the men on the rocks and the grass. The two 
messengers came back and spoke among the men, 
and not long after went back to the police 
again. We remained singing. The police drew 
nearer. 
We were told to stop singing, and did so. I 
heard the white policeman speak, and our men 
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answering, but understood nothing save that we 
were to disperse. Then the first shot was 
fired, in the direction of the men sitting on 
the rocks. The whole crowd stirred, and I saw 
horses dashing in to the gatherings, and in a 
moment the cruel police were among us, swinging 
their batons, and I heard fast firing of guns, 
our men were mixed up with the police, fighting 
back at them with sticks and stones, and we 
also, the women threw stones, trying to keep 
back the horses, which overwhelmed us where we 
sat. Down below us was the great fight, the 
real fight of sticks against bullets, and I saw 
many men shot down. 
From where I was, among the women the only 
direction was to fly up the mountainside, and 
some did so, but I, with a few others tried to 
take refuge in one of the chief's huts ... but 
one of the police saw us ... and turning fired 
into the hut. We ran out unhurt, and I made off 
for a flat-roofed house down the slope. 
I was tired, and deadly frightened by the shots 
that had missed me. Running for safety this 
time another policeman pulled me back by the 
end of my blanket I wore, and I struggled to 
free myself, struck me on the head with his 
baton. I fell but pulled him with me, forced 
him to the ground and sat on him, but then 
another appeared, held up his gun and shot me 
in the stomach. 24 
This particular account of the clash was examined by 
Hannah Jones 
autobiography. 
in her assessment of Mopeli-Paulus' 
She questions whether Machake Mabote's 
version was her own or an 'amalgamation of versions heard 
24 Ibid., pp. 129-130-131. 
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by Mopeli-Paulus and Basner [ne-Gordon) at the trial'. 25 
The importance of this particular narrative lies more in 
the fact that Mopeli-Paulus, a member of the African male 
elite, enabled a woman to narrate such a prominent part 
of the history of Witzieshoek. The version presented may 
well have been clouded by his own perceptions or the 
perceptions of his co-author or may even represent a 
synthesis of all the versions presented at the trial. 
What stands out, though, is that Mopeli-Paulus was 
unwittingly empowering women in a way that contradicted 
his status as part of the African male elite. 
Police immediately began arresting people (Machake Mabote 
among them) and on 29 November a special government 
notice was issued declaring a state of unrest in the area 
and demanding the summary arrest of fourteen members of 
the community. Included in this list were the four 
witnesses who had encountered the Commission of Enquiry 
on the tenth. 26 
Those who had taken part in the clash at Namoha, and who 
had been caught and arrested, were brought to trial and 
charged on two different counts. The first was attending 
an illegal meeting and the second was the intention to 
commit public violence. The case was heard in Harrismith 
and the judgement was given on 5 November 1951. 27 The 
rebellion had 'officially' come to an end. 
25 H Jones, ' "Basner and Mopeli-Paulus" The World and the Cattle in 
the written historiography of the 1950 Witzieshoek rebellion, 
riot, revolt, unrest, disturbance, tragedy, trouble, 
turbulence, terrible occurance, outbreak of passions, startling 
exp~losion, stain on our reputation, friction, fight, affray, 
unhappy affair' (paper presented to conference on 
'Democracy, Popular Precedents, Practise, Culture·, 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1994), p. 11. 
26 SAB: URU. 2824, 3462, 29/11/1950. 
27 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau. 
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Tactics adopted by the Lingangele 
The various official reports and telegrams posted out of 
Witzieshoek during the rebellion tended to single out 
women rebels in particular incidents. It is necessary to 
analyze these portrayals of women before discussing the 
tactics adopted by the rebels in general. 
The voices interpreting women's actions depicted them in 
the same manner time and time again: 'a large amount of 
natives encouraged by women giving their war cry• 28 , 
'4 00 armed Natives incited by women 129 , 'executed war 
dances in the road under the goading of women 130 • 'There 
is evidence that whilst passing the police station women 
shouted insults at the police and gave voice to that 
shrill molilietsane•· 31 The local officials of the Trust 
and the Department of Native Affairs restricted women's 
involvement to two specific related tasks or tactics. The 
one was to goad or encourage their male counterparts, 
while the other was to insult officers of the Trust. 
In the eyes of these officials, the molilietsane, sung by 
the women, was not only intended to provoke a response 
from their husbands, fathers, or sons but was a 
deliberate attempt to irritate and disturb the officials. 
According to everyone interviewed for the present study, 
the molilietsane was a means for women to inspire their 
men and to give them courage. Yet, the fact that they 
also resorted to singing the molilietsane when in groups 
on their own, would appear to substantiate the officials' 
view. 
28 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, PAO to CNC, 25/2/1950. 
29 Witzieshoek Commission of Enguiry, p. 8. 
3o SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, ANC to CNC, 17/2/1950. 
31 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex VS Malau. 
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According to Mopeli-Paulus, women had sung the 
molilietsane to announce his birth, the birth of a 
chief's son. 'The women sang the molilietsane to draw the 
attention of the villages across the streams, and the 
high pitch of their voices in this cry, which sounds like 
the neighing of horses, rose and was echoed back by the 
mountains. 132 Clearly the use of this cry was a customary 
form of communication within the community; it heralded 
events. By resorting to this particular tactic during the 
rebellion, women were subscribing to their 'traditional' 
role within the community. They were making use of a 
familiar custom to reaffirm that role. 
Yet women's actions went beyond this standard depiction. 
Along with the men, they resorted to active intimidation 
and non-co-operation, as well as attending unauthorised 
pitsos. By limiting the function of women to encouraging 
their men and to insulting the Trust, the officials 
misunderstood women's actions. Consistent with 
Departmental and state discourse which constructed women 
in the towns as being responsible for social decay, the 
officials were constructing women as responsible for the 
actions of the rebels. The rebellion in this sense 
symbolized the downfall of the community and reflected 
the sense of social decay and degeneration which had 
permeated state discourse from the early 1930s. 
Women joined the male rebels in their tactics to 
communicate their aims and grievances in 1949 and 1950. 
The men and women rebels drew on the kinds of methods 
they had used in the past, such as letter writing and the 
use of attorneys, but they also made use of new methods. 
Some of these reflected the kinds of actions being 
advocated and enforced by organizations such as the 
African Wational Congress, the South Arican Communist 
Party and Trade Unions on a national scale. 
32 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 8. 
139 
The first tactic used by the rebels which represented a 
continuation of earlier struggles was the writing of 
letters on behalf of the community. The first class of 
letters were mainly addressed to the Additional Native 
Commissioner and contained the demands of the rebels as 
well as threats to the Trust. For example, the letter 
given to the Commissioner on 14 March demanded that the 
Trust evacuate the reserve, 'take your bulls together 
with your fence, collect all that belongs to the Trust. 
Tell your servants to hold their hands in connection with 
ploughing the land that is not theirs, and to plant trees 
in a land that is not theirs' and ended off with a direct 
threat: 'We give you fourteen days to collect all that 
belongs to the Trust, because if we collect these things, 
of yours, we shall collect them with great 
carelessness. 133 
The second class of letters were those sent to individual 
members of the Trust warning them to abandon the 
betterment process. The irony of these letters was that 
they branded members of the Trust as criminals and 
trouble-makers. Such were the terms which members of the 
Trust were eagerly applying to the rebels. The final type 
of letters were the two sent to the United Nations in May 
and August of 1950. These letters reveal the adoption of 
sophisticated tactics. In the first instance, they 
display an awareness on the part of community members to 
global developments after World War Two. As some members 
of the community had served in the war, this was not 
( . . 
si.wr1s1ng. 
Secondly, the rebels demonstrate an awareness of the 
function of the United Nations organization. 
33 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau, Letsie Mopeli to ANC, 
14/3/1950. 
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As your Organization is founded on the four 
freedoms, and is set up to secure justice and 
happiness for all, can you not order your 
representatives to take this cruel injustice up 
with the Union Government. 34 
A consciousness of ethnic identity and self 
determination, was also evident: 
The culling of cattle is a measure calculated 
to bring about the extermination of our people 
this is carrying in to effect the same 
policy which was applied on the Tasmanians in 
Australia when they were exterminated by the 
European Colonists in that Colony. 35 
The rebels depicted the Witzieshoek community as a 
homogenous autonomous group and these letters hence 
displayed a strong nationalist sentiment. This indicated 
the extent to which Africanist ideologies had filtered 
into the reserve. By placing themselves on the same level 
as the Tasmanians, the rebels implied that the 
Witz ieshoek community were part of an exploited group 
which needed the United Nation's immediate attention. 
This marked sense of community identity was paradoxical. 
This was because the community, in subscribing to a 
'tribal' identity, was endorsing the tribalism advocated 
by the state and enacted through its pol icy of 
segregation. 
The protesters also continued to make use of lawyers to 
promote their cause. The community banded together in 
order to fund the various court cases and provide an 
adequate defence for those accused. Prior to the Rex vs 
34 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, PH Mopeli and P Moteka to 
Secretary General of the United Nations, 1/8/1950. 
35 Ibid. 
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Malau case in 1951, the community was generally on the 
winning side, albeit through appeal, because of the 
unwillingness of the Attorney General to prosecute, or 
through case dismissal. In August 1950, the magistrate at 
Wi tzieshoek pointed out the I dissatisfaction' generated 
within the community after 'considerable expense• had 
been incurred conducting defences only to have the cases 
dimissed. 36 
During the Rex vs Malau trial, members of the community 
yet again sent money to fund the defence. According to Mr 
Moleka, members of the community would send money for a 
specific relative. 37 In other words, each accused had his 
or her own support group in the reserve. Another 
indication of this funding was the government's demand in 
1951 to the Native Commissioner to cease dispensing 
pensions as pensioners were allegedly being 'forced' to 
give their money for the rebels' defence. 38 
The use of Mr Basner, not only in the trial, but prior to 
that as a spokesperson at the Commission, as well as a 
confidant as early as 1948, shows the community's 
determination to get legal support and advice. By 
choosing a lawyer 
room, the rebels 
to represent them outside the 
were attempting to legitimize 
court 
their 
grievances as well as to make their case known beyond the 
narrow borders of Witzieshoek. 
The rebels, both men and women, also adopted new methods 
of resistance. Part of this process was the adoption of 
tactics similar to those being tried and tested on a 
national scale. The use of mass action in the form of 
marches, meetings and strikes was not uncommon in 194 9 
and 1950. The protest march on 14 January heralded the 
36 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Mag to CNC, 18/8/1950 
37 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Moleka. 
38 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, DNA to ANC and Argus, 17/11/1950. 
142 
start of this strategy Witziesh~- and the mass 
meeting on 28 November signalled its end. Such protest is 
reminiscent of the Programme of Action formulated by the 
A.N.C. in 1949, calling for the use of more militant 
defiance, 
strikes. 
non-co-operation, civil disobedience and 
The refusal to take part in culling operations, 
effectively a tactic of non-co-operation, was extended 
into all spheres of Trust activities. Already in 1949, 
the community made no ef fart to respond to the stock 
sales conducted by the Trust. 39 In 1950, many refused to 
make use of the bulls, stallions or rams provided by the 
Trust. 40 The firing of a teacher in 1950 was met with 
agitation for a boycott and even a general strike. 41 such 
a demand indicates the extent to which tactics advocated 
by organizations like the A.N.C. 
infiltrated into the reserves. 42 
in the towns had 
The Witzieshoek rebels also chose to utilize more 
militant tactics. These included sabotage and 
intimidation. The extent to which people adopted these 
types of strategies was made clear in August 1950 where 
the Deputy Director of Native Agriculture described the 
situation in Witzieshoek. '15 years of effort by the 
South African Native Trust has been nullified by a) 
cutting (beyond repair) about ten miles of seven strand 
fencing, b) burning of all grass velt [sic] c) 
burning of six plantations [and] d) grazing of Native 
39 SAB: NTS, 7237, 163/326, Stock Sales, 1949. 
40 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex VB Malau. 
41 SAE: NTS, 9779, 961/400, part 1, conversation between Ross and 
Verwoerd. 
42 This is yet another indication of the intimate relationship 
between the town and countryside. 
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stock on Trust oats. 143 The judgement in the 1951 court 
case refers to an 'organized campaign of sabotage' which 
also included destroying contours, division banks and 
furrows. 44 The saboteurs apparently confined their 
actions largely to the night in order to conceal their 
identity and to be more effective. 45 
Parallel to this was a concerted effort to intimidate 
Trust employees. That process included the sending of 
letters sent to individual members of the Trust and the 
general threats made to the Trust discussed above. But, 
some members of the community also resorted to active 
intimidation, such as 'molesting surveyors and road 
parties• and preventing employees of the Trust from 
carrying out their duties. 46 According to the judgement 
in the court case, the 'reign of terror that existed in 
the Hoek 
planting 
was successful 
anything. 147 Even 
in preventing 
stripped of 
anybody from 
their emotive 
language, these quotations indicate the strong presence 
of intimidation and fear. The actions of the members of 
the community who disrupted the culling of the chief's 
and others stock further underline this atmosphere. 
The involvement of women in the demonstrations, acts of 
intimidation, marches and financial support cannot be 
disputed. 48 Their participation in the sabotage is less 
clear. Mr and Mrs Mothibi claimed that those responsible 
43 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Deputy Director of Native 
Agriculture to Director Native Affairs, 31/8/1950. 
44 VAS: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau. 
45 Interview, Shan Seerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
46 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Deputy Director of Native Affairs 
to DNA, 31/8/1950. 
47 VAS: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex va Malau. 
48 Their presence was recorded by Mopeli-Paulus, by Mr Modernwane, Mr 
and Mrs Mothibi, Mr amd Mrs Moleka, Mr Molaba and by members of 
the Trust. 
144 
were never revealed to the comrnunity. 49 Mopeli-Paulus 
made the following assertion: 'It was hard to find out 
who was responsible for the damage that was done, for 
everyone who knew anything was kept silent. ,so 
The tactics adopted by men and women were a reflection of 
tactics used in the past as well as a reflection of the 
new tactics being used on a national level. They entailed 
more militant and defiant as well as illegal action on 
the part of men and women. Women in particular made use 
of tactics familiar to them, but also broke out of their 
traditional mould in order to join the men in a variety 
of other strategies. Although there is evidence that 
women acted autonomously, there is no indication of 
exclusively male strategies. 
The support base 
A fundamental aspect of any rebellion is its support 
base. Taking into account the context within which the 
Witzieshoek rebellion occurred, it is necessary to 
examine this. Migrant labour had emptied the reserve of 
many of its able-bodied men, and 
women. It is important to analize 
this affected the age composition 
to a lesser degree, 
the extent to which 
of the rebels. Age 
grades or sects were customary in Witzieshoek. 51 As 
reported in the previous chapter, age brought with it an 
increase in status and power for men and women in the 
community. Bohali was a process whereby older men gained 
49 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Mothibi. 
SO Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 120. 
51 Mopeli-Paulus revealed this in his auto biography. For instance, 
he explained how a strict law of precedence was followed in the 
khotla and that decisions had to be made according to 'the 
seniority in age and rank of those present', 'The World and the 
Cattle', p. 13. Later he also talks about his 'age-mates', 
p. 60. 
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access to the wea 1th of younger men and harnessed the 
reproductive and productive capacities of young women. 
Bohali and marriage provided older women with access to 
motherhood, vital to their status in the cornmuni ty, in 
addition to direct and indirect to the power and weal th 
associated with the exchange of cattle and younger women. 
It is difficult to gauge the extent to which age 
determined participation in the rebellion. Clues to the 
ages of those involved can be found in the 1951 court 
case as well as scattered about other primary material. 
In the court case, of ninety four accused, fifteen were 
over the age of sixty, eleven were over the age of fifty, 
thirty three were over the age of forty, twenty five were 
over the age of thirty and eleven were over the age of 
twenty. Thus more than half of the accused were in the 
over forty bracket. Machake Mabote's account of the clash 
mentions an old woman and a woman with a baby. 52 In the 
interviews conducted for this study, the participants 
were described as being both young and old. 53 
Although the court case shows that the majority of 
of the community, 
of the support 
that on that 
participants were mature, older members 
this may not reflect the composition 
group. One has to take into account 
particular day approximately eight hundred people 
gathered and therefore the ninety four arrested 
constituted a small segment of the whole group. 
Notwithstanding this, the rebellion needs to be viewed in 
its context. According to many sources, women were in the 
majority on the land. The extent of that majority is 
unclear. However, in the context of rapid deterioration 
and high rates of migration, it would be safe to assume 
that at any moment most able-bodied men would be outside 
the reserve. The same cannot be said for able-bodied 
52 Hopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', p. 129. 
53 Interviews, Shan Beerstecher with Hr Holaba and Hr Hodernwane. 
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women. If one had to assume that 'able bodied' included 
all those under forty, one starts to get a clearer 
indication of possible participation by age. 
The reaction of the older members of the community was 
not unexpected. By resisting the Trust, both men and 
women were defending the system of organization which had 
existed prior to Trust interference. This was a system 
that older men and women had entrenched in their minds. 
They had been taught their roles in the productive and 
reproductive cycle from their parents, and were teaching 
it to their own children. 
However, one cannot ignore that younger men were also 
participants. Again their exact involvement is difficult 
to ascertain. The court case indicates that about a 
quarter were below the age of thirty. There was no 
indication whether younger women were amongst the female 
protesters. According to Harry Mothibi and his wife, the 
women involved were mostly 'matured women. 154 Yet, those 
younger men and women who were still in the reserve were 
also out of necessity and desperation laying claim to 
systems of organization that they had been taught by 
their parents and grandparents. 55 The apparent lack of 
younger blood in the ranks of the rebels was arguably 
largely due to their absence from the reserve. The fact 
that those people who had made the choice to remain 
permanently in the towns were on the increase necessarily 
affected the age ratios in the rebellion. 
As a result of their age composition, the rebels 
reflected the rural social hierarchy of the community. 
Important decisions in the community had been made by 
older male members of the community who outranked younger 
54 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Mothibi. 
55 The number of customary unions (eighty per cent) attests to this. 
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members through their age related status. 56 Although 
migration and the Trust had severely undermined that 
authority, the absence of younger men meant that the 
older men retained the ability to dominate decisions. As 
the forum within which the rebellion occurred was outside 
of the control of the Trust and its bodies of authority, 
these older men had the space to exert their authority, 
just as the erosion of male control enabled older women 
to act on the status they enjoyed within the community. 
The distinction between rich and poor in the community 
and the frustration this had generated within the 
community makes an evaluation of the class base of the 
rebels pertinent. As pointed out earlier, there were some 
members of the reserve who were without stock or land. At 
the other end of the scale there were members of the 
community who had large herds of cattle, in some cases as 
many as two hundred. 57 
However, the rebellion did not alienate either class. 
Rather, each had its own gains to make by rejecting the 
Trust. The rich would guarantee their access to continued 
wealth and power, whereas the poor would have the 
perceived opportunity to amass that wealth and power. 
Again, it must be stressed that in the face of dwindling 
resources, such ideals were governed by a desire to 
institute a way of life that was recognizable and safe. 
Evidence that support for the rebellion crossed class 
lines is provided by the fact that men such as Mopelyana 
and Mr Mothibi, both of whom owned large numbers of 
cattle, took part and were joined by younger men who had 
yet to acquire much cattle. Another clear example is the 
presence of women, who would have had ambiguous 
affiliations. As wives of the rich, some of the older 
56 Mopeli-Paulus and Gordon, 'The World and the Cattle', pp. 13-14. 
57 SAE: NTS, 7459, 506/327, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 8/7/1948. 
148 
women had a stake in supporting the wealth of their 
husbands to which they had indirect access. On the other 
hand, they were literally 'poor' as their access to 
cattle was limited. In addition, there were wives of 
'poorer' men (by far the majority) who had some cattle or 
land, but had been f creed into outside employment. As 
often the most militant and defiant of rebels, women had 
an unmistakable interest in rebelling. 
A further distinction should be made between active and 
passive resistance. This is because, despite the fact 
that only about one thousand people actively rebelled, 
the support for the resistance ran deeply through the 
the rebellion showed community. Passive advocates of 
their support in a number of ways. 
their financial contribution to 
example here is the Molekas, who 
actively rebel and were not present 
who contributed to funding the 
The first was through 
trial expenses. An 
did not themselves 
at the skirmish, but 
defence of family 
members. 58 Another example is the pensioners who were 
contributing to the defence of the rebels. 59 
Perhaps the best indicator of the broadly-based support 
for resistance lay in the lack of support of the chief. 
Prior to the Commission of Enquiry, there was no overt 
manifestation of chiefly support, bar the word of the 
chief himself. In a report on Witzieshoek in March 1950, 
the Additional Native Commissioner pointed out that 
Mopelyana had a 'very large following' and was 
1 undermining the authority of the chief' . 6° Furthermore 
he argued that it was possible that 'the agitators merely 
reflect the general feeling.' 61 Moreover, attendance was 
58 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Hr and Hrs Holeka, 14/4/1993. 
59 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, DNA to ANC and Argus, 17/11/1950. 
60 SAS: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, ANC to SNA, 21/3/1950. 
61 Ibid. 
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very low at meetings officially sanctioned by the Trust 
in 1950. In fact in one particular meeting on 20 February 
intended for the whole community, Chief Charles was the 
only representative of the Mopeli side. 62 
Despite forms of intimidation, the non co-operation of 
the majority of the community regarding attempts to cull 
and other activities of the Trust is another indication 
of the extent to which the community supported the foes 
of the Trust. An example of this can be found in a 
newspaper report which announced on 21 February 1950 that 
there had been 'no response' to appeals by the magistrate 
for the voluntary culling of cattle and in fact 'not one 
of the 11,000 head of cattle had been brought into 
Witzieshoek by noon. •63 In all of the interviews 
conducted for this study, everyone asserted that most of 
the community backed the rebellion. In an interview 
conducted by Prof Kotze in the 1970s, Mr Mohali argued 
that the 'majority of the people' were opposed to the 
'state' and stock improvement. 64 Moreover, the anti-Trust 
sentiment which permeated the community throughout the 
1940s cannot be ignored. The vast majority of Witzieshoek 
inhabitants, both men and women, were voicing their 
dissatisfaction with Trust rule in both passive and 
active ways in 1949 and 1950. 
Aims and Organization 
The aims of the Witzieshoek rebels in 1949 and 1950 can 
be summed up in three main demands: the removal of the 
Trust, a return to forms of organization which had 
existed prior to Trust interference and finally, self-
62 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, Minutes, Chiefs and people, 
20/2/1950. 
63 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 1, The star, 21/2/1950. 
64 UNISA: AAS219, Interview, Prof DA Kotze with Mr Mohali. 
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determination. For the Witzieshoek community, the last 
demand was bound up with the first two. 
The desire to evict the Trust was emblazoned on every 
petition and letter delivered by the rebels. The yearning 
to return to the old ways of organizing implicit in this 
first demand was made equally clear in a notice in August 
1950. 'We want the regime of the Late Paulus Mopeli that 
1s, 'The Tribal System!' We want the •tribal System!' 'We 
love the Tribal System' · 65 The predominance of the word 
'tribe' in the rebels' discourse is fundamental to 
understanding the force behind the rebellion. The 
productive and reproductive capacity of women, central to 
the organization of the community and its 'tribal' 
identity, had been disrupted. By asserting their 'tribal' 
identity and demanding an end to Trust rule, the rebels 
were re-asserting 'tribal' customs, such as bohali. The 
fact that the rebellion was sparked by cattle culling 
indicates that cattle, and hence bohali, was a major 
issue at stake. 
A pre-requisite of 'tribal I rule was some form of self 
determination. The rebels argued that the original treaty 
between President Brand and the Chief of Wi tzieshoek in 
1866 gave them 
report in 1950, 
'Agitators made 
undisputed rights 
Melle made the 
them believe that 
to the land. In his 
following assertion: 
during Republican days 
Reserve with freehold 
rights. The innovations brought in by the department ... 
merely restricted the people from their rightful lands 
which were already hopelessly inadequate' 66 
President Brand gave them the 
These aims, articulated as they were in the form of 
letters, 
emerged 
demonstrations, intimidation and sabotage, 
out of a highly organized programme 
65 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Notice Witzieshoek, 26/8/1950. 
66 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, Melle to DNA, 28/9/1950. 
of 
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resistance. The Wi tzieshoek rebellion was not an unco-
ordinated uprising. It occurred in a context in which 
resistance had been a planned affair for a number of 
years. The various forms it took indicate a strategy and 
a level of communication which required leadership and 
organization. 
An example of the level of organization of resistance can 
be found in the various meetings and marches held. As 
pointed out by the judge in the 1951 trial, members of 
the community did not just miraculously converge at 
specific venues. 'The accused is another adherent of the 
Witzieshoek telepathy cult: He wanted the Trust removed 
but he did nothing to achieve this. 167 Although the 
judge's comments were part of a broader state conspiracy 
discourse, and must be viewed in that light, they do 
reveal an important component of organization. 
for demonstrations to be successful, it was 
that people be informed of the time and 
In order 
necessary 
place of 
meetings. Mr and Mrs Moleka recalled that a man would go 
from village to village telling people about the 
meetings. 68 
Furthermore, these meetings, structured as they were as 
informal pi tsos, provided an opportunity for members of 
the community to discuss grievances, plan strategies and 
work out demands. The Mothibis recollected that they used 
to call pi tsos to discuss the Trust at a 'common place 
where they met: Namoha 1 • 69 The many letters presented to 
the Trust were clearly worked out and sanctioned, 
certainly by those accompanying their delivery. For 
instance, the letter which was delivered in connection 
with evidence to the Commission of Enquiry started with 
67 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex VS Malau. 
68 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Moleka. 
69 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr and Mrs Mothibi. 
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the following assertion, 1 We have decided, as a Tribe 1 • 70 
Meetings, of course, also developed into or were planned 
as demonstrations. Examples include the protest against 
the arrests of Letsie Mopeli and Paulus Mpheteng and the 
meeting outside the office of the Commission of Enquiry 
on 10 November. 
A significant aspect of such organization was its 
leadership. The most prominent leader in the rebellion 
was Paulus Howell Mopeli (Mopelyana) . This is borne out 
by all the evidence. Mopelyana was perceived to be at the 
head of what was described as the Lingangele (We stand 
firm) or Lehoha Le Sechaba by Chief Charles Mopeli and 
the various interests within the state. He was also 
classified as the ringleader by all the people 
interviewed for the purposes of this study. Most of the 
illicit pi tsos were held at his kraal at Namoha. His 
leadership, 
ringleaders. 
though, was backed up by a group of 
Chief Charles argued that Philip Moteka, Nehemiah 
Motleleng and Letsie Jack Mopeli were the main figures in 
Mopelyana's inner circle. 71 The Crown argued in the 1951 
court case that Paulus Mopeli, Letsie Mopeli and 
Mopelyana were pulling the strings, while the government 
in November of 1950 ordered the arrest of fourteen 
persons who allegedly 'organized or instigated' the 
'armed gatherings and assernblies•. 72 The strong 
leadership of the Witzieshoek rebellion attests to the 
extent of its organization. 
An intriguing part of the leadership of the rebellion was 
the role played by the Witzieshoek Vigilance Association. 
According to Mr Dirk Molaba, the Witzieshoek Vigilance 
7o VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau. 
71 SAB: NTS, 7459, 506/327, part 2, CC to ANC, 18/2/1950. 
72 Ibid. 
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Association was a main organizer, but other residents, 
the Molekas, reported that they knew nothing about the 
organization at all. This is interesting as the Molekas 
actually took part in the rebellion whereas Mr Molaba was 
only seventeen at the time and was not actively involved. 
Mr Modernwane argued that the Association was 
influential, yet he characterized its dealings as 'bad' 
and he called them 'skelms 1 • 73 He argued that they took 
advantage of Mopelyana's goodwill for their own monetary 
gains. Mr Moderwane's perceptions reveal the rural-urban 
tensions which were characteristic of Wi tzieshoek right 
up to the start of the rebellion. 
The evidence indicates that the 
Association had ceased to play 
Witzieshoek by the time of the 
Witzieshoek 
a prominent 
rebellion. 
Vigilance 
role in 
Bar the 
petition it had submitted in 1948, it had literally faded 
from the Witzieshoek scene after 1944. In its letters to 
the Trust and in its petitions it had always made its 
identity clear. All the letters submitted by the rebels 
were signed on behalf of the 'Mopeli tribe', not the 
Association. Prior to the skirmish in November of 1950, a 
few delegates including Mopelyana did travel to 
Johanesburg and consulted with Mofutsyana and James 
Moj oro, members of the Association· 74 However, neither 
Mofutsyana nor Moj oro were identified by the state or 
Chief Charles as prominent leaders. The extent to which 
they could have influenced and directed the rebels from 
Johanesburg is debatable. Tom Lodge argued that the 
Association may have influenced the actions of the 
leadership and the organization, but that the fact that 
the revolt displayed 'traditional forms of organization 
73 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwane. 
74 B Hirson, 'Rural Revolt In South Africa: 1937-1951', in collected 
seminars, Societies of Southern Africa in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 8/22, (University of 
London, 1976), p. 124. 
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and concepts of political behaviour' was indicative of 
its localized nature. 75 
This argument can be taken a step further. The kinds of 
tactics adopted by the the rebels displayed an admixture 
of the old and the new. The new tactics which followed 
the line being adopted on a national scale were argua~ 
a reflection of the influence of the Witziestioek 
Vigilance Association. Yet, the use of old, more familiar 
tactics as well as the nature of the aims of the 
rebellion accentuate the localized nature of the 
conflict. One cannot deny the influence of the town on 
the countryside, but at the same time one cannot dispute 
the very distinct nature of rural revolt. 
The Trial 
The trial record itself includes accounts of the skirmish 
between the police and rebels at the end of November 
1950. Its proceedings were important because it presented 
a particular description of the rebellion and signalled 
the end of the resistance of the so-called 'lingangele' 
which had dominated 1949 and 1950. 
The Crown accused 94 members of the community on two 
counts. The first was the more serious accusation of 
unrest. 
In that upon the 27 of November, 1950 the 
accused did all unlawfully and riotously 
assemble armed with sticks, kieries, 
assegaais and other weapons ... with intent 
by force and violence to disturb the public 
peace and security and by these means 
75 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 273. 
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assail and set at defiance the authority of the 
Police and then and there make a riot, 76 
The second 
proclamation 
people. 
charge was 
prohibiting 
the contravention 
gatherings of five 
of 
or 
the 
more 
Essentially, 
assembled at 
the Crown argued that 
Namoha attacked the 
the people who had 
police 'acting in 
accordance with a preconceived plan' , 7 7 The defence, on 
the other hand, denied their having planned the attack, 
and even denied any kind of organized resistance at 
all. 78 It argued that the accused were acting in self 
defence and were provoked by the police to 'attack 
without self control and without realizing the probable 
consequences of their act. 179 In delivering his 
judgement, the Judge made it plain that his sympathies 
lay with the prosecution. He based his arguments on his 
opinion that in general the accused failed to tell the 
truth: 'One wonders sometimes why not one of these people 
come out with the truth' and his finding that a common 
purpose existed. 80 He felt that the evidence pointed to 
the probability that an attack was planned after Mr 
Basner had left Namoha on the day of the attack. 
The events of that day were, and still are highly 
disputed. However, a consensus existed among the people 
interviewed for this study, a consensus that would have 
been unlikely to have existed forty years after the event 
unless it had some sort of realistic grounding. All the 
people interviewed had their own versions of the clash 
76 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau. 
77 VAB: HG.4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau, Sentencing, p. 24. 
78 Ibid., p. 23 
79 Ibid., p. 24. 
BO Ibid., p. 205. 
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and each was based on the same principles. Those 
assembled at Narnoha did not have a pre-conceived plan to 
attack and had acted in retaliation to the police. This 
is an argument quite similar to the one advanced by the 
defence in the trial, except that the interviewees did 
not attempt to cover up the leadership and organization 
of resistance before that day. 
Mr Modernwane, who was evidently informed of the incident 
after it had happened, gave the following description: 
On this very day of the fight, Basner was in 
Witzieshoek, 
with the purpose 
trying to explain 
at the Commissioner's off ice 
of meeting his clients and 
a few things. When he got 
there he found some tents, there were some army 
people, police and things around there and they 
were preparing to go and shoot at the people 
who had gathered at the place called Namoha. 
Somebody was sent out to go and warn these 
people to disperse because he believed there 
would be problems. Now this person who was sent 
there with a letter which was to be read to the 
people telling them to disperse. Unfortunately 
this man did not read the letter and when they 
came on horseback they were led by one 
policeman .... And when they got there lined up 
and asked these people: 'who is the leader?' 
The response was 'there is no leader it is the 
complaint of the tribe as a whole'. This man 
who was leading this group of army and police 
just got fed up and said 'I am tired of this 
nonsense, it is the people , it is the people 
all the time. I give you ten minutes within 
which to disperse.' Somebody stood up and said 
let us pray first before we can disperse. But 
the horses were restive a little and then this 
pol iceman, a black pol iceman, pointed at 
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somebody, that somebody happened to be an uncle 
of mine. In stature he was the same height and 
thin like this Mopelyana, the leader who at 
that time was already removed from the crowd. 
The first man that they shot was this man 
in the belief that they were shooting this 
Mopelyana chap. Then there was commotion .... I 
would imagine that they were not intending to 
fight as such.Bl 
Mr and Mrs Mothibi also described the incident. They were 
actually present at the clash. 
Then while they were gathered there at Namoha 
the policemen came. All of them were white 
except for one ... they all came on horseback. 
These horses were positioned in a half circle, 
positioned in such a way that there was no way 
out. They couldn't just go anywhere, they were 
locked inside. One of the policemen told them 
they should disperse in ten minutes. And the 
other one said, 'not ten minutes, five 
minutes. ' They did not even give them those 
five minutes they just went into them. The 
horses were wild. They didn't even have weapons 
with them, they only had sticks which were 
little. These policemen with sten guns started 
shooting. He says that many of them were 
killed. 82 
In these accounts, the clash which symbolized the tension 
between the community and the Trust was presented as 
being more a result of aggression on the part of the 
police than of the community. 
81 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Hr Hodernwane. 
82 Ibid. 
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The most contentious factor in the crown case was the 
fact that an entire armed patrol was required to deliver 
subpoenas. In Mr Basner's petition of appeal, he pointed 
out what the court had ignored: firstly that the police 
could not serve subpoenas and therefore must have had an 
ulterior motive. This was probably to break up the 
gathering. Secondly, he questioned the necessary to serve 
the subpoenas heavily armed when just one person would 
have been sufficient. 83 Furthermore, he felt that the 
composition of the crowd: women, children, pregnant women 
and old men, made the accusation of intent 
inconceivable. 84 
Yet, despite evidence to the contrary, the majority of 
people accused were convicted and sentenced to 
imprisonment and hard labour of varying lengths dependent 
on the severity of their alleged actions. The four women 
accused were all convicted and sentenced to between six 
months and two years of hard labour, while the men I s 
sentences ran from six months to five years. 85 The 
imprisonment of members of the community brought to an 
end a period of rebellion which was dubbed the 
Witzieshoek rebellion, but it did not quell the 
resistance which had characterized the actions of the 
community since the imposition of betterment. 
The impact of the rebellion upon the state 
In order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the 
Witzieshoek rebellion, it is necessary to look at the 
response of the state. 
83 VAB: HG 4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau, Petition of Appeal, pp. 32-
43. 
84 Ibid., p. 35. 
85 VAB: HG.4/1/2/1/487/488, Rex vs Malau, Sentencing 
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Witzieshoek was thrust into the foreground only after the 
clash on 2 8 November 19 50. Thus, most of the reactions 
expressed in the House of Parliament were concerned with 
this event. This was problematic as it tended to focus 
attention on the violent climax to the rebellion, and 
therefore glossed over the resistance which had preceded 
it. Furthermore, it accentuated the violent response on 
the part of the community, one which had not been 
pervasive throughout the rebellion at all. 
Most of the responses were reported in Hansard during and 
after the Commission had undertaken its analysis of the 
community. The Native representatives reacted in outrage 
to the clash. Mrs Ballinger blamed the Nationalists 
directly for the incident. She argued that 'a pretty 
difficult situation had developed' in Witzieshoek over a 
number of years, but that 'crucial developments' only 
occurred after the National Party's ascent to power. 86 
'Since this Minister came into office he has dealt with 
them in a way which I think must cause a very 
considerable amount of alarm to anyone who feels 
concerned about the future peace in this country. 187 Her 
main concern was with the way the government had handled 
the clash, both before and after. She condemned the 
government for ruling with 'sten guns and arbitrary 
imprisonment', bemoaning the fact that it had imprisoned 
fourteen of the rebels for three months without trial. 88 
Mrs Ballinger placed the Witzieshoek rebellion into a 
national context. 'The government has been in off ice for 
just on three years, and there is already a long trail of 
conf 1 ict between pol ice and natives and between natives 
86 HAD, (1951), vol. 74, col.2861. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., col. 2862. 
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and other people. ,89 Mr Kahn, another Native 
Representative backed up Ballinger's argument. He queried 
just how the Nationalist government could proclaim to 
fight a 'weaponless struggle to preserve its own 
civilization' when it 'collaborated to send large bodies 
of armed police with sten guns and rifles and fixed 
bayonets to Witzieshoek. 190 
The response by members of the Nationalist Party was 
predictable. Colonel Dohn argued that the clash was 'not 
because of apartheid. •91 He took an extreme stance, 
asserting that the only way to 'restore the right 
relationship at Witzieshoek' was to 'take those agitators 
and hang them. •92 Dr Van Rhyn also condemned the clash, 
but in this case from a opposite perspective to the 
Native Representatives. 'After one hundred years in which 
they tried to bring civilization to the natives, you find 
revolt, murder, manslaughter, you might even say 
revolution. •93 Ironically enough, Mr Barlow, a United 
Party member, took the Nationalists' side in this debate. 
'I do not see how this government can be blamed for 
taking action at Witzieshoek•. 94 His main concern was for 
the white women and children on the farms outside of 
reserve. Here is a incontestable demonstration of the 
result of accentuating the clash over and above the other 
actions of the rebels. 
What is interesting in this debate is that African women 
were completely ignored. Even those Members of Parliament 
expressing outrage failed to account for the fact that 
89 Ibid., col. 2864. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., col. 7824. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. col. 7861. 
94 Ibid., col. 3099. 
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women and children were present at the clash. Instead, 
the only mention women received was paternalistic 
protectiveness for white women. Obviously, the role women 
had played had been seriously overlooked in this context. 
Witzieshoek women were being relegated to the background. 
women and resistance 
In a paper delivered at the Conference on Women and 
Gender in Natal in 1991, Julia Wells endeavoured to 
explain why women rebel. She focussed specifically on the 
anti-pass campaigns of women in Bloemfontein in 1913 and 
in Johannesburg in the 1950s. Her argument revolved 
around the concept of I mother ism', 95 a term coined by 
Temma Kaplan and developed from the observation that, in 
Wells' terms, 'women's most effective calls to action 
centred on their roles as mothers and defenders of their 
children'. 96 Drawing on international studies of women's 
resistance movements, Wells explained that anti-pass 
campaigns were 'motherist movements'. This was because 
the protests against passes were 
responsibilities of motherhood 1 • 97 
'linked to the 
Walker argues that the concept of 'motherhood' requires 
analysis; its meaning in particular contexts needs to be 
examined. She points out that in pre-capitalist 
societies, the status and importance of female fertility 
'suggests that historically motherhood in African society 
cannot be equated with submission and passivity. ' 98 She 
argues that gender historians should avoid assuming that 
95 J Wells, 'The Rise and Fall of Motherism as a Force in Black 
Women's Resistance Movements', (paper presented to the 
conference on 'Women and Gender in South Africa', p. 1. 
96 Ibid., p. 2. 
97 Ibid., p. 12. 
98 Walker, Women and Resistance, p. xx. 
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'women's defence of their maternal roles constituted a· 
negation of their rights as women - that women's rights 
are somewhat at odds with the maternal role - and that 
organisation around the latter is evidence of an 
unproblematic conservatism and defence of patriarchy. •99 
In terms of resistance struggles in the 1950s, she 
asserts that the extent to which these older meanings of 
motherhood prevailed needs to be assessed, as wel 1 as 
whether new circumstances, such as female headed 
households and economic imperatives, shaped women's 
perceptions of motherhood. 
While the concept of 'motherism' could be applied to some 
of the female rebels at Wi tzieshoek, as bohali ensured 
security and an ability to continue to operate as 
mothers, it provides too narrow a view of why Witzieshoek 
women rebelled. The evidence suggests that mothers, 
grandmothers and daughters were reacting against the 
decline in their material well-being and their ability to 
produce. Betterment had severely disrupted women's 
economic security and status in addition to their role in 
the productive cycle of the community. For example, 
married women or single mothers could no longer continue 
to meet their families' nutritional needs 100 , a function 
that was integral to their role as producers and hence 
their status in the community. Women's reaction to the 
enforcement of culling in 1950 therefore was a reaction 
against the erosion of their security as producers. 
The predominance of female headed households, as well as 
the fundamental importance of women's productive and 
reproductive capacities in Witzieshoek, suggests that 
women's involvement in the Witzieshoek rebellion was 
99 . · Ibid., pp. X.lX and XX. 
lOO Those women who were squatting in the corrununity were the most 
deprived as they had no access to land in order to produce. 
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neither conservative nor an endorsement of patriarchy. 
The rebellion occurred in a context in which women had 
been challenging male authority and control for two 
decades. Women's active participation and support was 
therefore not 'unusual' but rather symbolised their 
militancy as a group. By defending bohali women were not 
defending the patriarchal ideologies that controlled it, 
but their own experience of power and authority within 
it. 
Conclusion 
The Wi tzieshoek rebellion was a wel 1 coordinated 
confrontation with the Trust and the Department of Native 
Affairs. It was distinguished by its support base which 
lacked the cleavages often characteristic of other 
uprisings. It deviated from other resistance struggles in 
the rural periphery of South Africa, between the 194 Os 
and 1950s, in that it articulated a nationalist ideology 
and hence was not entirely parochial in nature. The 
involvement of both men and women in the rebellion, 
though a departure from the past, was consistent with the 
context within which the rebellion occurred. The state 
managed to crush the rebellion, but its impact 
reverberated through the corridors of power and continued 
to influence the Nationalist government after 1950. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE WITZIESHOEK COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY: CONFLICTING 
REFLECTIONS OF A 'NATIVE POLICY' THAT IGNORED THE WOMEN 
'WHO CAUSED ALL THE TROUBLE' 
Introduction 
The Commission 
'disturbances' sat 
of Enquiry into the 
from l November 1950 to 
Witzieshoek 
26 January 
1951 with a short break in-between. The Commission 
consisted of four white people appointed by the state: Mr 
CJ Van Heerden, Mr J HJ Van Rensburg, Mr GEN Ross and 
Mr A Eyles who was the chairperson. 1 The Department of 
Native Affairs also appointed an African, Mr S S Terna, to 
the panel in an advisory capacity, after pressure from 
the Witzieshoek community. The Commission's function was 
to explain the rebellion in Witzieshoek and to make 
recommendations on how to solve the conflict as well as 
to address the problem of over-population of stock and 
people. 
Adam Ashforth argues that by setting up commissions, the 
state could view people as 'problems' and therefore make 
them the 'subject of a power which assumes to be able to 
resolve their status. ' 2 In this process a Commission of 
Enquiry becomes a 'theatre of power' . 3 This is because 
'the central truth of state power is ritually played out 
before a public audience. 14 In the Witzieshoek case, the 
Commission of Enquiry was a necessary mechanism to 
1 Witz ieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. l. 
2 A Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in 
Twentieth century South Africa, (New York, 1990), p. s. 
3 Ibid., p. 7. 
4 Ibid. 
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control the rebellion. It enabled the state, and more 
specifically the Native Affairs Department, to contain 
the problem in a forum in which they had the control and 
the rebels did not. 
However, the Witzieshoek Commission also represented the 
various interests constructing policies and ideologies 
regarding •native• affairs. Consequently, the 
inconsistencies and contradictions evident in its 
discourse diminished its status as a theatre of power. 
The discourse of the Commission and the way in which it 
mirrored the debates over 'native' policy between 194 8 
and 1950, as well as its influence on •native' policy in 
the 1950s will constitute this chapter. 
Women and the Witzieshoek Commission 
In the discussion thus far, the central importance of 
women to the Witzieshoek community between 1930 and 1950 
has been stressed. This is not only because of their 
function as 
but because 
overarching 
reproducers 
of their 
presence 
and producers in the community, 
increasing autonomy and their 
in the actual rebellion. In 
comparison, the Witzieshoek Commission almost completely 
ignored women. 
When analyzing and interpreting language and meaning, it 
is necessary to ask questions concerning power. 'Who 
takes the floor, who controls, who chooses, who defines 
what is good or bad behaviour?' 5 In the case of the 
Commission of Enquiry, the panel consisted of three white 
males who took the floor and controlled, chose and 
defined good and bad behaviour. Nevertheless, the 
5 R Wodak, Language, Power and Ideology, Studies in 
Political Discourse, (Amsterdam and Philadephia, 1989), p. 
xiv, 
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androcentr ic bias evident in the report went beyond the 
sex of the panel. 
The Commission sat at a time when the government was 
taking its support of African patriarchy a step further. 
In addition to its desire to entrench tribal and hence 
male authority in the reserves, the Department of Native 
Affairs had begun to discuss the possibility of 
controlling women directly through the requirement of a 
pass. 6 The Commission was also influenced by the males it 
interviewed. In the course of its investigation, it 
interrogated sixteen white males and twenty five African 
males, each with his own stake in male-supremacist 
authority systems. These attitudes were reflected in the 
report. 
Furthermore, the Commission focused primarily on the 
political and economic conditions in the reserve. Its 
recommendations were couched in economic and technical 
terms. This is apparent in its second chapter which it 
divided into the following sections: 
situation and extent of the reserve, 
population, extent and productive capacity of 
arable land, water supply and possibility of 
irrigation schemes, extent and nature of 
grazing area, possibility of the establishment 
of local industries and the availability of 
labour and accommodation of such labour, the 
right of ownership or occupation of individual 
Natives in the Reserve, the success or 
otherwise of the rehabilitation measures which 
have up to now been applied to Witzieshoek by 
the South African Native Trust. 7 
6 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 204. 
7 Witz ieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 16. 
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It steered completely clear of the social and domestic 
relations which were commonly associated with African 
women by both the state and the male African elite at 
that time. By largely excluding women from their report, 
the Commission was re-casting the political, economic and 
technical domains as masculine. The irony in this 
assumption is that it directly echoed the attitude of the 
Trust officials right from the inception of the 
betterment process in 1939 and had become integral to the 
problem of development. 
The 'Native Problem' Debate 
When the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, three 
main schools of thought advocated policies and programmes 
which promised to affect Africans in Witzieshoek 
directly. The United Party, a formidable opponent to the 
Nationalists prior to the 1953 elections, championed a 
programme of legislation which fell mid-way between 
segregation and integration. 8 It believed that the 
Africans in the urban areas should become part of a 
permanent urban population whilst further migration from 
the reserves and urbanization should not be 
unrestricted. 9 
According to Posel, the Nationalists were influenced on 
the one hand by adherents of a policy of 'total 
segregation 110 who desired complete economic, social and 
political separation (pure apartheid) . 11 On the other 
hand, there were proponents of what Fasel dubbed 
'practical apartheid 1 , who maintained that white 
8 Pose 1, The Making of A:gartheid, p. 47. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. so. 
11 Ibid. I p. 53. 
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supremacy would not be jeopardized by economic dependence 
on the Africans in the urban areas. 12 In their opinion, 
the problem of 'the urbanized African' could be resolved 
through strict control measures rather than by absolute 
segregation. 13 In its representation of the rebellion and 
in its recommendations, the Witzieshoek Commission of 
Enquiry contained components of each philosophy. It 
vacillated between embracing the principles of total 
apartheid, of practical apartheid and those of the United 
Party. 
The Recommendations of the Witzieshoek Commission 
The Witzieshoek Commission's recommendations are the most 
important aspect of its report as they directly 
illustrate the debate prevalent within government circles 
concerning the question of 'native' policy after 1948. 
The Commission stated that it hoped that its 
recommendations would contribute to 'a possible solution 
to the Native problem in South Africa. 114 Notwithstanding 
this bold declaration, the capacity of the report to 
influence the policies of the Department of Native 
Affairs was questionable. 
Written at a time when the National Party was accused of 
speaking 'with many voices on the question of their 
Native policy' 15 , its authors tended to draw on 
ideologies and policies advocated before 1948, which were 
still being debated in 1950. Some of these ideologies 
were ultimately rejected by the government as they were 
contrary to Nationalist ideology in the 1950s. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., p. 55. 
14 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 29. 
15 HAD, (1950), vol. 71, quoted in Pose!, The Making of 
Apartheid, p. 63. 
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Moreover, the Commission had to compete with a variety of 
other forces acting on the Nationalist Party and its 
'native' policies at this time. Its recommendations were 
challenged by the proposals made by those representing 
the interests of the mining and farming industries. Posel 
argues that between 1948 and 1961, Nationalist policies 
were more concerned with dealing with conflict and 
compromise than with following a pre-planned blueprint. 16 
The Witzieshoek Commission was a part of that conflict 
and compromise. 
Finally, the Commission's influence was diminished by its 
framework. Its primary concern was Witzieshoek and its 
development, whereas the Department of Native Affairs, 
during the early 1950s, gave priority to the position of 
urban Africans over those in the reserves, concentrating 
on influx control. 17 
Nevertheless, as a public document, the report gained the 
power and authority associated with publication. Uta M 
Quastoff' s distinction between 'public' and 'published' 
opinion is useful here. She argues that public opinion 
becomes influential only once knowledge is shared. 
Published opinion is the medium through which knowledge 
becomes authenticated and part of a collective belief and 
hence empowers public knowledge. 18 The Commission of 
Enquiry influenced and was in turn influenced by shared 
public opinions. This is why its discourse as a part of 
wider public discourses requires examination. 
16 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, pp. 6 and 60. 
17 Ibid., p. 71. 
18 UM Quastoff, 'Social Prejudice as a Resource of Power: Towards 
the Functional Ambivalence of Stereotypes', in Wodak (ed), 
Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political 
Discourse, p. 193. 
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Urbanization 
Ironically, the most important recommendation of the 
Commission of Enquiry dealt with the status of the urban 
African's relationship to Wi tzieshoek. It proposed that 
Witzieshoek was faced with two alternative futures. On 
the one hand, it could continue to consist of migrant 
labourers, who were absent but had rights to reside 
there, and of permanent residents whom the Commission 
dubbed the 'purely farming population•. 19 
On the other hand, it could 'develop in the direction of 
becoming a self supporting unit as soon as possible' 
which would consist of people who 'by means of 
agriculture, business and local industries' could supply 
their own needs. In turn, this would require the 
limitation of migrant labour to 'a minimum' so that 
'industrialised Natives would no longer have the right, 
taken for granted, to regard Witzieshoek as a place to 
which they can return at will when after years of absence 
they retire from industrial life to spend their old age 
there. 1 20 The Commission supported the latter 
recommendation. 
This problem was something the Department of Native 
Affairs had attempted to tackle in 1949. Their proposed 
solution had been set out in the Native Laws Amendment 
and Urban Areas Amendment bills of 1949. The Native Laws 
Bill proposed the setting up of 'nation-wide labour 
bureaux•, 21 and the Urban Areas Bill had set out 
restrictions on urbanization, limiting Africans in the 
urban areas to those who were either born there and were 
permanent residents or those given permission to reside 
19 Witz ieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 92. 
171 
there by the local authorities. 22 Both these pieces of 
Legislation were withdrawn by Dr E G Jansen, the Native 
Affairs Minister at that time. 
The Commission of Enquiry ignored the defunct Urban Areas 
Bill. Instead, it recommended that 'a Native who has been 
absent from the Reserve for two years or more should be 
regarded as having left the Reserve permanently 1 • 23 This 
was a far more radical proposal then the requirement 
proposed in the 1949 legislation. 
In fact this recommendation was even more liberal than 
that proposed by the United Party in 1951 when Verwoerd 
re-introduced the Native Laws Amendment Bill to 
parliament. The United Party argued that the restriction 
of permanent residence in the town to those born there, 
was 'unduly harsh' and that a time scale of three to five 
years was a more appropriate measure for permanent urban 
residence. 24 The discrepancy between the United Party's 
recommendation and that of the Witzieshoek Commission, 
both of which were part of the political debate of 1951, 
was clarified by Major Van Der Byl, the former Minister 
of Native Affairs under United Party rule, in his 
discussion of the Commission's proposal. 
22 
If the Native Reserve is to be the fatherland 
of the Native and if he goes out of it because 
economic circumstances force him to go and seek 
a living somewhere else, should the government 
- because he is away for two years - deny him 
entry to his own fatherland? 25 
Ibid., p. 95. 
23 Wi tzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 18. 
24 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 99. 
25 HAD, (1951), vol. 76, col. 8296. 
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By making use of the key word 'fatherland', Van Der Byl 
was appropriating the Nationalist Party discourse. He 
revealed the inconsistency between the notion of a 
fatherland and the economic reality of urbanization. 
The final draft of the Native Laws Amendment Bill was 
passed in 1951. It represented the politics of compromise 
identified by Posel. Instead of demanding that permanent 
residence be limited to those born in the towns, the 
amendment stated that those who had been employed 
continually for ten years by one employer, or more than 
fifteen years by several, were eligible for the status of 
the permanently urbanized. 26 
Linked to the Commission's recommendation on curtailing 
re-entry into the reserve was the notion of a permanent 
urban population, one which had its source in the United 
Party's Fagan Commission. This is illustrated in the 
Witzieshoek Commission's commentary on the urban areas. 
In order to stabilise the population in the 
reserves, and in this case Witzieshoek, and to 
limit it in the main to the farming population, 
the Commission considers it essential that in 
the urban areas, especially in the large 
industrial centres such as the Witwatersrand, 
certain areas be proclaimed Native areas in 
terms of the Group Areas Act for the permanent 
segregation of natives in their residential 
areas where provision will be made for three 
groups of Natives, namely the sub-economic 
lessee, the economic lessee and the economic 
landowner. Where the permanently industrialised 
Native may live and where he may be granted a 
certain amount of say in his own affairs and 
26 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, pp. 101-102. 
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where the native who had saved up capital may 
invest it safely in property or in business. 27 
Like the Fagan Report, the Witzieshoek Commission 
recognised the need for a permanent urban African 
population with encumbent responsibilities and rights. 
The Witzieshoek Commission's response to urbanization 
predictably flew in the face of Nationalist adherents of 
puritan apartheid. These puritans desired to halt most 
African urbanization, restricting it to temporary male 
migration. 28 In their discourse which closely followed 
the Stallard Commission, the concept of a permanent urban 
African population was unacceptable. 29 Major van Der Byl 
reflected this in parliament. 
According to the recommendation contained in 
this report, the permanent industrial worker is 
to live in the town and have a say in his own 
affairs. This recommendation cuts right 
across the Government policy - the policy that 
in the towns the native shall merely be a 
temporary worker. This recommendation is 
similar to that of the Fagan Commission and I 
would like to know what the Government thinks 
of it. 30 
Van der Byl, indisputably aimed to challenge the 
Nationalists with this assertion. He believed that the 
Witzieshoek Commission's report was 'going to have a very 
important bearing on all future Native policy' and 
therefore was enthusiastic to hear the Nationalist 
27 Witzieshoek commission of Enquiry, p. 18. 
28 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 53. 
29 Ibid. p. 47. 
30 HAD, ( 1951), vol. 76, col. 7854 and 8296. 
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response. 31 
Nationalist 
It is 
Party 
here that 
becomes 
the conflict 
apparent and 
within 
that 
the 
the 
historical forces moulding 'practical' 
Neither Jansen nor Verwoerd could 
African subject and proposed to deal 
apartheid emerge. 
escape the urban 
with it through 
control rather than through eradication. They sought to 
create 'order out of the present chaos•. 32 
Posel maintains that 'the NAD's determination to halt the 
urbanization process placed a particular premium on 
controlling the movements, marriage patterns, and 
economic activities of African women'. 33 African women 
were an important feature of the Nationalist concept of 
creating order out of chaos. As argued at various points 
in this thesis, African women were held responsible for 
the social decay of the towns. In order to eradicate 
their negative 
'buttressing and 
influence, 
restoring 
the Nationalists aimed at 
African men's control over 
women', both in the rural and urban areas. 34 To this end, 
Verwoerd ensured that the 1952 amendments to the Native 
Laws Amendment Act applied to women as well as men. 
During the 1940s, the Native Affairs Department had been 
reluctant to interfere directly in the control of African 
women as reaction to any form of legislation had been 
vehemently opposed. By the 1950s, the Nationalists 
altered course and decided to impose legislative controls 
on the movement of women. Although the 1952 amendments 
did not have an immediate affect on women, as Verwoerd 
promised an 'administratively lax approach', they 
signalled the beginning of a more direct approach to the 
control of women. 35 
31 Ibid., col. 7854. 
32 quoted in Posel, The Making of A12artheid, p. 68. 
33 Ibid., p. 80. 
34 Ibid., p. 81. 
35 Ibid., p. 207. 
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The Wi tzieshoek Commission made no distinction between 
men and women in its proposals concerning urbanization. 
It is interesting that the Commission ignored women, when 
they were an important component of the urbanization 
debate. Perhaps the 'almost fanatical opposition' to the 
introduction of passes led the Commission to steer clear 
of the controversial issue or perhaps the implicit 
assumption was that what the Commission applied to men 
should be applied to women too. 36 
Whereas the Witzieshoek Commission proposed that African 
urbanization was a permanent solution, Verwoerd argued 
that his version of 'practical' apartheid was merely the 
first step towards puritan apartheid. Permanently 
urbanized Africans were presented as expedient for the 
time being by Verwoerd, yet as Posel points out, 'the 
'practical' policies of the first stage would take the 
country along a different route from that leading towards 
the purported ideal of total segregation. •37 
In contrast to its proposals which challenged Nationalist 
policies on urbanization, the Witzieshoek Commission's 
concept of Witzieshoek as 'a self supporting unit' 
brought it closer to the ideals of the puritans. Total 
segregation embraced the notion of the development of the 
reserves into miniature 'states' with the ability to 
support and control their own resources. The fact that 
the Witzieshoek Commission explored the 'possibility of 
the establishment of local industries• 38 and recommended 
that the government 
the European traders 
36 Ibid., p. 204. 
37 Ibid., p. 68. 
'expropriate the trading rights of 
and that in future no trading 
38 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 16. 
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rights be granted to Europeans in Witzieshoek 139 
indicated its commitment to the total economic, political 
and social segregation of the Reserves. 
Tribalism 
The development of the reserves into self-supporting 
units and the introduction of rigid influx control were 
bound up with Nationalist discourse, both puritan and 
practical, 
viewed as 
African. 
on the concept of tribalism. The towns were 
breeding grounds for the 'detribalized' 
Posel points out that Verwoerd and his 
predecessor 'bemoaned the loss of tribal discipline and 
identity amongst urbanised Africans' . 40 The loss of 
tribal discipline cannot be dissociated from the social 
decay that Verwoerd and Jansen blamed on African women. 
Male authority and control were intimately linked with 
tribal discipline and thus constituted part of the 
Nationalist's attempts to control women. 
There was a rigid separation between so-called tribalized 
Africans living in the reserves and in the towns on a 
temporary basis, and so-called 'detribalised' Africans. 
Jansen argued in 1950 that 'the number of detribalised 
Natives in the urban areas should be frozen to 
prevent further detribalisation of families'. 41 The 
Witzieshoek report mirrored this distinction: 
39 
The Commission is of the opinion that it is of 
the utmost importance for the solution to the 
native problem in South Africa that a definite 
policy should be laid down and followed in 
respect of natives who initially left the 
Ibid., p. 34. 
40 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 203. 
41 HAD, (1950), vol. 71, quoted in Fasel, The Making of 
Apartheid, pp. 79/BO. 
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Reserves as migrant labourers and who by force 
of circumstances remain outside for so long a 
period that for practical purposes they lose 
all contact with the reserve, take their 
families to the urban areas, become totally 
dissociated from their tribe, 
regarded as urbanised Africans. 42 
and may be 
It essentially accused the 'detribalized and 
industrialized Native' 43 of being the villains in the 
case of the Witzieshoek rebellion and hinted that their 
exclusion would prevent further disturbances. 
It will also prevent 
Native] from trying, 
him [the detribalized 
like the Witzieshoek 
Vigilance Association, to exert influence from 
outside upon the Administration of the Reserve, 
sometimes with extremely detrimental results, 
as was apparent in the case of the recent 
disturbances in Witzieshoek. 44 
The belief that towns were inappropriate areas for 
African residence lay behind the scapegoating of urban 
African subjects. Towns continued to be cast as havens 
for the immoral, undisciplined and criminal and this 
influenced public opinion and the Witzieshoek Commission 
of Enquiry. The Commission insisted on locating the 
source of the rebellion outside Witzieshoek. 
This evidence, taken as a whole, leads the 
Commission to the conclusion that the 
'Vigilance Association' of Johanes$burg and the 
'Agitators' in Witzieshoek were very closely 
associated with sinister aims, the true nature 
42 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 17. 
43 Ibid., p. 23. 
44 Ibid., p. 18. 
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and object of which are not very clear. 
Alternately, 
conclusion 
the Commission comes to the 
that Paulus Howell Mopeli's 
actions were inspired by a source outside the 
Reserve, of which he was merely the instrument 
for the obstruction of the authorities in the 
Reserve. 45 
The Commission reinforced its conspiracy theory by 
linking the outside source with organized resistance in 
the towns, specifically in the form of communism. 
Extremely reliable evidence was made available 
to the Commission that one of the persons who 
withdrew, was a person 'named' in terms of the 
provisions of the Unlawful Organization Act. It 
also transpired that during the week before the 
27 November, 1950, Paulus Howell Mopeli and 
some of his followers were in Johannesburg and 
that they had consul tat ions with other named 
persons as well as Dr. Dadoo [a member of the 
Communist PartyJ.46 
. e. This conspiracy theory was directed by the prominance of 
communism in the political debates. The suppression of 
Communism Act had been passed in 1950 and there was a 
widely held belief that the towns were 'breeding grounds 
of "communistic" onslaughts on white economic and 
political supremacy•. 47 The sheer political force of 
organizations such as the ANC, the SACP and Trade Unions 
in the towns had inflamed public opinion regarding the 
'undesirable conditions' in the towns. 48 
45 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
46 Ibid., P· 13. 
47 Pose!, The Making of Apartheid, p. 76. 
48 Ibid., p. 203. 
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Interestingly, in its enthusiasm to generate semi-skilled 
labour, the Commission I s report later contradicted its 
recommendation to separate the urban detribalized African 
from the rural tribalized African: 
One takes into account that many of the 
migrant labourers from Witzieshoek are at this 
moment working in factories in the industrial 
areas of the country and, therefore, supply a 
source of semi-skilled labourers. 49 
The undesirable persons generated by the towns could be 
of use to Witzieshoek, after all. 
The Witzieshoek Commission's report entrenched the 
concept of tribalism in a number of other ways. The 
members of the Commission approached Witzieshoek with the 
preconception that they were dealing with a tribe with 
its own specific brand of tribal identity and 
organization: 
Apart from being subject to the laws of the 
country the Native residents in Witzieshoek 
live to a great extent in their tribal setting 
and according to tribal customs and laws with 
the Chief as their leader, legislator and 
administrator. 50 
This approach was not inconsistent with the approach of 
the Nationalist party and the Department of Native 
Affairs. The Department's aims throughout the 1950s in 
the reserves continued to prioritize tribal authority and 
to entrench chiefs as tribal heads. As Fred Hendricks 
argues in his case study of the Transkei reserve between 
49 Wi tzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 23. 
50 Ibid., p. 3. 
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1950 and 1970, 'propping up "tribal unity" or re-
tribalization was given precedence•. 51 
Part of the process of 'propping up' tribal authority was 
that of entrenching chiefly, and hence male, authority in 
the reserves. The Commission subscribed to this tactic. 
It urged that 
the powers which the Chief exercised formerly 
and which were later entrusted to the Native 
Commissioner be restored ... The Commission is 
of the opinion that if these powers are 
restored and the Chiefs assume greater 
administrative duties, the stipend paid to them 
should be considerably increased so that 
they can maintain their position amongst the 
tribe with dignity and without any financial 
embarrassment. 52 
The Commission itself and the Nationalists came under 
fire in 1951 from one of the Native Representatives in 
parliament, for upholding the concept of tribalism. Mr 
Kahn's speech demonstrated the inconsistency of this 
ideology. 
Now the 
Witzieshoek, 
whole 
as 
system 
it has 
of 
been 
tribalism 
exposed by 
in 
the 
Commission, has broken down and they are making 
a desperate attempt to mend the holes in the 
tottering system of tribalism. Therefore the 
Commission makes wholly illogical and 
contradictory recommendations. 53 
51 F Hendricks, 'Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement: The Politics 
of Conservation and Control in the Transkei, South Africa, 
1950-1970', Journal of Southern African Studies, 15/2, 
(1989), p. 312. 
52 Witzieshoek commission of Enquiry, p. 30. 
53 HAD, (1951), vol. 76, col. 8420/8421. 
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The Under-Secretary for Development also criticized this 
particular recommendation albeit from a different 
perspective. 
It is the neglect or the inability of those 
Chiefs who have hitherto controlled the Native 
areas that the present chaotic and dreadful 
state of some of the Reserves can be 
attributed. 54 
The Secretary of Native Affairs, to whom the Under-
secretary was addressing this comment, asserted his 
unequivocal support in 1952 for the recommendation, 
illustrating that the conflict stretched beyond 
parliamentary debate. 55 
The Witzieshoek commission's like the 
Nationalists, clung to the whole 
it authenticated the development 
panel, 
system of 
of the 
tribalism as 
reserves into 
self-contained units and because it acted as a vessel of 
control. By propping up tribalism and the chief, the 
Commission satisfied the immediate need within 
Witzieshoek to castigate the rebels and to reinstate 
control. In the discourse of both the Commission and the 
Nationalists (practical and puritan adherents), tribalism 
was constructed as the central tenet of the reserve 
societies. It was this entrenchment of tribalism that 
Kahn condemned. 
Now, the crux of the matter is that this very 
ill-equipped and partisan commission has failed 
to draw the very obvious conclusion on the 
Witzieshoek disturbances .... These occurrences 
are proof of the fact that the whole of the so-
54 SAS: NTS, 9779, 961/400, US to SNA, 2/5/1951. 
55 SAS: NTS, 9779, 961/400, SNA to CNCs, 19/9/1952. 
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called native administration with its reserves, 
its synthetic tribalism, its puppet chiefs, has 
suffered a complete col lapse. Instead of 
recognising this historic process, the 
Government is still pottering around with the 
trivialities of outmoded tribalism and a 
hopeless effort to entrench the present system. 
The solution of the Native problem is not 
to be found in the cramped over-crowded 
reserves, but in the urban areas with their 
developing industries. 56 
This criticism revealed the contradiction between the 
development of reserves and the freezing of urbanization. 
In Kahn I s opinion, Native policy could only succeed if 
the concepts of 'reserves' and •tribalism' were abandoned 
altogether. The Commission of Enquiry hung onto reserves 
and tribal ism in its recommendations, but at the same 
time envisaged the urban areas as appropriate dumping 
grounds for the detribalized African. In other words, 
development within the boundaries of Witzieshoek was 
contingent on separating the supposedly pure tribal 
members of the community from those contaminated in the 
towns. The contradiction in this philosophy was that it 
failed to account for the dependence of Witzieshoek 
inhabitants on the town's inhabitants. 
Posel maintains that during the 1950s a characteristic of 
reserve life was reliance on the wages of migrants. 57 In 
1951 the Under-Secretary for Development expressed 
concern for the relatives of town inhabitants in his 
report on the Witzieshoek Commission. He stated that the 
recommendation to restrict entry to the reserve after a 
two year absence was I impracticable', arguing that 'it 
would probably cause untold hardship to the families of 
56 HAD, (1951), vol. 76, col. 8421. 
57 Pose!, The Making of Apartheid, p. 127. 
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labourers who in fact regard the reserves as their 
homes. ' 58 
By distinguishing between tribalized and detribalized 
Africans and entrenching the concept of tribalism, the 
Witzieshoek Commission was able to justify its notion of 
Witzieshoek as a self-contained unit as well as to 
propagate the notion that the rebellion was caused by 
'outsiders'. The Nationalists, however, weakened their 
concept of segregation when subscribing to these notions. 
This was because total segregation entailed the expulsion 
of all women and children from the towns and only 
temporary migration for all the men. 59 By differentiating 
between tribal and detribalized Africans and by 
entrenching the tribal system, the Nationalists were 
creating tribal enclaves with which detribalised Africans 
could not identify and therefore to which they would not 
return. The Witzieshoek Commission, ironically enough, 
tried to deal with this problem. 
Natives whose applications to return to the 
reserve are refused or who for some reason are 
removed from the industrial area or a 
prohibited area in terms of section 10 of the 
Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, should 
be removed to a special reserve as for example 
Hamanskraal, and should not automatically be 
sent back to the reserve of their birth. 60 
The inconsistency between advocating tribalism and 
suggesting that detribalised Africans be left to wander 
in the no man's land of 'special 
articulated by the Under-secretary, 
communication about the Commission. He 
58 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, US to SNA, 2/5/1951. 
59 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 53. 
reserves' was 
again in his 
argued that the 
60 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 32. 
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recommendation would 'bring about a most embarrassing 
situation' which would stern from the fact that •a variety 
of tribes some with families and some without, would be 
hurled together in a strange place far from kith and 
kin I • 61 
Contradicting tribalism 
The way in which the Commission dealt with the issue of 
bohali is illuminating. The fact that it had been charged 
with finding the causes of the rebellion gave it the 
opportunity to explore the role of cattle within the 
community, yet, despite stressing the •tribal' way of 
life, the Commission barely touched on the issue. 
In the section dealing with the state of •unrest• within 
the community, the Commission claimed that in addition to 
bringing about radical and unpopular changes in the 
tribal life of the community, 'the full implications of 
these especially in respect to the limitation of stock 
was not properly understood. •62 
This was the first and last time it reflected on cattle, 
except for a brief reference near the end of its report. 
By arguing that the limitation of stock was 'especially' 
problematic, the Commission came to an unescapable 
conclusion: cattle were of central importance to the 
'tribal' life of the community. Yet it took the issue no 
further. It did not articulate that stock limitation was 
the most I radical and unpopular I change because of the 
threat it constituted to bohali and the relations of 
reciprocity and security that went with it. 63 
61 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, US to SNA, 2/5/1951. 
62 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 12. 
63 Ibid. 
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The Commission could not have failed to grasp the link 
between cattle and women. Mr H P Smit, the Additional 
Native Commissioner for Witzieshoek at the time, was 
reported as having made the following declaration to the 
Commission: 
All the natives wanted large numbers of cattle 
because of the lobolo system. The only solution 
was that they should be allowed to pay lobolo 
in money instead of cattle. 64 
The Commission excluded a lengthly examination of bohali 
because it was in conflict with its recommendations. Its 
proposals were based on the viability of stock as 
commercial products, not as a form of social control. 
Paternalism is again evident in this attitude. Both the 
white members of the panel and the white men they 
interviewed tended to equate 'the native' with the 'small 
child in need of constant guidance and reassurance'. This 
was explicit in the way the Commission dealt with the 
impact of the Trust. 
It is easy to understand that such a change 
would cause a natural dissatisfaction in the 
mind of the ordinary native especially those 
who are unable to understand the weighty and 
logical arguments ( from the point of view of 
the Europeans) which formed the basis of the 
introduction of these new measures. 65 
This reinforced the notion that labour reorganization on 
European terms was logical, whereas organization based on 
the productive and reproductive capacities of women was 
illogical and irrational. 
64 cape Times, 14/11/1950. 
65 Witz ieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 10. 
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In contrast to the Witzieshoek Commission, newspapers 
reporting on its proceedings and recommendations 
reflected on lobolo in more detail. This indicated that 
the whole system of lobolo was important within the 
political and public arena, as newspapers were one front 
on which political debates were fought. Interestingly, 
there seemed to be some sort of consensus among the major 
white newspapers over the issue. 
In an editorial written in The Argus (the English liberal 
mouthpiece of the Cape), the inhabitants of Witzieshoek 
were berated for such practices. 
If the natives persist in clinging to the 
ancient ways and ideas the problem of raising 
their standards of life in their own 
territories cannot be resolved. 66 
The Volksblad (The mouthpiece of the conservative 
Afrikaans community) brought up the subject in its 
editorial only a week later. 
It had been a struggle of many years within the 
native reserves against the traditional notion 
that the number of cattle determine a man's 
weal th. 67 
These opinions emerged out of a white, male prejudice 
which sought to impose its own values on the community, 
but they were directed by conservationist principles. 
They blamed 'excessive hoarding of cattle' for the 
deterioration of the reserves. The Commission saw the 
solution to 'cattle hoarding' in technical terms and in 
this way managed to divorce cattle from tribalism and 
66 The Argus, 4/8/1950. 
67 Volksblad, 11/8/1950. 
187 
bohal i. In essence, the Commission was creating its own 
brand of 'tribalism'. 
The contradictions of selecting only certain features of 
'tribalism' were revealed by The Argus in another 
editorial on 28 November 1950: 
It is a popular theme in some political 
quarters to insist that the native must develop 
his own way of life, spiritually and tribally. 
He must, these advocates say, be preserved from 
the contaminating influences of European 
civilization. Yet the lobolo system is the 
greatest encouragement to overstocking. Can 
culling ever be successfully taught to the 
native if he is left to believe at the same 
time that cattle should remain the coin of his 
matrimonial realm? 68 
In Witzieshoek, in 1950, women, cattle and rebellion were 
unmistakably connected. Newspapers had the prerogative to 
expose that connection while the Witzieshoek Commission 
had a stake in underplaying it as it exposed the 
contradictions in its report. 
Conservationist Discourse 
A remnant of pre-1948 discourse inherited by the 
Commission was a concern for conservation and the 
parallel development of the reserve. The Commission 
report makes use of key words such as 'improved methods', 
'conservation 
'unscientific 
farming', 
control', 
'scientific 
'rotation of 
control', 
grazing' and 
'harmful to the soil', all of which were used in the pre-
6 8 The Argus, 28/11/1950. 
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apartheid era. 69 The main thrust of its argument was to 
implement a system of conservation farming where the 
methods utilized would be 'under the guidance of 
experts' and where 'demonstration farms' would provide 
examples. 70 In short, the Commission sought to create 
conditions within which a stable peasantry or group of 
farmers could emerge. Its lack of differentation between 
men and women in its discourse makes it difficult to 
determine whether conservation farming would be the 
responsibilty of men, women or both. The fact that the 
Commission largely ignored women and tended to discuss 
what it perceived to be within the masculine domain 
suggests that its concept of a conservation farmer was a 
male one. 
The Commission's recommendations with regard to 
conservation and agricultural methods could have been the 
blueprint (riddled with the same male-orientated 
prejudices) for the betterment measures introduced in 
Witzieshoek in 1936 and 1939. The salient difference, 
however, was that the Commission sought to implement such 
strategies under new conditions. Not only was its 
conservationist discourse incongruous with current 
Departmental policies and ideologies in 1950, but its 
desire to introduce a whole new set of conditions clashed 
with Nationalist thinking as well as the ideas of a lobby 
critical to the Nationalists: the white farmers. 
Hendricks maintains that al though the Nationalists and 
the United Party both desired the development of the 
reserves as units which could support their population of 
migrant and permanent residents, 'the idea of creating a 
stable peasantry was incongruous with broader 
69 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, pp. 19, 20, 22, 26 and 
2 7. 
70 Ibid., p. 32. 
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political priorities. 171 According to Posel, in the first 
part of the 1950s the Department earmarked inadequate 
funds to the reserves in order to satisfy development 
needs. 72 At the end of the decade, the SA IRR report on 
the 'economic development of the reserves' indicated that 
conservation work •was still patchy, much depending on 
the interest and attitude of local officials' . 73 
In fact, the Government in the mid-1950s embarked on a 
new strategy in the reserves. It planned to implement a 
three stage plan: 'stabilisation, reclamation and 
rehabilitation'. 74 The aim of the first stage was to 
'check the general spread of erosion, stabilise the 
present condition of the soil and minimise the 
possibility of further deterioration•. 75 To this end, the 
government introduced a system of 'loose' planning to 
replace the comprehensive system of planning that had 
preceded it. 76 This conflicted with the recommendations 
and proposals of the Witzieshoek Commission which 
entailed detailed management of conservation strategies 
and focused on reclamation rather than stabilization. 
The Commission's conservation proposals were ultimately 
rejected by the Nationalists and the Department of Native 
Affairs. Instead of creating stable peasantries or indeed 
making the reserves self-supporting, government policies 
by 1960 had failed to change the status quo in the 
reserves. This was not suprising, due to the strong 
71 Hendricks, 'Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement', 
p. 309. 
72 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 71. 
73 Ibid., , p. 127. 
74 Hendricks, 'Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement', p. 318. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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influence on Nationalist policy of white farmers who 
would lose much needed labour with the development of a 
stable peasantry in the reserves. Posel quotes P 
Ntantala's impression of the reserves in the 1950s: 'One 
monotonous song of droning flies, sick babies, dying 
stock, hunger, starvation and death 1 • 77 As Hendricks 
rightly points out, the policies of the Nationalist Party 
from the 1950s made conservation the 'casualty' in the 
reserves. 78 
The friction between the Witzieshoek report and 
Nationalist and white farmers went beyond broad 
conservation. It is in the fine pr int that the 
contradiction is most apparent. The first major 
recommendation that the Commission made in order to 
ensure the development of the area was that 'the 
agricultural land should at least be doubled' . 79 This 
particular recommendation generated an immediate response 
from the local farming community in and around 
Witzieshoek. 
Colonel Dahn, a member of the Nationalist Party, informed 
parliament of the following in 1951: 
I have been instructed by the agricultural 
societies, by the farmers living on the borders 
of Witzieshoek, to protest strongly against the 
recommendation of the Commission that more land 
should be given to the Natives. 80 
Dr Rhyn, another Nationalist Party member, also 
registered the farmers' objections in his speech in 
77 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 127. 
78 Hendricks, 'Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement', p. 325. 
79 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 22. 
80 HAD, (1951), Vol. 76, col. 7824. 
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parliament. He quoted from a telegram he had received 
from the Bethlehem Farmers Circle which apparently 
represented fourteen 
stated their strong 
farmers' associations. The telegram 
objection and demanded that their 
parliamentary representative take up the matter on their 
behalf and oppose the recomrnendation. 81 
Jansen's and Verwoerd' s approach to the reserves in the 
1950s was 'deeply affected by white farmers' opposition, 
both to the prospect of competition from peasant farmers 
in the reserves and the possible extension of reserve 
land. 182 
However, the Witzieshoek commission did not come under 
fire from the farmers only; it was also criticised for 
failing to recommend the extension of the reserve even 
further. In the first place, Kahn illustrated the 
Commission's dilemma: 
[It was] Caught between the human desire of the 
Commissioners to modify the stark conditions of 
hunger and land starvation which had produced 
such bitter discontent on the one hand, and the 
desire to satisfy the demand for cheap labour 
on the part of the adjoining farms and the 
mines which necessitated the perpetuation of 
that land hunger [on the other]. 83 
He then went on to present the inadequacy of the 
Commission's solution: 
[T]he miserable and, in the circumstances, 
trivial increase of land recommended makes the 
position ludicrous and 
81 Ibid., col. 7860. 
82 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 71. 
83 HAD, (1951), Vol. 76, col. 8420. 
farcical, because, 
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according to the Commission, the average 
production of grain on this size of allotment 
is only three bags of grain per year, which is 
barely enough to maintain a family of four for 
two or three months. 84 
The Commission had indeed 'fallen between two stools' as 
Kahn had intimated. Written as it was in a context where 
Native policy was still being defined and hotly debated 
and where differing interests caused contradictions and 
conflict, it reflected those contradictions and conflicts 
instead of resolving them. 
In the section entitled, 'The Right of ownership or 
Occupation of the Industrial Native in the Reserve•, the 
Commission explored the communal tenure of land ownership 
in Witzieshoek. 85 It concluded that 
[a]lthough the Native in the Reserve lives in 
his tribal setting and subjects himself to 
tribal customs and tribal laws under the 
control of the Chief, he has developed to such 
an extent that he finds the communal possession 
of land, which subjects him to the arbitrary 
will of the Chief and/or the official, 
irksorne. 86 
Its solution to the problem was to propose that 
84 Ibid. 
a system should be applied whereby the 
individual native in the Reserve would be 
placed in a position to buy his residential lot 
and his land which would give him freehold of 
the land with the right to communal grazing for 
85 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 24. 
SG Ibid. 
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a definite and limited number of large and 
small stock. 87 
The whole concept of private ownership was rejected by 
the Nationalist government. This was apparent in a report 
from the Secretary of Native Affairs to the Chief Native 
Commissioners in 1952. The Secretary for Native Affairs 
stated that recommendations Number sixteen and twenty 
three, of the Witz ieshoek Commission, which dealt with 
the purchasing of individual tenure were rejected as they 
were 'contrary to policy•. 88 
In order to satisfy the demands of the white farming 
community, farming in the reserves had to be kept to a 
subsistence level, albeit unofficially. Therefore 
communal tenure, the bastion of unproductive farming 
according to the Witz ieshoek Commission, 89 endured into 
the 1950s. 90 Hendricks asserts that communal land tenure 
was in fact bolstered by the introduction of 'new 
administrative powers of the chiefs 1 • 91 The eradication 
of communal tenure would have left the Nationalist Party 
and the Department bereft of their one mechanism of 
control in the reserves: the chiefs, and, as Hendricks 
claims, would have •created a group of people independent 
of chiefly control' . 92 
87 Ibid. 
88 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, SNA to CNCs, 19/9/1952. 
89 They argued that the farmer is 'not so appalled as the private 
owner to see his land deteriorating and the carrying capacity 
decreasing year.by year. He becomes fatalistic and places full 
responsibility for his future on the shoulders of the 
Authorities·. Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, p. 24. 
90 Hendricks, 'Loose Planning and Rapid Resettlement', p. 309. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid., p. 310. 
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The Witzieshoek Commission, though, was at pains to deny 
the contradiction between private ownership and the 
system of tribalism at Witzieshoek. 
It is of the opinion that such a change need 
not interfere with tribal ties and tribal 
solidarity of the Natives of the Reserve ... It 
1s obvious that such individual tenure should 
be within the framework of communal tenure of 
the Reserve, the tribe and the tribal customs 
and the laws and within the jurisdiction of the 
Chief and the State. 93 
The ability of the Commission to reconcile private 
ownership with tribalism was 
parliament, again by Kahn. 
severely censured in 
It makes, in the circumstances, the startling 
recommendation, that the Africans must be 
permitted ownership of land on the basis of 
individual 
the same 
tenure and ownership, and that 
time they must be put under 
at 
the 
jurisdiction of the chief and maintain tribal 
associations subject to traditional tribal 
customs and laws. As if it is at all possible 
to have within the primitive, tribal 
communistic system, land owned in a form of 
individual capitalist ownership. It 1s frankly 
contradictory and utterly impossible. You 
cannot have the maintenance of a tribal system, 
on the basis of the individual ownership of 
land. 94 
The ambivalence in the report between tribalism on the 
one hand and a system of individual tenure on the other 
93 Witzieshoek Commission of Enguiry, p. 24. 
94 HAD, (1951), Vol. 76, col. 8421. 
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was discussed by the Under-Secretary for Development as 
well. He maintained that the granting of land to 
Witzieshoek inhabitants on the basis of individual tenure 
was 'incompatible with the augmenting of the powers of 
chiefs in their present state of tribal development. 195 
The Wi tzieshoek Commission fell into the same trap as 
that of the Nationalists and the Department in the 1950s, 
which was to elevate tribalism as a system of control 
above all else in the reserves. The victims were again 
conservation and the development of a stable peasantry. 
Loyal vs disloyal, unrest vs disturbances: The 
Commission's rebellion. 
The Commission's discussion of Wi tzieshoek prior to and 
during the disturbances has particular notable 
characteristics which are worth noting. In the first 
instance, it presented Witzieshoek women in a particular 
way. Secondly, it established the concept of tribalism 
and male chiefly authority and reinforced them both 
throughout its discussions. To entrench these two 
concepts it distinguished between two groups and two 
rebellions. It also used its license to moralize about 
the state of affairs in Witzieshoek, and to criticize 
specific actions of the Department of Native Affairs, 
revealing its relative autonomy from the Department. 
Representations of women 
The Witzieshoek Commission mentioned women specifically 
three times in its report. The fact that it ignored women 
completely in the rest of the report underlines the 
importance of these three instances. 
95 SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, US to SNA, 2/5/1951. 
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In all three cases, it linked women to the rebels. 
These animals were removed from this camp by 
force by a large number of mounted natives who 
were armed and accompanied by native women 
about 400 armed natives had appeared in front 
of the office where, incited by women, they 
executed a war dance ... a large number of the 
natives were armed, some with knobkerries, 
other with axes and assegais, while the native 
women carried sickles under their blankets. 96 
The Commission was associating the African women of 
Witzieshoek with negative stereotypes. Women enjoyed the 
same status as rebels in the report. Moreover, they were 
made responsible for the actions of the rebels by being 
the persons who 'incited' the latter to 'execute war 
dances'. This kind of construction of women was not 
inconsistent with Nationalist Party discourse in the 
1950s. By linking the women to the rebels, the Commission 
associated them with the 'sinister aims' of the persons 
responsible for the 'disturbances', who, they maintained, 
had their source outside Witzieshoek. 
Unlike the men in Witzieshoek who were divided into 
'loyal' and 'disloyal' camps, women only occupied the 
ranks of the disloyal in the Witzieshoek Commission's 
report. This indictment of African women can be viewed as 
part of a broader public discourse castigating them in 
particular contexts, such as the towns. 
96 Witzieshoek Commission of Enquiry, pp. 7-8-9. 
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Tribal Authority 
In order to authenticate the tribal system, the 
Commission romanticized it. When examining the causes of 
unrest in Witzieshoek, the Commission maintained that 
In other 
brought 
wrecked 
[i]n order to fully understand the position, it 
is necessary to realise that before the Native 
Trust and Land Act came in to operation in 
1936, The Natives of Witzieshoek had for 
generations been living according to their old 
tribal customs, with little interference from 
the Department. 97 
words, the 'new and drastic change' which was 
about by the Department was presented as having 
the perfect harmony of tribal existence. 98 The 
Commission presented this as one of the main causes of a 
state of unrest in the minds of the inhabitants of 
Witzieshoek. •rt is easy to understand that such a change 
would cause a natural dissatisfaction in the mind of the 
ordinary Native. 199 
Chief Charles Mopeli was an important figure in the 
Commission's report and it was careful to maintain his 
integrity as an authoritative person throughout. 
We feel that it is essential to mention that 
this attitude [lawful] can, or should be, 
attributed to the wise leadership of Chief 
Charles Mopeli who during the whole of this 
difficult period brought his influence to bear 
in an exemplary manner. If this had not been 
97 Ibid., p. 10. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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the case, the situation would have in all 
possibility have taken a serious turn. 100 
In order to bolster Chief Charles and the tribal male 
authority he represented, the Commission took advantage 
of the split within the conununity to construct a group 
outside of that authority. Right from the start of the 
report, the Commission distinguished between 'loyal' and 
'disloyal' factions within the conununity. 101 Whilst a 
split had occurred within the community during the 
rebellion, the Commission's description and understanding 
of it was crude. The community was not divided by a clear 
line as the Commission intimated, as support for the 
rebel leaders was juxtaposed to support for Chief 
Charles. If anything, the di vision between rebels and 
loyalists was hazy; it was only among the leadership that 
the split was overt. The rebel leaders had to defy the 
authority of Chief Charles in order to fulfil their 
function as leaders of the rebellion. However, despite 
this, they continued to claim that they had no wish to 
undermine his authority. 
By distinguishing between the Chief and disloyal members 
of the community, the Commission was able to reiterate 
the legitimacy of tribal authority and cast the rebels' 
authority as illegitimate. 
100 
101 
Mopelyana and his three followers came into 
open conflict with the officials of the 
Department and the movement under his 
leadership known as 'lingangele' or the 'Leihlo 
la sechaba', whose activities were directed 
against the Trust, gained increasing strength. 
Ibid., p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 3. 
199 
The campaign against the trust, its officers 
and the Chief intensified. 102 
Although their representation of the split in the 
community 
threat to 
was underdeveloped, it was rooted in 
Chief Charles I authority. This was a 
a real 
menace 
which he had verbalised himself. 
Chief Charles Mopeli wrote to the Native 
Commissioner and reviewed the position 
[February, 1950). He stated that Paulus Howell 
Mopeli was the instigator of trouble and that 
he, 'Mopelyana', worked hand in glove with the 
Witzieshoek Vigilance Association, which body 
had caused 
surveyed. 103 
trouble when the lands were 
Chief Charles' assertion of links between Mopelyana and 
the Vigilance Association supported the notion of a 
source outside the reserve and outside tribal authority. 
It is of great importance to point out that 
this organisation has no place in the normal 
tribal life and that it has repeatedly been 
condemned by the present Chief. The aims that 
it purports to serve are amply served by the 
Chief and his councillors. 104 
Thus, the Commission's distinction between the Chief and 
the 'disloyal section' of the community was embedded in 
Chief Charles' testimony. The Commission's so-called 
conclusions were hence more reflections of the Chief I s 
opinion, fears and perceptions, than an unbiased 
evaluation. By setting up the rebels and the Association 
102 Ibid. , p. 4. 
103 Ibid. , p. 8. 
104 Ibid. , p. 13. 
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as opponents of the tribal authority, the Commission 
ignored the tremendous importance of the disruption of 
that authority to the rebels, as well as their 
characteristically 'tribal' discourse. 
This study has already indicated that the rebellion was 
about reinstating the •tribal' way of life and more 
specifically re-asserting the patriarchal authority of 
the chief. By demanding a return to the 'tribal system' 
the rebels were displaying their loyalty to Chief 
Charles' authority rather than disputing it. The 
Commission's rigid distinction between 'loyal' and 
'disloyal• factions denied the rebels the space in the 
report to express their 'tribal' allegiance. 
Furthermore, the 
rebellion into 
Commission's 
'Unrest 
on 
and 
the 
decision to 
Disturbances' 
divide the 
effectively 
closed the lid rebels' association with 
•tribalism• . 105 The Commission maintained that •unrest• 
was a state of mind' in opposition to disturbances 
which were 'an outward active manifestation of a state of 
mind•. 106 The assumption was that unrest as such could be 
condoned whereas disturbances could not. To this end the 
Commission argued that those members of the community who 
were loyal to the Chief had legitimate reasons for 
unrest. It was these loyal members of the community who 
had behaved in an exemplary manner. 
105 
They conducted themselves as a community who 
had a bona fide grievance which they 
persistently and rightly brought to the notice 
of the proper authority without any unlawful or 
improper demonstration. 107 
Ibid., p. 10. 
l0 6 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., p. 12. 
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In contrast to the causes for the disturbances, according 
to the Commission, the causes of the unrest were closely 
associated with 'radical and unpopular changes in the 
tribal life of the Natives•. 108 Tribalism or disruption of 
the tribal process was predictably excluded from the 
reasons for the disturbances. The theory that the 
disturbances had their source outside the reserve as well 
as outside tribal authority was a deliberate attempt to 
castigate and condemn the actions of the rebels, while 
conveniently elevating the Chief. The discussion of the 
Witzieshoek community was therefore carefully constructed 
to lead the reader to this particular conclusion. 
Moralizing about the Department of Native Affairs 
The Witzieshoek Commission had set out to establish the 
'facts' of the situation in Witzieshoek. 109 As a body set 
up by the Department of Native Affairs but with its own 
authority, it essentially had the licence to moralize 
about the actions of the Department. The Commission, 
though, tended to castigate the actions of the Department 
of Native Affairs operating under the United Party 
government, leaving the Nationalists relatively 
untarnished. 
The Commission concluded that one of the reasons for the 
the •unrest' within the community was that 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid., 
110 Ibid., 
[t]he Department did not recognise or 
appreciate the various danger signs which 
appeared from time to time and followed a 
policy which further disturbed the Natives. 110 
p. 3. 
p. 12. 
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The Commission's main problem with the Department was its 
actions before the 1948 elections and thus before the 
Nationalists came to power. It bemoaned the Department's 
'powerlessness' in 1946 and 1947, arguing that the 
Department's 
Mopelyana and 
cattle for 
inability to initiate charges against 
others, after they refused to submit their 
culling, effectively indicated to the 
Witzieshoek community that 'the Trust as such had no 
status in the Reserve' . 111 The Commission found this state 
of affairs puzzling, and a further indictment on the 
Department. 
[T] heir continued successes and the apparently 
powerless attitude of the Department is a 
matter which greatly suprises the Commission, 
considering the enormous powers vested by 
legislation in the Supreme Court which could 
have been exercised at a much earlier stage. 112 
The Department and the Minister of Native Affairs, in 
particular, were criticized for an earlier decision not 
to appoint a Commission of Enquiry, despite the 
Additional Native Commission's recommendation to do so in 
1947. 
111 Ibid., 
112 Ibid., 
113 Ibid., 
In the light of all the evidence, we are 
obliged to state that the decision of the 
Minister was a very unfortunate one. We are of 
the opinion that a detailed and frank 
investigation by independent investigators was 
justified at that stage and that it would have 
prevented a situation, which was bad at that 
time, from developing in the direction and 
assuming the proportions that it did. 113 
p. 4. 
p. 13. 
P· 11. 
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In contrast, its criticism in 1950 was restricted to a 
statement made by the Under-Secretary of the Department 
of Development and not the Department of Native Affairs. 
'A further set-back to co-operation by the Natives was a 
statement made by the Under-Secretary of the Department 
[Development] on the 18th January, 1950' . 114 
The Commission's apparent reluctance in this section to 
point fingers at the Nationalists is interesting, 
especially in the light of its subsequent recommendations 
which in some cases clashed with Nationalist thinking. 
Verwoerd was quick to point out in a debate in parliament 
in 1951 that the Chairman of the Commission was 'probably 
one of the most impartial, most reasonable and most 
sensible magistrates we have' . 115 
This kind of discrepancy within the discourse of the 
Commission is yet another indication of the fact that it 
tended to mirror the on-going debate on Native Affairs 
rather than to represent a specific viewpoint. This was 
articulated, again, in the parliamentary debates on the 
Commission. Verwoerd claimed in 1951 that Eyles was an 
'adherent of the United Party' whilst endorsing his 
criticism of Van der Byl, the ex- Minister of Native 
Affairs. 116 In his defence, Van Der Byl pointed out the 
ambivalence of Verwoerd's position. 
114 Ibid. 
According to the recommendation contained in 
this report, the permanent industrial worker is 
to live in the town and have a say in his own 
Affairs. the Minister is very anxious to quote 
115 HAD, (1951), Vol. 74, col. 3066 
116 Ibid. 
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the part where I am criticized, but is he 
anxious to adopt the other side as well? 117 
Conclusion 
The Witz ieshoek Commission of Enquiry was not only an 
active participant in the debate on the 'native 
question', but it also reflected the variety of opinions 
expressed in the debate. The contradictions and 
inconsistencies in its own argument reflect the 
incongruities in the ideologies on the party political 
front. It vacillated between advocating the policies of 
the 'practical I and I puritan' Nationalists and those of 
the United Party. Ultimately, it produced its own blend 
of policy which elicited criticism and praise, sometimes 
from the same quarters. 
The Commission's representation of 
community was guided by proposed 
the Witzieshoek 
solutions to the 
'problem' of 'native' policy. In its determination to 
elevate the chief and the tribal system he represented, 
it produced a crude explanation of the rebellion. Women 
were the biggest victims of the Witzieshoek report. They 
were not only silenced by the Commission's report but 
were also constructed negatively. 
117 HAD, (1951), Vol. 76, col. 7854. 
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Postscript 
Witzieshoek: the aftermath 
The crushing of the Witzieshoek rebellion did not herald 
the end of resistance in the Witzieshoek reserve. In 
1952, the Native Commissioner reported to the Chief 
Native Commissioner that the women employed to repair the 
damage caused by the rebels had protested about low 
wages, refusing to return to work until they were given 
an increase. In the same report, the Native Commissioner 
complained that he was still experiencing I trouble I at 
Namoha, Paulus Howell Mopeli 1 s headquarters, and that he 
had received a request from the chief to expel Mopelyana 
once the latter had served his jail sentence. 1 Mopelyana 
was subsequently banned from Witzieshoek and never 
returned, but, despite his expulsion, the spirit of the 
rebellion lived on. 2 The authority of the chief remained 
precarious and the members of the community continued to 
air their grievances in meetings of the Chiefs and 
people. The Witzieshoek reserve was the first to embrace 
the bantustan policy of the Nationalist Party, and in a 
bid to entrench his legitimacy with the Nationalists, 
Charles Mopeli was the first chief to accept the system 
of Tribal Authorities in 1953. 3 
A Historiography 
The present examination of the Witzieshoek rebellion has 
attempted to approach the Witzieshoek community from a 
fresh perspective. In order to test more directly the 
approaches of the few historians who have written about 
l SAB: NTS, 9779, 961/400, part 2, NC to CNC, 15/4/1952. 
2 Interview, Shan Beerstecher with Mr Modernwame. 
3 UNISA: AAS219, Interview Prof Kotze with Mr Mohali. 
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the rebellion, it is necessary to examine their work 
within the context of South African historiography. 
The historiography of the Witz ieshoek rebellion reveals 
wider historiographical trends between 1976 and 1983. The 
1970s saw the onset of a new approach to the writing of 
history. The doctrines of liberal 
challenged by marxist interpretations 
historians were 
in which the 
hegemony of capital was stressed, and its impact on black 
South Africans subjected to intense scrutiny. 
Colin Bundy asserts that 'the relationship between 
politics and scholarship in South Africa is immediate and 
pervasive'. 4 The first historians to emerge out of the 
1960s were influenced by 'the climate of repression' 
characteristic of the country at the time'. 5 They were 
driven by a desire to account for the 'obvious success 
the South African state had controlling the 
contradictions over which it presided' . 6 Their work was 
distinguished by a materialist approach, giving class 
precedence over race and gender. As a result, African 
nationalism, racism and the influence of gender were 
underplayed. Bozzoli and Delius label these 
methodological theories as 'realist' as they combined 
empiricism with categorization of theories and concepts. 7 
Structuralists also inhabited the South African academic 
space in the 1970s. They merged a structuralist approach 
with marxism and were mainly concerned with finding the 
answer to 'why the South African state had managed to 
4 C Bundy, 'An Image of Its Own Past? Towards a Comparison of 
American and South African Historiography', Radical History 
Review, 46/7, (1990), p. 139. 
5 B Bozzoli and P Delius, 'Radical History and South African 
Society•, Radical History Review, 46/7, ( 1990), p. 19. 
6 Ibid., p. 20. 
7 Ibid., p. 21. 
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accumulate and retain such an extraordinary degree of 
power; [and] how it was able to oversee the process of 
capitalist accumulation with such success. 18 They divided 
the history of capitalism in South Africa into a series 
of epoches, each defined by a new ruling elite and by a 
particular interplay between classes. 9 These historians 
could not escape eventual censure and, Bozzoli and Delius 
contend, were castigated as functionalists and Stalinists 
whose work was typified by 'mechanistic rigidities', a 
lack of appreciation, and a systematic evaluation, of the 
relationship of the oppressed classes to capitalism. 10 
A third group of historians working in the 1970s 
comprised Africanists whose primary aim was to redress 
the imbalance of history which had largely ignored the 
agency of the African populace. Their work was often 
embedded in the revisionist tradition. The realities of 
Africans' experiences informed their work and their 
initial optimism concerning independence from colonial 
rule was replaced by a determination to explain the 
underdeveloped nature of African societies post-
independence.11 Bozzoli and Delius indicate that although 
underdevelopment theories continued to influence the work 
of some Africanists in the 1970s, others who were 
investigating the 'internal dynamics of African societies 
and African initiative' struggled to accommodate these 
ideas. 12 
Sean Maroney inhabited the Africanist enclave. His key 
argument was that the Witzieshoek rebellion was a 
8 Ibid., p. 24. 
g Ibid. 
lO Ibid. 
11 Amongst these historians were Colin Bundy and William Beinart. 
12 Bozzol i and Delius, 'Radical History and South African Society' , 
p. 25. 
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'typical "peasant" response to administrative 
interference in, and control of, household management•, 13 
as well as a response by the inhabitants to 'their plight 
as an increasingly deprived group within the South 
African economy. ' 14 He examined the cornmuni ty' s response 
to its 'pattern of underdevelopment•. 15 
In his investigation, Maroney also made use of marxist 
theories, intersecting these with his approach to 
underdevelopment. This however, precluded an exploration 
of the differential impact of underdevelopment on men and 
women in Wi tzieshoek and the resultant breakdown of the 
community's mechanisms of control. He focussed on the 
'development of a peasantry 1 , 16 plotting the transition 
of the community from a viable peasant economy to one 
which was characterized by 'a familiar pattern of 
overcrowding, taxation, migrancy, inefficient production 
and increasing migrancy [ sic] 1 • 17 According to Bozzoli 
and Delius, the wealth of information generated by 
Africanist studies focussing on local experiences was 
enriched by the latter's examination of 'the interaction 
between the societies they were studying and the 
processes involved in the prolonged and painful birth of 
an industrial economy. 118 
Maroney argued that the deterioration of Witzieshoek was 
due to the demands of white agriculture and industry for 
labour on the one hand, and government legislation, such 
as the Land Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act 
13 Maroney, '1950 Witzieshoek Rebellion•, p. 2. 
14 Ibid., p. 11. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
18 Bozzoli and Delius, 'Radical History and South African Society', 
p. 26. 
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of 1937, on the other. He subscribed to the cheap labour 
power theory of Harold Wolpe, one of the early 
structuralists. Wolpe had propounded a top-down argument 
that the capitalist sector had exploited migrant 
labourers and their relationship with the reserve 
economies in order to pay lower wages. Maroney maintained 
that the needs of farming and industrial capital 
precipitated the transformation of Witzieshoek into a 
'high-density labour pool' . 19 The Land Act had led to 
'increasing pressure on the arable land of the Reserve', 
resulting in increased rates of migrancy as well as 
escalating landlessness. 2° Consistent with historical 
writing in the 1970s, his analysis was primarily 
concerned with capital accumulation. 
This kind of approach to South African history was 
important as it entailed an evaluation of the 
relationship between capital, the state and the 'black 
masses' and their transition from pre-capitalist modes of 
production to capitalist ones. Historians such as Maroney 
though, have been criticized for 'economic reductionism', 
for casting the black population 
capital accumulation and for 
as passive victims of 
ignoring the subtle 
interplay of discourses on the South African landscape. 21 
Baruch Hirson's investigation into the Witzieshoek 
rebellion was also revisionist. He compared the 
Witzieshoek rebellion with a sequence 
Zoutpansberg in the early 1940s. 
incorporated a relatively detailed 
reserves• interaction with the state 
19 Maroney, 'Witzieshoek Rebellion', p. 4. 
20 Ibid., p. 5. 
of events in the 
His arguments 
account of the 
and capitalism. 
21 P Hetherington, 'Women in South Africa; the Historiography in 
English', International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 26/2, (1993), p. 241. 
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Hirson stressed that like the Zoutpansberg, in 
Witzieshoek 
there was the same redistribution of land, and 
the reduction of area that could be ploughed; 
the same form of resistance and co-operation 
with a parallel urban organization; and the 
same confrontation with the police. In addition 
there was repeated culling of cattle, and this 
exacerbated the peasants' bitterness. 22 
It would have been useful if Hirson had attempted a more 
detailed comparison of the two rebellions. He failed to 
investigate the relevance of divisions other than class. 
For example, one important issue he ignored was whether 
women participatfeh in either or both revolts. Such an 
aA')..ysis would have shed light on the subtleties and 
complexities of each reserve•s interaction with the state 
and on the proletarianization of Africans in the 
different areas. 
Hirson's examination of Witzieshoek and the Zoutpansberg 
included an analysis of aspects of the internal dynamics 
of each society and its initiatives, but his primary 
focus was the state and capital accumulation. He argued 
that both rebellions were doomed in the sense that they 
could not overturn the Land Act, which was there to 
ensure that 'the land could not provide a living for most 
of the peasants' . 23 
The 19805 heralded a new historiographical trend, with 
new theories and methods. The 1976 Soweto riots, the 
development of the ideology of black consciousness and 
the growth and radicalization of new organizations and 
22 B Hirson, 'Rural Revolt in South Africa: 1937-1951', in collected 
seminars, Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 
20th Centuries, 8/22, (University of London, 1976), p. 123. 
23 Ibid., p. 127. 
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associations had 'politicised the educational and 
cultural domain. •24 The response in the hallways of 
knowledge was to revise contemporary ideas about history. 
Studies were increasingly inf armed by attempts to 
'incorporate notions of culture and consciousness into 
that of "class". ' 25 This led to a fresh analysis of 
history, appropriately labelled radical history. 26 
Radical historians viewed the historical process 'from 
below•. They substituted a top-down analysis for one 
which tried to incorporate the notion of human agency 
into an understanding of the state. They realized that 
African, and indeed South African, experiences were 
unique and had to be viewed within their particular 
contexts. Their concern was with how the active 
engagement of African societies whad shaped processes 
such as capitalist penetration. They went beyond the 
purely economic concept of class, acknowledging that 
class could not be understood without reference 
to the divisions produced, not only by factors 
such as proletarianization, but also by 
inherited and imported cleavages of race, 
religion and other cultural forms, chiefly 
authority, region, ethnicity, age, community 
form and gender which in turn were refashioned 
by multiple popular struggles and processes of 
change. 27 
Within this framework, notions of daily action and 
response, nationalism, the state, and the interaction 
24 Bundy, 'An Image of Its Own past?', p. 138. 
25 Bozzoli and Delius, 'Radical History and South African Society', 
p. 2 9. 
26 Examples of historians include Belinda Bozzoli and Cherryl Walker. 
27 Bozzoli and Delius, 'Radical History and South African Society', 
p. 31. 
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between town and countryside were illuminated, and a new 
understanding emerged. 28 An example of this is William 
Beinart's analysis of migrant labour in Pondoland. He 
challenged the assertions structuralists had made, and in 
particular refuted the 'cheap labour thesis 129 in an 
attempt to 'restore the initiative and process to 
dominated societies and classes. ' 30 His main argument 
was that migrant labour 'stemmed from attempts to 
strengthen the existing order within the chieftaincy, or 
[that] ... 11,. could stem from fundamental material 
impoverishment. 131 
D A Kotze's analysis of the Witzieshoek rebellion 
encapsulated this 'bottom-up' strategy. He endeavoured to 
explain the variety of causes of the rebellion, stressing 
the sense of 'deprivation and powerlessness' among the 
Wi tzieshoek inhabitants as a result of an inadequately 
planned and poorly executed development policy. 32 His 
analysis went beyond class (and hence beyond Maroney and 
Hirson) and looked at Witzieshoek as a region, examining 
its chieftainship, its interaction with the broader white 
community, the white traders and officials of the Trust, 
as well as the divisions within its own ranks. 33 
Tom Lodge's approach towards resistance and Witzieshoek 
also reflects historiographical trends of the early 
1980s. He introduced a chapter on 'resistance in the 
countryside' by explaining that the 1940s, 1950s and 
28 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
29 W Ruiters, 'A Historiography of Migrant Labour: Selected Works 
1920-1980', (Honours Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 
1989), p. 51. 
30 Ibid., p. 61. 
31 Ibid., p. 62. 
32 DA Kotz.e, 'The Witz.ieshoek Revolt 1940-1950', African Studies 
Journal, 4/1, (1982), p. 127. 
33 Ibid., pp. 129-138. 
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1960s were characterized by state intervention as a 
result of new economic and political constraints. 34 The 
consequences for the reserves were that 'established 
social relationships were disrupted, traditional 
authority was to be robbed of whatever legitimacy it 
retained, and the area of conflict between the people and 
the government expanded rapidly.• 35 He examined the 
Witzieshoek rebellion within this framework. 
Lodge felt that betterment was an 'attempt to deal 
systematically' with the declining level of production in 
the reserves. The result was 'a substantial 
reorganization of life' within them. 36 The population of 
the reserves was •subjected 
supposedly 
to an increased range of 
controls and self-imposed voluntary 
measures' . 37 These were 'extremely unpopular' among 
reserve inhabitants and the 'interference by Native 
Affairs Department officials into matters which had 
previously been the concern of chiefs or headmen 
reduced the popular standing of chiefs and headmen and 
could conflict with the principle that each household had 
sufficient land for its need. •38 
The history of the Witzieshoek rebellion written by 
historians from Maroney through to Lodge reflects the 
development of historiography in South Africa. Each new 
analysis of the rebellion built on its predecessors, 
broadening its focus and refining its interpretation. The 
present study, 
has aimed both 
challenge it. 
'Witzieshoek: women, cattle and rebellion' 
to augment this historiography, and to 
34 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, p. 261. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 263. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 265. 
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Gender blindness 
A common thread throughout the Witzieshoek historiography 
is a tendency to disregard the categories of gender and 
women. As this particular interpretation focussed on the 
implication of gender relations for the rebellion and for 
women, this anomaly requires specific attention. Bundy 
argues that South Africa is characterized by 
'historiographical under-development•. 39 One result of 
this is that 'entire areas of the past remain blank 1 • 40 
The lack of gendered history, in his opinion, is the 
'most glaring' example of this. 41 Women and gender 
started receiving serious attention from academics in 
South African history departments at the end of the 
1970s, schools such as the structuralists and early 
Africanists having ignored them. Women's histories 
concentrated on women specifically while gender histories 
broadened their focus to examine the impact of gender 
relations and gender identities on the past. 
Maroney's analysis typically disregarded women and gender 
completely. He argued that the rebellion was 'merely 
sparked off by the cattle culling of the 40s 142 • What he 
fails to observe is that cattle were not only central to 
the rebellion, but also to a specific set of gender 
relations. Cattle culling was the final challenge to the 
existing gender organization of the community. As cattle 
formed an integral part of the control of women, a threat 
to the former constituted a threat to the whole 
community. In essence, culling was the one challenge the 
39 Bundy, 'An image of Its Own Past?', p. 135. 
4o Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Maroney, 'Witzieshoek rebellion•, p. 5. 
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community could not accept. Maroney' s study disregarded 
this, analyzing the relationship surrounding cattle at a 
superficial level. 
Ironically, Maroney did point out the centrality of 
cattle to the community, arguing that 'it was government 
interference in this area of production [livestock 
management] which precipitated the 1951 Witzieshoek 
rebellion. 143 In his account the practice of bohali was 
not mentioned, let alone its significance. Writing before 
there had been any real development in gender studies, 
Maroney predictably focussed on cattle as 'the tribal 
equivalent of money', 'as consumption goods' and to 
'provide hides'; he did not account for their other 
primary function to women, as draught animals in the 
ploughing season or their use by men as a means of 
acquiring and controlling women. 44 
While acknowledging women's existence, Hirson failed to 
distinguish their experiences from those of their men. 
'It was the men and the women who were called to produce 
cattle for culling, or to accept reduced plots, who had 
to take action. 145 By failing to examine the differential 
impact of culling or production on women and on men, 
Hirson succumbed to a gender-blind approach. 
Hirson's preoccupation with the land meant that he 
highlighted its importance above all else. In the case of 
Witzieshoek, the issue of land was bound up with the 
issue of cattle and therefore the control of women. 
Hirson ignored this, placing the productive and 
reproductive capacities of women on the periphery of 
Witzieshoek society when in fact they occupied centre 
stage. Moreover, the organization of the community was 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Hirson, 'Rural revolt in South Africa', p. 128. 
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crucial to an understanding of land as an area of 
conflict between the inhabitants and the Trust. 
Kotze's appreciation of gender was as poorly developed as 
Maroney I s. His arguments ignored women and their role 
within the productive and reproductive cycle of the 
reserve. On the other hand, Lodge's interpretation showed 
a deeper sensitivity to the categories of women and 
gender. This is not suprising, given that he was writing 
in 1983 after Cheryl Walker had published a path-
breaking article on gender and migrant labour. Walker 
stressed the impact of male migration on women and 
discussed women migrants themselves. 46 Lodge not only 
discussed women in connection with migrancy, but also 
with regard to land reclamation and the Witzieshoek 
rebellion itself. He contended that •women also suffered 
from the new system of land allocation• 47 instituted 
along with reclamation, because land was usually allotted 
to household heads. According to Lodge, women 'played an 
unusually active role for what was still a very 
patriarchal society' . 48 
However, Lodge I s work on Witzieshoek did not adequately 
account for the role of women and the impact of gender 
relations. In the discussion of cattle, he contended that 
'cattle represented wealth, savings and security', yet 
failed to trace the link to women and their ability to 
generate surplus. It is interesting to note that Lodge's 
book was published in the same year as Belinda Bozzoli's 
article which accused radical scholars of lacking 
'awareness of gender issues•. 49 
46 Walker, 'Gender and the Development of the Migrant Labour'. 
47 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 265. 
48 Ibid., p. 273. 
49 Hetherington, 'Women in South Africa', p. 247. 
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By ignoring the 
interrelationship 
crucial 
between men 
role 
and 
played 
women 
by 
in 
the 
the 
organization of the community and in the rebellion, the 
Witzieshoek historiography to date has failed to uncover 
the rebellion's complexity. 
Anna Davin argues that 'working towards a complete 
understanding of the past encompassing the complementary 
and sometimes conflictual diversities of both women's and 
men's experience' involves more than just transforming 
historical practice but includes a bid to help in the 
long term 'transformation of society•. 50 The present 
examination of the history of the Witzieshoek rebellion 
comes at a time of transformation within the South 
African state. The role of women in society, and African 
women in particular, is being debated at all levels of 
society. The focus on this particular rebellion and the 
highlighting of women and gender relations within it, may 
contribute to these debates. 
This study has illustrated the struggles waged by women 
in their own interests, and the extent to which they were 
breaking out of the patriarchal mould in the 1940s and 
1950s. It casts doubt on contemporary claims by 
particular African men concerning their authority over 
African women, as it provides an example of female 
insurgency, at least partly, against such authority. 
Yet, at the same time, this study has contested the 
widely-held belief that women were universaly oppressed 
and exploited by 'customary• practices. In its 
examination of the gender relations in the Witzieshoek 
community, it has underlined the centralily of women to 
the productive and reproductive cycle of the community 
and the status and power they enjoyed as a result. 
SO A Davin, 'Redressing the Balance or Transforming the Art? The 
British Experience' in s s Kleinberg (ed), Retrieving 
Women's History: Changing Perceptions of the Role of 
Women in Politics and Society, (Oxford, 1988), p. 78. 
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The transformation of South African society in the 1990s 
is leading to a re-examination of South African history 
itself. The employment of gender as a tool of analysis in 
this process of rediscovery is vital. African women are 
no longer lost to history. However, their past 
experiences, 
be uncovered 
their 'triumphs' and their 'fears' 
further. The social and cultural 
need to 
roles of 
such women, their relationships with men and the state in 
the context of the dynamics of class and race, in 
specific contexts, require explication. The present 
investigation of 'Witzieshoek: women, cattle and 
rebellion' is part of that process. 
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